Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Fighting corruption in a time of crisis: Lessons from a radical regulatory shift experience

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study investigates the establishment of new anticorruption structures arising from a radical regulatory shift experience. Rooted in a recent state-corporate crime scandal overlapping Quebec’s construction industry and political domain, we examine the organizational adaptation of regulatory entities across three major shifts: increased police resources; enhanced regulatory collaborations; and an overreliance on penal channels to prosecute wrongdoers. Based on interviews conducted with several police officials and regulatory agencies (inspectors, managers, and directors), this article presents the enforcement challenges experienced by anticorruption forces during this transition. Specific themes concern intra- and inter-agency struggles, media scrutiny, and prosecution. The study illustrates how heightened prosecution may come as a necessary step for many regulatory actors, albeit constituting a highly perilous road over the long-term. Such work remains critical in assessing contemporary anticorruption and regulatory progresses.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. L.Q. [54], c. 30; L.Q. [55], c. 35; L.Q. [49], c. 38; L.Q. [56], c. 3; L.Q. [52], c. 10; L.Q. [51], c. 12.

  2. L.Q. [53], c. 21.

  3. L.Q. [58], c. 25.

  4. L.Q. [58], c. 25; L.Q. [50], c. 7.

  5. L.R.Q. [57], c. L-6.1.

  6. In French: Unité permanente anticorruption.

  7. Include mostly middle-managers, team leaders and directors. Since the unit is a coordinating one, many employees are not part of the unit per se, but are resources loaned by all incorporated agencies to conduct investigations or verifications. When all loaned resources are considered, the unit consists of nearly 300 employees.

  8. R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73.

  9. See for example Agence du revenu du Québec c. BT Céramiques inc.,

    2015 QCCQ 14534.

  10. A 2010 public inquiry found that the selection process to nominate a judge was permeable to various kind of political influences in Quebec [6].

References

  1. Allern, S., & Pollack, E. (2012). Scandalous! The mediated construction of political scandals in four Nordic countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Benson, M. L., & Cullen, F. T. (1998). Combating corporate crime: Local prosecutors at work. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Benson, M. L., & Walker, E. (1988). Sentencing the white-collar offender. American Sociological Review, 53(2), 294–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Benson, M. L., Maakestad, W. J., Cullen, F. T., & Geis, G. (1988). District attorneys and corporate crime: Surveying the prosecutorial gatekeepers. Criminology, 26(3), 505–518.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Boileau, J. (2011). Commission Bastarache – Faire des liens. Le Devoir. Found at: http://www.ledevoir.com/non-classe/315026/commission-bastarache-faire-des-liens.

  7. Braithwaite, J. (1984). Corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Braithwaite, J. (1985). White collar crime. Annual Review of Sociology, 11, 1–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative justice & responsive regulation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Braithwaite, J. (2008). Regulatory capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Braithwaite, J., Walker, J., & Grabosky, P. (1987). An enforcement taxonomy of regulatory agencies. Law & Policy, 9(3), 323–351.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Calavita, K., & Pontell, H. N. (1993). Saving and loan fraud as organized crime: Toward a conceptual typology of corporate illegality. Criminology, 31(4), 519–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Coleman, J. W. (2005). The criminal elite. New York: Worth Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Commission of inquiry on the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (2014). Testimony of Robert Lafrenière. Fount at: https://www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_client/fichiers/Transcriptions/2014-09/Transcription_audience_CEIC_2014-09-16.pdf. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.

  15. Commission of inquiry on the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (2015). Final report. Montréal: Québec. Fount at: https://www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca/la-commission/rapport-final.html. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.

  16. Cullen, F. T., Cavender, G., Maakestad, W. J., & Benson, M. L. (1987 [2006]). Corporate crime under attack: The fight to criminalize business violence. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Cullen, F. T., Hartman, J. L., & Jonson, C. L. (2009). Bad guys: Why the public supports punishing white-collar offenders. Crime, Law and Social Change, 51(1), 34–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Doig, A., & Norris, D. (2012). Improving anti-corruption agencies as organisations. Journal of Financial Crimes, 19(3), 255–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Favarel-Garrigues, G. (2009). Présentation. Revue international de théorie du droit et de sociologie juridique, 72, 275–284.

  20. Fisse, B., & Braithwaite, J. (1983). The impact of publicity on corporate offenders. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Hagan, J., & Palloni, A. (1986). Club fed and the sentencing of white-collar offenders before and after Watergate. Criminology, 24(4), 603–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Hagan, J., & Parker, P. (1985). White-collar crime and punishment. The class structure and legal sanctioning of securities violators. American Sociological Review, 50(3), 302–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Hawkins, K. (1990). Compliance strategy, prosecution policy, and aunt Sally: A comment on Pearce and Tombs. British Journal of Criminology, 30(4), 444–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Hayagreeva, R., Morrill, C., & Zald, M. N. (2000). Power plays: How social movements and collective action create new organizational forms. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 237–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Katz, J. (1980). The social movement against white-collar crime. Criminology Review Yearbook, 2, 161–184.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Lascoumes, P., & Nagels, C. (2014). Sociologie des élites délinquantes : de la criminalité en col blanc à la corruption politique. Paris: Armand Colin.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  27. Lessard, D. (2015). Dépôt d’accusations: l’UPAC s’impatiente. La Presse. Found at: http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/justice-et-affaires-criminelles/actualites-judiciaires/201510/22/01-4912637-depot-daccusations-lupac-simpatiente.php.

  28. Levi, M. (2006). The media construction of financial white-collar crimes. British Journal of Criminology, 46(6), 1037–1057.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Mandeville, B. (2004). L’énigmatique affaire Jarvis: la nouvelle « approche contextuelle » en matière règlementaire. In J. C. Paquet et al. (Eds.), Actes de la XVIe conférence des juristes de l’État (pp. 89–105). Yvons Blais: Cowansville.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Mann, K. (1985). Defending white-collar crime: A portrait of attorneys at work. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Maxwell, J. (1996). Qualitative research design: An interaction approach. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  32. McGurrin, D., Jarrell, M., Jahn, A., & Cochrane, B. (2013). White collar crime representation in the criminological literature revisited, 2001-2010. Western Criminology Review, 14(2), 3–19.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Moroff, H., & Schmidt-Pfister, D. (2010). Anti-corruption movements, mechanisms, and machines – An introduction. Global Crime, 11(2), 89–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Patriquin, M. (2010). Quebec: The most corrupt province. Why does Quebec claim so many of the nation’s political scandals? Maclean’s. Fount at: http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-most-corrupt-province/.

  36. Pearce, F., & Tombs, S. (1990). Ideology, hegemony, and empiricism: Compliance theories of regulation. British Journal of Criminology, 30(4), 423–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Quah, J. S. T. (2010). Defying institutional failure: Learning from the experiences of anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries. Crime, Law and Social Change, 53, 23–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. (2008). Social movements and institutional analysis. In O. Greenwood & K. Sahlin-Anderson (Eds.), The SAGE of organizational institutionalism (pp. 648–670). London: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Shapiro, S. P. (1985). The road not taken: The elusive path to criminal prosecution for white-collar offenders. Law & Society Review, 19(2), 1979–1218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Shapiro, S. P. (1987). Wayward capitalists: Target of the securities and exchange commission. London: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Simpson, S. S. (2002). Corporate crime, law and social control. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  42. Snider, L. (1990). Cooperative models and corporate crime: Panacea or cop-out? Crime & Delinquency, 36(3), 373–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Snider, L. (1993). Bad business: Corporate crime in Canada. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  44. de Sousa, L. (2010). Anti-corruption agencies: Between empowerment and irrelevance. Crime, law and. Social Change, 53(1), 5–22.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Stratas, D. (2003). Crossing the Rubicon’: The supreme court and regulatory investigations. Criminal Reports, 6, 74–84.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Tombs, S., & Whyte, D. (2013). Transcending the deregulation debate? Regulation, risk and the enforcement of health and safety law in the UK. Regulation & Governance, 7(1), 61–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  48. Vaughan, D. (1982). Towards understanding unlawful organizational behavior. Michigan Law Review, 80(7), 1377–1402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Cited laws

  1. An Act respecting political party leadership campaigns, L.Q 2011, c. 38.

  2. An Act to amend the Act respecting elections and referendums in municipalities with respect to financing, L.Q 2013, c. 7.

  3. An Act to amend the Professional Code with respect to disciplinary justice, L.Q 2013, c. 12.

  4. An Act to amend the Taxation Act and other legislative provisions, L.Q 2013, c. 10.

  5. An Act to amend various legislative provisions concerning municipal affairs, L.Q 2012, c. 21.

  6. An Act to eliminate union placement and improve the operation of the construction industry, L.Q 2011, c. 30.

  7. An Act to prevent, combat and punish certain fraudulent practices in the construction industry and make other amendments to the Building Act, L.Q 2011, c. 35.

  8. An Act to provide for the provisional relief from office of an elected municipal officer, L.Q 2013, c. 3.

  9. Anti-Corruption Act, L.R.Q 2011, c. L-6.1.

  10. Integrity in Public Contracts Act, L.Q 2012, c. 25.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Criminology, Université de Montréal, 3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, H3T 1N8, Canada

    Maxime Reeves-Latour & Carlo Morselli

Authors
  1. Maxime Reeves-Latour
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Carlo Morselli
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Maxime Reeves-Latour.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Reeves-Latour, M., Morselli, C. Fighting corruption in a time of crisis: Lessons from a radical regulatory shift experience. Crime Law Soc Change 69, 349–370 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9741-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9741-z

Search

Navigation