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Parametric and Semiparametric Efficiency Frontiers in Fishery Analysis: Overview and Case Study on the Falkland Islands

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Abstract

Provision of adequately valued individual transferable quotas and effort quotas is essential for sustainability and profitability of a fishery. Despite possible misleading consequences for policy-making, the extent to which fishery inefficiency estimates and rankings may depend on the model used, has received less attention. This paper first reviews determinants of fishers’ behaviour under regulated harvesting, with the Falkland Islands as focus case. Next, a ‘best scenario’ long-term equilibrium framework is outlined, under a regime of transferable effort quotas and fishing seasons as implemented in the Islands, followed by an overview of panel data stochastic frontier models, with specific regard to fisheries. To test hypotheses and impact of a mainly ITEQ-based regime for Falkland fisheries, two parametric and one semiparametric model rely on different assumptions on frontiers and inefficiency scores. Relative to companies operating in Falkland seas, regression estimates highlight the relevance of economies of scale, vessel ownership, and climatic factors among others, with improved cost effectiveness, and revenue efficiency frontier-enhancing/inefficiency-reducing effects, following the implementation of the new regime. Within either modelling approach, inefficiency differs marginally across regression specifications, but mismatches in levels and rankings emerge between parametric and semiparametric models. Relative to southern hake catches by Falkland trawlers, the semiparametric approach suggests upward shifts in output frontiers under the new fishery regime, with inefficiency scores substantially unaltered between two functional specifications.

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Notes

  1. Although catch share-based management regimes, of which ITQs represent a modality, cover 2% of fisheries worldwide, their contribution to global fish catch landings is nearly one third—of which up to three fourths originate from ITQs—(Libecap 2017; Birkenbach et al. 2016). While the 2006 Falkland fishery regime is based mainly on effort quotas and to limited extent on catch quotas, in the Islands the term ITQ refers also to ITEQ.

  2. Additionally, if the government is the provider of fisheries management services, this will cause distortions in the “collective incentive [of ITQ holders] …to maximise the net return from the fishery”, due to omitted management costs (Arnason 2007: 374; for further arguments, see Bromley 2009). However, many countries and fishery jurisdiction territories, including the Falkland Islands, have cost recovery programmes through fees and taxes to fisheries, and in most cases, the economic benefits from fishery management upgrades substantially outweigh the additional costs (Mangin et al. 2018).

  3. As possible explanation, since fixed costs include the opportunity costs of alternative uses of physical and human capital, a primary goal of fishing companies is to accomplish sufficient net returns to cover at least fixed costs (Anderson 2005). Revenue (/cost) inefficiency derives from either or both of two sources, namely output-oriented (/input-oriented) technical inefficiency and output (/input) allocative inefficiency in light of prevailing relative output (/input) prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000: 51–55). Under optimal size of operation—no scale economies or diseconomies—, input- and output-oriented measures of technical efficiency, yield equivalent results (Coelli et al. 2005: 180; Farrell 1957: 259).

  4. Moreover, effectiveness of economic incentives also depends on the composition of rights holders, with the Falkland Loligo fishery formed by a limited number of companies and vessels for use rights, and the local government being the only holder of ‘property’ rights (Squires et al. 2016: 17). From a report by a quota-holding company, “the ITQ system has enabled the sector to work together more easily, as we are no longer in direct competition for licences… The ‘old policy’ has run its course, and a positive impact of ITQ is that [companies] can maximise profitability rather than be side-tracked by embarking on routes which detract from this.”.

  5. As typical of the Falkland Loligo squid, uncertainty in stock assessment for a single species fishery as Loligo is considered to make fishing effort caps—with VUs related to catchability and mortality rates—biologically more accurate than fish catch limits (Strauss and Harte 2013: 4; Weitzman 2002; Jaeger 2000).

  6. One should notice that the Falkland Islands government has consistently avoided budget deficits, by holding contingency reserves at a level 2.5 times higher than annual public expenditures, as a safeguard for unexpected requirements (FI Association, July 20, 2020; www.fiassociation.com).

  7. While referring to the case of the Falklands, this section draws on studies on optimal sustainable rent and management of regulated fisheries (Elleby and Jensen 2018; Higashida and Takarada 2009, 2011; Woodward and Bishop 1999; Pascoe 1997; Anderson 1994). In a theoretically ideal rent-maximising small coalition, quota holders act as a “single member” with common long-term sustainability goals, with no myopic behaviour and an inefficiency loss, due to negative externalities, virtually removed through the transferable quota regime (Hannesson and Kennedy 2009: 59).

  8. Given a future single sum of money F (at time T), a present single sum P (at time 0), and a uniform series A of equal payments at end of each period (1,…T): A = P{r/[1 − (1 + r)−T]} = F{[r (1 + r)−T]/[1 − (1 + r)−T]} = F{r/[(1 + r)T − 1]} = F[A/Fr,T]. A/Fr,T is a sinking-fund deposit factor, i.e. a factor used to calculate a uniform series of end-of-period payments A equivalent to F (given T periods and r interest rate per period).

  9. However, this would imply theoretical limitations for MSY (where F′(B) = 0) as a fishery management target, since it requires fishing costs unrelated to stock size and a zero discount rate (Pearce and Turner 1990).

  10. Relative to economic yield, the literature is not always consistent. Some authors distinguish between MEY and optimal economic yield (OEY), defining MEY as maximum undiscounted resource rent and OEY as largest discounted present and future profits (Clark and Munro 2017). However, MEY and OEY are often synonymous for sustainable catch that maximises the net discounted returns from fishing (Kula 1992: 37). In the presence of a very steep cost function—as theoretical case—, MSY can be associated with negative profits.

  11. Similarly, non-negative annual profit constraints have underlain simulations on optimal fleet effort trajectories, which contributed to management advice for the design of a system of tradable effort units and a dynamic version of MEY targeting for the Northern Prawn Fishery in Australia (Dichmont et al. 2010).

  12. While applicable to other Falkland fisheries, this theoretical background especially refers to Loligo squid, as main target species in the quota-regulated system and principal source of government revenues from fisheries. As common in fisheries management (Martell 2008), a combined strategy of fixed escapement and fixed-exploitation rate policy tools underlies Falkland government decisions on annual limits to fishing effort and catches. Regarding the latter for toothfish, each year a threshold is set at spawning stock biomass (SSB) of 45% of total projected biomass (SSB0): if SSB falls short of this yardstick, gradual reductions of TAC are normally applied (Andrews et al. 2017). Conversely, sustained periods—at least over 3 years—with SSB/SSB0 above 0.5 allow possible TAC increase (FIG 2017: 14).

  13. Among transformation functions, an output distance function reflects the maximal proportional radial expansion of a unit-normalised output vector, given existing input levels. A ‘directional production technology’ distance function measures proportional changes (radial expansion/contraction) in opposite directions of outputs and inputs, with a given technology. Output and input distance functions are special cases of directional distance functions (Färe and Grosskopf 2000). Unlike early directional distance functions, hyperbolic distance functions do not require jointness in desirable vs. non-desirable outputs (Färe et al. 2007).

  14. Revenue and cost functions reflect movements along isorevenue and isocost surfaces, with constant input and output levels respectively, thus being Hicksian—output supply and input demand—functions. A price elasticity derived from a profit function allows for input and output adjustments to price changes, corresponding to a Marshallian function (Wall and Fisher 1988).

  15. To distinguish strictly semiparametric from varying-parameter SF models, such as those formulated by Greene (2005b), Table A (online) refers to the latter as (semi-)parametric. More broadly, one can also distinguish between ‘semi-nonparametric’, if the conditional error distribution is not restricted to a parametric family with finite number of unknown parameters or, relative to SF analysis, no a priori functional form is assumed for the frontier apart from monotonicity and concavity (/convexity) restrictions, and ‘semi-linear’, if regressors enter parametrically and non-parametrically (Kortelainen 2008; Powell 2008). Among models not listed in Table A, Tonini and Pede (2011) and Horrace and Schnier (2015) formulate nonparametric and semiparametric models of stochastic production frontier that account for spatial effects, with applications to agriculture and fisheries, respectively. Likewise, Glass et al. (2014) formulate an SF model with endogenous spatial autoregressive processes.

  16. The constraints in data availability make SF analysis not strictly defined in terms of revenue and costs functions, but only approximations of these functions. Interpretation of parameter results should take into account these limitations. Relative to PU survey and supplementary data concerning subsamples of fishing companies, one variable (Table 1: Tonnage) is highly collinear with years of fishing activity since start of operations in Falkland seas (correlation coefficient [Tonnage-Years] = 0.54, on 165 observations). Two other variables (Crew, Vessel) are highly correlated with total net financial assets of companies ([Crew-Asset] = 0.73 and [Vessel-Asset] = 0.57, besides [Vessel-Crew] = 0.62 and [Tonnage-Crew] = 0.71).

  17. Additionally, a lagged revenue-cost ratio—or, as alternative specification, a variable capturing changes in terms of lagged efficiency-inefficiency ratio—introduces a dynamic element in SF model estimation. This allows to focus on medium-term effects, by avoiding a static measure of inefficiency more centred on the short run in small T panels (Emvalomatis 2012: 9).

  18. As indicated under Table 2, HN and EXP stand for half-normal or exponential distribution of the stochastic inefficiency component uit, respectively. The statistical analysis and econometric models were run using Limdep 10/11 and NLogit 5/6 (Greene 2012), complemented with PcGive 10/OxMetrics (Hendry and Doornik 2001).

  19. For instance, given an estimated inverse scale parameter θ and standard error σv, model RE-EXP1 yields σu = 1.39 and λ = 3.09, which falls short of σu and λ of its half-normal analogue (Table 2: RE-HN1). Relative to costs, model RE-EXP2 yields σu = 0.901 and λ = 2.197, which fall short of σu and λ of the same specification with half-normally distributed inefficiency (Table 4: RE-HN8).

  20. Other specifications yielded similar results, as those reported in Table 2. The inclusion in the same regression of lagged revenue-cost ratio and its interaction term with itqown, simultaneously accounting for both, yielded model specifications, which turned out to be over-parameterised, and the same applies to SF PD models with time-varying inefficiency (Table 3). Since a similar distinct pattern for quota holders emerges from TRE SF regressions, the higher responsiveness to lagged revenue-cost ratios does not appear to be due to inflated parameters of these ratios induced by omitted frontier heterogeneity effects.

  21. This concerns at least two quota-holding companies, with spurious effects on the respective cost inefficiency estimates in parametric SF models (with time-invariant or time-dependent inefficiency).

  22. Relative to the pseudo-R2 reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4, one should notice that ρ0 is comparable across models, while ρp refers to respective pooled SF regressions with identical chosen covariates and time-invariant u. As such, comparability for the latter is limited to models with the same specification of the revenue (/cost) frontier equation. Results from Battese and Coelli’s (1995) RE SF model on factors influencing revenue inefficiency, should be weighed up against possible over-parameterisation also in non-augmented regression specifications, due to statistically insignificant inefficiency score standard errors despite large and significant signal-to-noise ratios (Table 3: TD-HN2/3). As for semiparametric models, a TFE SF model that shifts parameter heterogeneity to the mean or variance of the inefficiency distribution tends to suffer from ML convergence problems (Appendix and Table A; Greene 2012: E1594).

  23. Given the log-transformed dependent variable, moving from previous years to years with the new fishery regulations entails: Δfrevenue / frevenuepre-ITQ = [exp(α + δdpost + ε) − exp(α + ε)]/exp(α + ε) = expdpost) − 1.

  24. Relative to a pooled parametric SF regression model applied to a manufacturing firm panel, Baccouche and Kouki (2003) similarly found inefficiency estimates to be unaffected by the choice of a Cobb–Douglas vs. translog functional form.

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Correspondence to Stefano Mainardi.

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The author currently collaborates on projects with colleagues in Kigali, Rwanda, and formerly served as senior economist at the Dept. of Natural Resources, Stanley, Falkland Islands. Insightful comments from anonymous reviewers, M. Kowalski, and colleagues in the Falklands are gratefully acknowledged.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Stochastic Frontiers, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Inefficiency

In SF regression analysis, an outcome variable (yi) is regressed on deterministic and stochastic parts of the efficiency frontier (α + β′xi and vi, respectively), with vi included in an asymmetric compound error εi. Besides the independently and identically normally distributed symmetric random disturbance vi (~ N[0,σv2]), a second, independent component of the compound error is given by a skewed stochastic (inefficiency) term ui (~ N+[0,σu2]), with εi = (viui) in production, revenue and profit frontiers, and εi = (vi + ui) in cost frontiers. In the seminal study by Aigner et al. (1977), xi, vi and ui were assumed to be mutually independent, and firm-specific effects were absorbed into the inefficiency term. Since the mid-1980s, SF panel data (PD) models have striven, each with its own advantages and shortcomings, to distinguish inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity (Table A [online]). Apart from an idiosyncratic random error vit, individual-specific heterogeneity (αi(t)) and inefficiency (ui(t)) can have time-invariant or time-varying unobserved elements. Without prior information, disentangling the two components through SF PD models, based on observed data, is subject to empirical uncertainty.

Conventional fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators redress either one or the other of the restrictive assumptions underlying the cross-section SF model. FE SF measures inefficiency as a distribution-free gap from maximum (/minimum in SF cost functions) firm-specific parameter (Table A: FE-SF), thus not complying with an absolute yardstick of efficiency. In the FE SF model by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), all time-invariant effects are part of inefficiency and the frontier is likely to have an upward bias in small-T panels, thus overestimating inefficiency scores (Kim and Schmidt 2000: 96). Conversely, in RE SF the inefficiency component complies with a unit-value yardstick, but it is tightly parameterised, and assumed to be stochastically independent from the explanatory variables. This is often unrealistic, since inefficiency can vary with quality and use of inputs, and persistent inefficiency will be ‘learnt’ by firms, thus leading to adjustments in input choices. Alternative RE SF specifications relax this assumption, by testing for partial dependence on firm-specific effects, including the intermediate case that only some inefficiency stays with a firm (Pitt and Lee 1981).

Beyond these differences, both SF PD estimators treat inefficiency as structural, with no substantial learning through rethinking on past decisions. To better distinguish unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency, SF PD estimation methods have undergone substantial revisions. Battese and Coelli (1992/1995) formulate two parametric RE models: one based on monotone time dependency of half-normally or truncated normally distributed inefficiency (uit), which declines, remains constant, or increases given a parameter η > 0, ≈ 0 or < 0, respectively (Eq. [1b1]), and another where inefficiency depends on a vector of firm-specific determinants (Eq. [1b2]).

$$ y_{it} = \upalpha +\upbeta ^{{\prime }} x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} $$
(1a)
$$ \varepsilon_{it} = v_{it} - u_{it} \quad \left( {v_{it} \sim {\text{N}}\left[ {0,\upsigma _{v}^{2} } \right],u_{it} = exp\left[ { -\upeta \left( {t - T} \right)} \right] \sim {\text{N}}^{ + } \left[ {\upmu _{u|t} ,\upsigma _{u}^{2} } \right]} \right) $$
(1b1)
$$ \varepsilon_{it} = v_{it} - u_{it} \quad \left( {v_{it} \sim {\text{N}}\left[ {0,\upsigma _{v}^{2} } \right],u_{it} = exp\left[ {\upeta ^{{\prime }} {\text{z}}_{{{\text{it}}}} } \right] \sim {\text{N}}^{ + } \left[ {\upmu _{u|z} ,\upsigma _{u}^{2} } \right]} \right) $$
(1b2)

Other SF PD models have focused on groupwise heterogeneity, modelled through multivariate truncated normal distributions and/or prior information on sample separation in switching regression (Table A [online]: HET-SF; SW-SF), and hence fall in between parametric and fully-fledged semiparametric approaches. Relative to the latter, true FE and RE models assume unobserved heterogeneity to be time-invariant (Greene 2007: 154; the term ‘true’ just serves to define concisely the newly formulated models). In a true FE (TFE) model, individual-specific dummies capture heterogeneity as shifts in production (/cost) or inefficiency. In a true RE (TRE) model, heterogeneity affects frontier locations and/or inefficiency distributions, thus being a special case of hierarchical random-parameter model. A TRE SF model (also defined as random constants model and estimated by MSL; Greene 2005a, 2012: R24) is written as follows:

$$ y_{it} = \upalpha _{i} +\upbeta ^{{\prime }} x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} $$
(2a)
$$ \varepsilon_{it} = v_{it} - u_{it} \quad \left( {v_{it} \sim {\text{N}}\left[ {0,\upsigma _{v}^{2} } \right],u_{it} \sim {\text{N}}^{ + } \left[ {0,\upsigma _{u}^{2} } \right]} \right) $$
(2b)
$$ \upalpha _{{\text{i}}} = {\upalpha } + w_{i} \quad \left( {w_{i} \sim {\text{N}}\left[ {0,\upsigma _{w}^{2} } \right]} \right) $$
(2c)

Greene (2007: 157) argues that, with an unsolved identification problem, the ‘truth’ will lie somewhere between the conventional and the thus modified approaches. Possible pitfalls of TFE and TRE mirror those observed for conventional FE/RE estimators: if stable and persistent over time, inefficiency, or its latent effects, can be ‘masqueraded’ as time-invariant heterogeneity, thus being systematically underestimated (Agrell et al. 2014).

1.2 Distributional Assumptions and Panel-Data Estimator Consistency

In SF models, shortfalls from a stochastic efficiency frontier (g(xi,β) + vi) are measured by the conditional mean of ui, i.e. E[ui|εi], with ui usually assumed to follow a zero-truncated half-normal distribution (0 ≤ ui < ∞). Define μ* =  − ε[σu2/(σv2 + σu2)], σ*2 = [σv2σu2]/[σv2 + σu2], and an asymmetry parameter λ = σuv (i.e. ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio, which reflects the relative importance of inefficiency over random disturbances). Similar to a truncated-from-below distribution for Y ≥ c (for a stardard normal variable Y), the conditional mean of inefficiency is written as follows (with φ(.) and Φ(.) denoting standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions; Verbeek 2012: 456; Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000: 78; Jondrow et al. 1982):

$$ {\text{E}}\left[ {u_{i} |\varepsilon_{i} } \right] =\upmu ^{*} +\upsigma ^{*} \left[ {{\varphi }\left( { -\upmu ^{*} /\upsigma ^{*} } \right)} \right]/\left[ {1 -\Phi \left( { -\upmu ^{*} /\upsigma ^{*} } \right)} \right] =\upsigma ^{*} \left\{ {\left[ {{\varphi }\left( {{\upvarepsilon \lambda /\sigma }} \right)/\left( {1 -\Phi \left( {{\upvarepsilon \lambda /\sigma }} \right)} \right.} \right]{-}\left( {{\upvarepsilon \lambda /\sigma }} \right)} \right\} $$
(3)

The unconditional mean and variance of u are σu√(2/π) (= − E(ε)) and [(π − 2)/π]σu2, respectively (Greene 2007: 117; Jondrow et al. 1982: 234–235). In subsequent extensions of the model to a PD framework, Eq. (3) holds except for ε being replaced with its sample average, and σv2 with σv2/T (Kim and Schmidt 2000: 94). Among distributions other than the half-normal, i.e. non-zero restricted truncated normal, gamma, and (negative) exponential, under exponentially distributed ui(t) the range of inefficiency scores can be wider, but the frequency of high scores tends to be lower than under half- or truncated-normal assumptions, with tighter clustering of ui(t) near zero. Relative to a gamma distribution with shape parameter r > 0 and inverse scale parameter (or rate parameter) θ > 0 (u = f(zi) ~ Γ[r/θu|z, r/(θu|z)2]), the exponential distribution is a nested case with r = 1, while for large r and θ < 1 the gamma density approximates a normal shape with near-zero skewness (Mood et al. 1974: 112–113).

In PD models, parameter consistency relies on cross-sectional asymptotic (N → ∞, with T fixed) in RE estimates, and on time asymptotic (T → ∞, with N fixed) in FE estimates. The latter corrects the bias associated with the incidental parameters problem—even if structural parameters prove to be less sensitive to this bias in SF models than in binary choice models, among others—(Greene 2005a). Hence, RE models—eventually including fixed time-effects—are more suited for panels with large N and small T, with scope for population inference, and FE models for large T and small N, where the analysis focuses more on explaining a sample (Hsiao 2007; Greene 2003; Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 291). Wooldridge (2002: 287) shows that the RE estimator is a quasi-time demeaning, that is removing from dependent and explanatory variables, at each time t, a fraction of their time average: in the case of Eq. [2a/c], this fraction is given by τ = 1 − {1/[1 + T[(σw)2/(σε)2]]}0.5. As T → ∞ or [σw2ε2] → ∞ (i.e. with heterogeneity overshadowing the conditioning composed error variance), τ → 1 and RE approaches FE, and the effects of nearly time-constant regressors become more difficult to estimate in either case.

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Mainardi, S. Parametric and Semiparametric Efficiency Frontiers in Fishery Analysis: Overview and Case Study on the Falkland Islands. Environ Resource Econ 79, 169–210 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-021-00557-x

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