Abstract
The types of corruption measures that practitioners find along the existing spectrum can complement each other, but have also posed challenges for policy makers and practitioners. We argue that these challenges have been characterized as conflict between precision and politics, which obscures the possibility for incorporating both aspects into corruption measurements. The paper presents a framework for evaluating corruption datasets in terms of their accessibility to a range of stakeholders, as well as their methodological design, potential for sustainability, and explicit link to reform actions. We believe that this exercise will dispel the myth that the gap between objectivity and inclusiveness is inevitable, and the findings will provide examples of how openness and reform action have been built into the design of some corruption datasets
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Notes
This is in line with the “resistance to reforms” argument first highlighted by Fernandez and Rodrik [2].
There is also the argument that they may not be relevant for outcomes. See [6].
Aggregate measures often combine various types of data, but do so with the understanding that the conceptual grounding of indices overrides concerns about differences in data points.
The Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA) has also shown that NSOs are uniquely placed to collected this type of data, and also suggests that corruption modules can be done in collaboration with CSOs. The initiative was developed by the community of African statisticians and supported by UNDP, the AUC, the AfDB and the UNECA to address gaps in nationally-produced governance data.
See also Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) proposed by Andrews et al. [25].
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Trapnell, S., Recanatini, F. Evidence, corruption, and reform: the importance of context-sensitivity. Crime Law Soc Change 68, 477–491 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9697-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9697-z