Introduction

Previous research suggests that adverse social stereotypes and biases, together with non-inclusive policies and practices at the level of the state, create an enabling environment for public hostility towards a minority community (Poynting and Perry 2007; Perry and Scrivens 2018). Jenness and Grattet (2001) argue that hate crimes cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the larger processes that identified, defined and ultimately generated the problem. They further argue that the appropriate target analysis of a social problem is much wider than the horrifying incidents that reach the public consciousness; rather, it is the social processes that generated and sustained the problem as a framework for understanding such incidents. Individuals who have been unjustly harmed or damaged by forces beyond their control are described as victims and hence deserving of support and protection (Holstein and Miller 1990; Schweppe et al. 2016). In the case of hate crimes, we can point to minorities who are victimized by violence motivated by differences of religion, ethnicity or race. In each case, individuals suffer from psychological and physical harm born of exogenous conditions. However, implications of these harms and the overall climate of hate have not been sufficiently investigated in the literature on management and organization, a gap which the present study seeks to address.

Van Fleet and Van Fleet (2006) note that hate-based violence and terrorism are rapidly becoming a domestic problem for a potentially large number of organizations. This situation and the fact that the external climate and dysfunctional leaders can foster intolerance within organizations make it imperative that managers everywhere develop their knowledge of hate and terrorism. This paper addresses this topic by focusing on issues and challenges facing the professionals and employees of a minority Muslim sect (Shia) in a Muslim majority country (Pakistan).

It may be noted that the violence and hostility that Shia Muslims in Pakistan experience at the hands of TakfiriFootnote 1 (or Khawarij) Islamist extremists is also experienced by the Muslim majority community (Sunni Muslims) as well as by non-Muslim minorities. Hence, the study does not represent a tit-for-tat violence or hostility between Sunni and Shia Muslim (Abbas 2010). This point is important to note as the both sects, Sunnis and Shias, are suffering at the hands of Takfiri extremists (Syed 2016; Syed et al. 2016).

Internal heterogeneity of Islam is largely ignored and under-explored in the mainstream media and academic literature. This is problematic because Takfiri Islamist militancy and extremism are not only hurting non-Muslim communities but have also caused much damage to the majority of mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims (Rajan 2015; Syed and Pio 2018; Syed et al. 2016). Mir and Naquvi (2016) point towards the increasing sectarian tensions within Muslims to the fore, particularly in the shape of Takfiri puritanism within certain sections of Muslim communities which manifests itself as an intolerance both of intra-Islamic heterogeneity and of non-Muslim faiths. This heterogeneity is particularly conspicuous and important in contexts where there is a sizable Muslim minority community facing ‘othering’, discrimination and violence at the hands of a Muslim majority community, e.g., stereotypes and discrimination facing Sunni Sufis and Shias in Saudi Arabia, Sunni Baloch tribes in Iran, Alevis in Turkey and Shias in Pakistan.

This paper offers a ‘pyramid of hate’ perspective to explore issues of bias and discrimination facing Shia Muslim professionals and employees in Pakistan. The Pyramid of Hate (ADL 2018) is a theoretical and visual image of how the seeds of hate, once planted, can quickly grow from biased ideas to harmful behaviors and violence. The pyramid comprises several interconnected levels and there is a tendency of hate to escalate when unchecked. Although the behaviors at each level adversely affect individuals and groups, as one moves up the pyramid, these become more extreme and violent.

Drawing on interviews with 76 Pakistani Shia Muslim professionals and employees, all of whom were either working or had worked in Pakistan, the study demonstrates how societal biases and stereotypes infiltrate into organizational level interactions resulting in harassment and discrimination.

The study is important due to a number of reasons. First, it challenges the common misperception that Muslims, including Muslim employees, constitute one homogenous community. By focusing on a minority Muslim sect representing 10–15% of the world Muslim population (1.6 billion) and 10–15% of Muslim population of Pakistan, it highlights the internal heterogeneity of Muslims which remains ignored in mainstream commentaries and literature on Islam (Turner 2002). Second, the study highlights an urgent human rights issue facing not only Pakistani state and society but also the international community at large, i.e., the anti-Shia violence, in which Shia professionals and employees, along with other Shias, face bias, hate speech, discrimination and violence. While the perpetrators of violence are usually located outside the workplace, both workplace discrimination and external violence are driven by prejudice against, hatred or fear of Shia Muslims which we describe as Shiaphobia. Given the enormous scale of anti-Shia violence in Pakistan, as noted by international human rights groups (such as Amnesty International 2002, 2011; HRW 2014; UN News 2015), it is important to assess its implications for Shia employees and wider community. Theoretically, the study is important as it integrates the pyramid of hate perspective into management and organization studies and advances this theory by pointing towards issues of hatred within one religion and examining these issues in the context of work and employment.

The paper is structured as follows. First, it explains the interconnected notions of the pyramid of hate and Shiaphobia. It then offers a brief historical overview of Shia Sunni differences and the genesis of Shia persecution. Then the study’s context is offered including Shia demographics and issues in Pakistan. Finally, through empirical findings, the paper provides a pyramid of hate analysis of issues and challenges facing Shia professionals and employees.

Theoretical Framework: Shiaphobia and the Pyramid of Hate

For the purposes of this paper, we define Shiaphobia as prejudice against, or hatred or fear of, Shia Muslims. Shiaphobia may be observable in biased and hostile behavior such as discrimination, harassment and violence on the basis of religious faith and sect. While Shiaphobia may also be found in other communities, in the twenty-first century it seems to be more prevalent and severe in the Takfiri extremist fringe within the Deobandi and Salafi (‘Wahhabi’) sub-sects of Sunni Islam.

With some modifications in the Runnymede Trust’s (1997) description of Islamophobia, Shiaphobia may be explained as comprising the following key features: (1) Shia Muslims are seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; (2) Shias are seen as non-Muslims and Shia sect as a deviant version of Islam, an outcome of an alleged Jewish, Christian or foreign conspiracy to hurt Islam and Muslims; (3) Shia Muslims are seen as inferior, barbaric, irrational and primitive; (4) Shia identity is denied or suppressed with an intent to force assimilate or/and convert Shias to ‘mainstream’ Sunni Islam; (5) Hostility towards Shia Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Shia Muslims and their exclusion from mainstream society; (6) Anti-Shia hostility is seen as natural and normal; systematic violence against Shias is projected and rationalized as equal Sunni-Shia sectarian violence; all Sunnis and Shias are seen as hostile to each other; violent anti-Shia groups are projected as representing entire Sunni population; (7) Scale and nature of anti-Shia hostility and violence is denied, ignored, diluted or covered up; faith-based violence against Shia Muslims is misattributed to other reasons (e.g., ethnic and political differences; Saudi-Iran proxy war; law and order problem); (8) All Shias are projected as Iranians or Iran’s proxies; their criticisms of Islamist or Takfiri groups, Sunni rulers and ‘the West’ are rejected as Iranian or/and sectarian propaganda; (9) All Shias are seen as aggressive, abusive, threatening and supportive of violence and terrorism.

Depending on time and space, much of the above description of Shiaphobia reflects the state of persecution, hostility, stereotypes and violence facing Shia minority Muslim communities across the world. For analytical purposes, the situation of Shia Muslims and the phobia facing them may be understood through the lens of the Pyramid of Hate (ADL 2018). A description of various levels of the pyramid is provided below (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1
figure 1

Source: ADL (2018)

The pyramid of hate.

Full size image

The first level, Biased Attitudes, is the base of the pyramid indicating biased attitudes in everyday life, in schools, workplaces, communities and families. This may reflect in offending or non-inclusive language, stereotypes, microaggressions or insensitive remarks. Some of these biases may appear benign but, if left unchallenged, these can easily grow into sustained feelings of dislike and hatred about a specific group.

The second level, Acts of Bias, is based on biased attitudes, and indicates how prejudicial feelings about a group may degenerate into actions such as bullying, scapegoating, offensive and biased jokes, insults, and name-calling.

The third level, Discrimination, is the logical consequence of biased attitudes and actions. Discrimination moves the biased attitude “I don’t like or trust those people” to discrimination, “I won’t hire those people to work in my factory.” Workplace discrimination entails treating employees or job applicants differently because of certain characteristics, such as religion, ethnicity, race and gender, which results in the impairment of equality of opportunity and treatment (ILO, n.d.). The literature suggests that discrimination in the workplace is caused by several factors ranging from societal stereotypes and misperceptions, institutional discrimination, group closure and individual biases. In its mildest form, discrimination is reflected in the absence of workplace civility, i.e., behaviors that are fundamental to mutual respect at work and positively connecting with one another. Examples of uncivil conduct include sarcasm, disparaging remarks, hostile looks, and subtle maltreatment (Pearson et al. 2001). Another closely related phenomenon is workplace harassment which may be described as unwanted conduct affecting the dignity of individuals in the workplace due to their personal characteristics and may comprise actions or comments viewed as demeaning and unacceptable to the recipient (Acas, n.d.). Religious harassment may be described as unwanted behavior based on religious practices or beliefs. It may take many forms including insulting the items worn for religious reasons or derisory comments against an individual’s beliefs or customs. It includes the incitement or persistent pressure through forms of religious propaganda. Examples include mocking or deriding people’s religious beliefs, making unwanted comments on dress or practices, and making it unnecessarily difficult for people to conform to their religious beliefs (Pearce et al. 2005).

The fourth level, Bias-Motivated Violence, indicates that when biases and discrimination are unchecked or rather encouraged and expected, these may motivate and result in violence in schools and communities, including desecration of properties or places or symbols of worship, threats and assaults, arson, vandalism, and in its extreme form murder, target killing and terrorism.

The fifth and final level, Genocide, is the top level of the pyramid. It may start from low-intensity genocidal violence or target killing to large-scale attacks not only on people but also on places of worship, other properties, symbols, and traditions of the targeted community. In its full form, genocide is reflected in the act of or intent to deliberately and systematically annihilate an entire people.

The Pyramid of Hate shows how puritanical and biased ideas, feelings and attitudes can form a basis for hateful behaviors and violence. Although not every act of bias may result in genocide, it is important to realize that every historical instance of genocide began with benign jokes and stereotypies and other similar expressions of bias. The most effective opportunity to take action is when such biases or behaviors are witnessed at the lowest level of the pyramid. Peaceful co-existence, diversity and inclusion can be safeguarded in families, schools and communities by promoting respectful behavior and engaging in efforts to stamp out hate.

Although the behaviors at each level negatively affect individuals and groups, these may have more life-threatening consequences as one moves up the pyramid. Thus, the more prominent a Shia Muslim is by virtue of his or her professional or economic status in a Sunni-majority context, the more vulnerable he or she may be to hostility and violence.

Next, we offer an historical overview of Shia Sunni differences in Islam and how such differences lead to persecution of minority Shia Muslim community.

History of Shia Sunni Differences and the Genesis of Shia Persecution

Turner (2002) notes that mainstream Western commentaries on Islam typically fail to consider the heterogeneity of contemporary Islamic belief. They ignore that recent resurgence of Islamic radicalism has been challenged by several moderate or liberal intellectuals in Islam (Othman 1999), and that not all Islamic sects subscribe to post-9/11 radicalism (Nasr 2007).

Shia Islam (also known as Shiite Islam) is the second largest branch of Islam, after Sunnism. According to Pew (2009), there are between 154 and 200 million Shia Muslims in the world. Most Shias (between 68 and 80% of their global population) live in four countries: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India. Iran has 66 million to 70 million Shias; Iraq, India and Pakistan each are home to at least 16 million Shias. In four countries—Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain—Shia Muslims make up a majority of the total population whereas in Yemen they represent about 50% of the population and in Lebanon they constitute the largest faith group (Pew 2009). Shias are a sizable minority in Turkey (Alevis), Kuwait, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Tanzania.

The majority of Sunnis across the world follow the Hanafi, Shafei and Maliki schools. Salafis (or ‘Wahhabis’) and Hanbalis have some similarities and are in majority only in Saudi Arabia and UAE but remain influential in the Muslim world due to their active promotion of Salafi ideology through mosques, seminaries, media and publications, generously sponsored by their petrodollars.

Most Shias belong to the Twelver sub-sect (Ithna Asharis or Imamis) and the rest are divided between Zaidis (Yemen), Alevis (Turkey), Ismailis (South Asia and East Africa) and other groups. Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities in South East Asia, South Asia, Africa, and part of the Arab world.

Although both Sunni and Shia share their belief in the Oneness of God, the Quran and the finality of the Prophet Muhammad, and both sects practice five prayers a day and fasting in Ramadan, there are some difference in religious practice and customs, often related to jurisprudence (Khalili 2016) or sources of hadith and sunnah, i.e., the traditions of the Prophet.

The historical background of the Sunni–Shia split lies in the schism that occurred when Prophet Muhammad died in 632 AD, leading to a dispute over his succession as a caliph of the Islamic community. The dispute became further pronounced when Muawiya, a governor of Syrian province, waged a war against Ali, Sunni Muslims’ fourth Caliph and Shia Muslims’ first Imam, son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet, and a key member of the Prophet’s family or Ahl al-Bayt.

In contrast to Sunni Muslims who focus on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (Sahaba, particularly the first four Caliphs), Shias adhere to the teachings of the Prophet and his family and descendants who are referred to as the Ahl al-Bayt or Aal-e-Muhammad.

Sunnis’ views on the Umayyad Caliph Yazid (son of Muawiya) whose forces slaughtered Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Imam Hussein in 680 AD are divided between those (dominant majority) who outrightly condemn Yazid and a very few (within some hardline Salafi/Wahhabi and Deobandi communities) who consider that both Imam Hussain and Yazid were right. However, Imam Hussein remains a central and most revered character in contemporary Shia and Sunni Sufi ideology and ritual practices of the Ashura of Muharram.

After Muawiya took over as a caliph (661 AD) (most Sunni Muslims do not consider Muawiya to be a part of the Rightly Guided Caliphs), Shia persecution became institutionalized and systematic, and continued throughout the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 AD) (Hoyt, 1975). Shia persecution was also a routine during the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258). The Abbasid caliphs who ruled from Baghdad imprisoned and killed Shia Imams (the Prophet’s descendants) and encouraged eminent Sunni clerics to define Sunni orthodoxy and contain the appeal of Shia Islam. Shias were attacked during Ashura mourning processions of Muharram, often killed or imprisoned. Shia clerics were killed, shrines ransacked and homes of ordinary Shias torched. This pattern was repeated throughout the centuries. The Shias were usually treated as the enemy within and were the first to come under suspicion if there was an internal or external threat to the ruling Sunni establishment (Nasr 2007, pp. 52–54).

The Shias were able to gain power through the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171) but it was short-lived. The next notable Shia power emerged in Iran in the shape of the Safavid rulers (1501–1736). The Safavids faced rivalry by the Ottoman Sunni Caliphs (1299–1922) who put Shias to the sword in Anatolia, Turkey. Thousands of Shias were massacred in the Ottoman Empire, including the Alevis in Turkey, the Alawis in Syria and the Shia of Lebanon (Nasr 2007, pp. 65–66).

In recent centuries, major incidents of Shia persecution and violence have been reported in Saudi Arabia (by the Wahhabi or Salafi warlords, clerics and rulers), Iraq (by Saddam Hussain), Afghanistan (by Emir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century and more recently by the Taliban since 1990s and ISIS since 2010) and Syria and Iraq (at the hands of the ISIS from mid-2000s to 2018).

Religious differences between these two sects become rather intensified during power struggles, such as the Bahraini uprising (2011), Syrian civil-war (2012–2017), or the 2003 Iraq War. Anti-Shia hatred persists to this day from Pakistan to Yemen, Afghanistan to Iraq, Malaysia to Egypt, and is a major element of sectarian frictions throughout the Middle East.

While there are examples of Sunni-Shia tensions throughout the history of Islam and there are instances when rulers of one sect marginalized or persecuted their subjects of other sect, it must be noted that there are also examples of both communities existing largely peacefully, e.g., during the Mughal rule in India or in certain parts of the Abbasid period. Even today, it is not uncommon to find inter-sect marriages or political alliances between Sunni and Shia in Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon and other parts of the Muslim world. Both communities have largely supported each other in times of distress and need. However, at the same time, there have also been certain intolerant elements in existence who have opposed the inter-sect harmony, occasionally resorting to Takfiri violence and extremism. Historically, both Sunni and Shia communities have suffered at the hands of the Takfiri extremists and often the Takfiri violence within the world of Islam is misconstrued as Sunni vs Shia violence.

The Study’s Context: Shia Muslims of Pakistan

Despite the largely peaceful co-existence of both communities in South Asia, there are some instances when Shia in this region faced persecution at the hands of certain hardline Sunni rulers, clerics, warlords and invaders. For example, Shias in Kashmir have faced repeated massacres in the past few centuries. Plunder, loot and massacres which came to be known as Taarajs virtually devastated the community between fifteenth to nineteenth century during which the Shia habitations in Kashmir were plundered, people slaughtered, libraries burnt and their sacred sites desecrated. Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi (1564–1624, known as Mujaddid Alf Sani), Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) and Shah Ismail (1779–1831) played a key role in aggravating anti-Shia sentiments in local Sunni rulers and populations in India. Afghanistan’s Pashtun ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani Abdali (1722–1772), who invaded India upon the invitation of Shah Waliullah, especially targeted and killed Hindus and Shia Muslims.

The sectarian sentiments became further institutionalized in the shape of anti-Shia literature and fatwas (religious decrees) issued by the Darul Uloom Deoband, the first Deobandi madrassa that was founded in 1866 by Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi. The Deobandi fatwas also targeted Barelvi Sunni Muslims, the traditional Sufi community in South Asia who were labeled as polytheist and grave-worshippers. In Saudi Arabia, anti-Shia and anti-Sunni Sufi sentiments became institutionalized in the shape of the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) and the subsequent ascendance of the Saud family to power.

Some of these anti-Shia sentiments were also inherited when Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. In 1948, the founder of Pakistan, although himself a Shia Muslim, was denied a state funeral led by a Shia cleric. His state funeral was led by a Deobandi cleric, an ultraorthodox Sunni sub-sect that remains vehemently anti-Shia and anti-Sunni Barelvi.

Pakistan is a Muslim majority country with 97% Muslim population. Shias make up between 10 and 15% of the Muslim population of Pakistan and are estimated to be between 17 and 26 million. Majority of Pakistani Sunnis comprises Barelvi or Sufi Muslims whereas Deobandi and ‘Wahhabi’ (Ahl-e-Hadith or Salafi) Muslims constitute less than 20% of Sunni Muslims (HRCPs 2012).

Although Shias in Pakistan are scattered throughout the country, there are certain regions where they constitute the majority population, e.g., Gilgit-Baltistan, Kurram Agency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and significant pockets in certain areas of Jhang, D.I. Khan, Quetta, Layyah and parts of Sindh. Shias of Pakistan belong to almost all ethnic backgrounds including but not limited to Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi, Baloch, Urdu speaking, Hazara and Gilgiti ethnicities.

Assimilation and Subtle Persecution

In government census and other national surveys, no data are collected on sect basis. All Muslim sects including Sunni and Shia are categorized as Muslims. There is, however, a subtle tendency to suppress and deny Shia identity and assimilate them with Sunni Muslims. For example, in the Objectives Resolution, the preamble and integral part of Pakistan’s national constitution (1973), there is a commitment to Islamic principles of the Quran and Sunnah (the Prophet’s traditions), but no affirmation is made to the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family and descendants) which is an integral part of the Shia Muslims’ belief. Similarly, Islamic laws of General Zia-ul-Haq (military dictator 1977–1988) were tilted towards the Deobandi and Salafi interpretations of Islam. In the mainstream media and literature, usually the Sunni practices of Islam, e.g., methods of prayer and ablution, are presented as ‘normal’ and ‘mainstream’ and on TV channels, the calls for prayer are broadcast according to the Sunni method.

Anti-Shia Violence

Since mid-1980s, a systematic violence is evident against Shias in the aftermath of the state-sponsored Afghan jihad and the Saudi-Iranian political tensions which were played out in the garb of sectarian differences (Abbas 2010; Zahab 2002). The role of colonial powers such as the US and UK in promoting and exploiting these tensions to promote their own political and economic interests, such as to contain the Soviet Union and the post-revolution Iran and benefit from the Gulf states’ petrodollars, cannot be ignored. Before 1980s, there were isolated incidents of violence against Shias, such as in Therhi et al. (1963) and in Karachi (1970s).

In the literatures of Deobandi and Salafi/Wahhabi madrassas and also on social media, it is common to find hate speech against Shia Muslims and Sunni Barelvis or Sufis because of their beliefs and rituals. Anti-Shia groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, formed during the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq), now banned but operating as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jmaat (ASWJ), freely operate and spew venom against the Shia, Sunni Barelvi and Sufi Muslims with impunity. SSP’s militant wing Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is known for links with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and has attacked and killed not only Shias but also a large number of Barelvi Sunnis, Sufis, moderate Deobandis, Ahmadis, Christians, ordinary citizens, foreigners, and members of security forces.

During 1990s and beyond, incidents of violence became more frequent and intense against Shias, Sunni Barelvis, Sufis and non-Muslim communities. Data on target killings, attacks on shrines and processions, and persecution are cited in various national and international reports.

According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Shia Muslims in Pakistan face “discrimination and societal violence" (US 11 Mar. 2008, Sect. 5), as well as "significant discrimination in employment and access to education, including at government institutions" (ibid., Sect. 2.c; ibid. 19 Sept. 2008, Sect. 2). The Report notes that Shia Muslims are “the targets of religious violence" (ibid. Sect. 2.c). The International Religious Freedom Report 2008 indicates that some Sunni Muslim groups have published literature calling for violence against Shia Muslims (US 19 Sept. 2008, Sect. 3). The report also cited some incidents of discrimination and hate. For example, students at the Punjab University (PU) in Lahore reported that some teachers and administrative officials had been "discriminating among students on religious and political grounds" (ibid. 19 May 2008; US 19 Sept. 2008, Sect. 3; IRBC 2008).

According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP 2012), a total of 313 people of the Shia sect were killed in the first eight months of 2012. Ninety-six people were targeted in Balochistan and 52 in Karachi. The situation in Gilgit and Parachinar was found no more different with 38 and 53 killings, respectively.

The Shia Muslims of Pakistan have been relentlessly attacked by jihadist and sectarian militants, many of whom were bred and raised during the 1980s for the US- and Saudi-sponsored jihad-motivated guerilla war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The anti-Shia violence took the form of systemic killings during and after General Zia-ul-Haq regime (1977–1988).

It may be noted that in the context of anti-Shia violence, the term ‘sectarian violence’ is misleading as it suggests equal incidents and scale of violence between Sunni and Shia sects and also ignores the common Takfiri identity of the extremist groups who are not only attacking Shias but also Sunni Barelvis, Sunni Sufis, moderate Deobandis, Christians, Ahmadis and other communities. Indeed, those who are killing Shias are also killing moderate Sunnis. Pakistani Sunnis have generally rejected the Takfiri (excommunicating and violent) militants of SSP, TTP, LeJ and allied groups who are killing all communities and ethnicities. It is, therefore, inaccurate to present the anti-Shia violence as a Sunni vs Shia sectarian issue. That is not to say that the Shias are not the most target killed religious community in Pakistan. Moreover, given that Shias of all ethnic backgrounds are being killed by Jihadi-sectarian groups, it is inaccurate to describe the anti-Shia violence as an exclusively ethnic (e.g., Hazara, Pashtun or Saraiki specific) issue.

Challenges at Work

Barring a few appointments in Pakistan’s armed forces and other sensitive institutions, there are generally no such policies in Pakistani organizations where it is compulsory to declare one’s Muslim sect. Also, official labor force surveys do not include Muslim sect information in their statistics. Thus, very few empirical insights on organizational experiences of Shia employees are available. This is with the exception of a few isolated incidents reported in the media. One particular news article was about a Shia Muslim officer of armed forces. In the article, Mateen (2012) describes the account of an army major who was “born as a Pakistani but died as a Hazara” because of multiple forms of discrimination and biases that he faced within and outside his workplace.

In recent years, many Shia Muslim employees have been killed while they were traveling to work or were at work. For example, in 2001, Shaukat Ali Mirza, the managing director of Pakistan State Oil (PSO), was shot dead in Karachi (BBC 2001). Similarly, in October 2003, seven Shia Muslims were shot dead and seven others wounded when a bus carrying employees of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization (Suparco) for Friday prayers was ambushed by armed men (Geocities 2003). Other professionals targeted include doctors, university lecturers and lawyers in particular. Amnesty International (2002) has provided details of target killings of professional Shias, particularly Shia medical doctors. The hatred and violence against Sunni Sufis and Shias was also clearly mentioned and condemned by the US President Obama in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 in which he stated: “Let us condemn incitement against Sufi Muslims and Shiite pilgrims.” (The White House 2012: para. 47).

Many civilians and a few security personnel have been particularly targeted because of their allegiance to Shia sect of Islam. For example, in January 2008, Taliban over-ran a post of Pakistan army (Frontier Corps) abducting many soldiers. Later, they segregated Shia soldiers and killed them after brutal torture. The dead included eight Shia personnel whom the militants killed by slitting their throats (Daily Times 2008).

The above overview presents a glimpse of the multilevel bias, discrimination and violence facing Shia Muslims. The next section describes the empirical study.

Methodology

This study draws on 76 interviews with Shia Muslim employees. Participants were approached through personal networks of the authors and also through social networks such as LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter. Interviews were conducted both face to face (30) and online (46) such as through Skype, WhatsApp and email. The interviews were semi-structured to allow for free flowing conversations while some structured portion was used to maintain focus. Initial participants were recruited through the authors’ personal and social networks and then connecting with further participants based on the initial contact. This method is known as snowball or chain sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). All such interviews were conducted individually in private, in the participant’s home, at a local café or mosque, in Urdu and/or English language(s). The interviews were conducted by a Pakistani man conversant in both languages. The purpose of the interviews (to examine the bias, discrimination and violence related issues facing Shia professionals and employees in Pakistan) was explained to the participants in advance and assurances of ethical conduct of research and anonymity of their responses were given. To ensure honest responses, no participant was paid or promised anything in return for their interview. Due to sensitivity of the topic and the participants, only eight of the face to face interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed while for others, detailed notes were taken. These notes and transcriptions were then translated into English, and the data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (Stemler 2001).

The online method was found helpful in view of the geographical spread of the Shia population and the sensitivity of this topic. The online method included email or online (Skype/WhatsApp) responses to a structured set of open ended and closed questions which were then followed up by probing or clarifying questions as appropriate. Another advantage of the online method was its ability to provide access to individuals who were difficult to reach through other channels (Garton et al. 1999; Wellman 1997).

Given the sensitivity of this topic and the overall environment of fear and insecurity, finding relevant participants was not easy, hence the participants’ or their organizations’ names were not recorded. Any identifiable details from responses were amended to mask individual and organizational identity. While routine caveats apply (e.g., not everyone has access to the Internet, the online sample is generally biased to English and computer literate people), the snowball method was used and the initial participants were asked to spread the word only to Shia Muslim acquaintances who met three parameters: Shia Muslims, formal work experience, lives in (or has lived in) Pakistan. The methods adopted proved to be useful and inclusive, allowing a reach across many areas of Pakistan.

About 87% of the participants had more than one year of work experience. 80% of them had a graduate degree or higher qualification. All of them had work experience in Pakistan while 80% of them were resident in Pakistan at the time of this research. 62% of the participants were married while 20% of the participants were female.

All the responses were assembled in a word document, including those transcribed from face to face interviews and other methods. All interviews were read multiple times and the key themes were noted. The analysis was done by both authors and the interrater reliability was achieved by an independent analysis in the first stage and cross-checking and refinement of themes subsequently (McHugh 2012).

Findings

The interviews’ findings have been structured by utilizing the pyramid of hate perspective on issues of bias, discrimination and violence.

Biased Attitudes and Acts

The participants’ accounts point towards stereotypes and biased actions facing them within and outside the workplace, a theme that represents the first level of the Pyramid of Hate, i.e., Biased Attitudes. Such bias is reflected in offensive or insulting language, stereotypes and insensitive remarks. The interviews also provide examples of the second level of pyramid, Acts of Bias, indicating how prejudicial feelings about a group may degenerate into actions such as offensive and biased jokes, insults, name-calling and harassment.

Majority of the participants faced either blatant (54%) or subtle (30%) criticism and hateful remarks about their beliefs.

Many times, people around me, oblivious to the fact that there may be those of different beliefs around them, will simply say "Shias are kafirs [infidels]" or "you shouldn't believe all the crap these Shias say" or "you should pray to God to guide you" or even "Shias believe in idol-worshipping, all they do is 'bidat' [deviation/impermissible innovation in religion] and we have to show them the right path.

When I was in Quetta about 9 or 10 years ago, one day me and my friends went on a mountain for picnic and we saw some Sunni Afghan kids they were climbing on mountain and when they saw us they started yelling like Khomeini Kafir and Hazara Kafir and ran away.

Comments such as "Shias are kafir [infidels]", "Shias are magicians and they deliver black magic", "Shias perform unlawful/shameful rituals during Muharram", and “should be destroyed”, and many more.

Criticism of Shia religious rituals

70% of the participants stated that they had felt or experienced discomfort towards or blatant criticism of Shia rituals of Muharram or Ashura in Pakistan by their Sunni colleagues or friends. Some of the anti-Shia remarks could be categorized into workplace incivility while others seemed to be offensive and insensitive. For example, a female participant complained about the strange looks by her colleagues at workplace during the Islamic month of Muharram:

When Muharram used to roll around and lipstick would disappear and the black clothes would come out, I remember a few raised eyebrows and some smirks here and there but I never paid attention.

Some participants felt uncomfortable when colleagues asked cynical questions about Shia beliefs and related rituals.

Well, they seem amazed at the ritual of matam [self-flagellation while mourning Imam Hussain], which they call "beating ourselves". Their remarks are derogatory and rude. They also seem to think we Shias exaggerate the tragedy at Karbala and most of it is dramatized by our aalims [clerics] and zaakirs [orators].

A colleague made fun of matam and zuljinah [Shia rituals of mourning in Muharram].

Some participants shared their experience of being subject to insensitive remarks and allegations during the Islamic month of Muharram:

One officemate didn't know that I am a Shia and told me that Shias do wrong things [adultery] at Sham-e-Ghareeban [the night of mourning on the 10th of Muharram] that's why they switch off lights. That’s when I told him that I am a Shia and he should refrain from false allegations.

Some participants felt uncomfortable when colleagues asked sarcastic questions about Shia beliefs and rituals. There was a view that some of the Sunni colleagues were either ill-informed or chose to remain politely silent.

Many of them remain politely silent. A few remain curious and ask strange, at times offending, questions about Shia beliefs and rituals.

Overall, the participants pointed toward general insensitivity towards Shia beliefs and practices.

Our mosque mullah (cleric) is super-hostile towards us in Muharram, prohibiting the Sunnis to go into processions even to see them.

My neighbors played a recorded, hateful speech against Shias. A madrassah near my house staged a program against Shias.

Harassment in Academic Institutions

Some participants reported that they faced discrimination in their school or colleges years. For example:

One of my high school teachers (teacher of Islamic Studies or Islamiyat) used to ridicule Shia students and their beliefs. Another teacher actually called me dirty. (male, Punjab)

My Islamic Studies professor to me: ‘Saying Ya Ali madad [O Ali, help me] is kufr [un-Islamic] and the one who says it is a kafir’ [non-Muslim]. A friend to me: ‘Do you guys really beat yourselves?’ Another friend: ‘Shiite belief is very dangerous.’

I remember once in Grade 5, my Urdu teacher, upon discovering that I was a Shia, made me stand up in front of the entire class and recite the kalma [fundamental article of Islamic faith. Within the Shia version of kalma, there is a commitment not only to Oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) but also to the sanctity of Ali]. When I had finished, she raised her eyebrows in a most incredulous manner and asked me, "Are you sure that what you have been taught is right?" Being 10 years old and her being my teacher, I obviously had NO answer for her as I shame-facedly sat down and I remember actually feeling quite embarrassed at what I had been out through AND of being a Shia.

Girls at hostel of our university have some very extremist anti-Shia thoughts. They say crap about our belief.

I faced discrimination since I started my school. This continued till I started my job. At schools, I used to listen to anti-Shia remarks such as 'you are not a true Muslim' and at work it was more sophisticated, 'why do you beat your chest in Muharram, Muslims are not supposed to hurt themselves'. I cannot recall discrimination by my employer but it is more from the colleagues which makes workplace a hostile environment at times.

Some participants also illustrated the way they responded to anti-Shia biases or remarks.

An event (of many events) specifically I would like to mention, once I requested my hostel warden for Muharram leaves, so that I could participate in Azadari [mourning rituals during Muharram]. The hostel warden's response was extremely anti Shia. In fact, he made fun of Azadari. All I did was to request him in a mild tone not to make fun.

I usually respond with reason and logic and with a tone of sarcasm and treat the other person as an uninformed dunce.

Only because they knew I was capable of answering back, they refrained from direct remarks.

Discrimination

The interviewees’ accounts point towards their experiences of discrimination, which is a logical consequence of biased attitudes and actions. The findings indicate the extent to which anti-Shia stereotypes and negative attitudes permeate in the workplace and result in anti-Shia discrimination. Majority of the participants faced some kind of discrimination (70%) at workplace. Many of them faced subtle or refined hostility (50%) while some faced blatant anti-Shia remarks (20%). The participants shared examples of discrimination or hostility in their workplace due to their Shia beliefs or practices.

I worked in xxx University where university teachers who lived with me in teachers' hostel used to play [SSP’s founder] Haq Nawaz Jhangvi's anti-Shia cassettes during Muharram and otherwise.

Always silly questions like, why you guys join prayers, why you need a sajdagah [earthen tablet used in prayer], why do you do Ziaraat [salutation of the Prophet and Imams] and the best one is, do Shias go to Iran for their Hajj?

All kinds of questions and blatant remarks about worshipping Imam Ali; Mutah [the provision of temporary marriage]; taqayya [hiding of faith to save life]; insulting the Sahaba [Companions of the Prophet], as well as innuendo about Hazrat Ali being responsible for killing of [Caliph] Usman. Gave them reply from their own sources.

My office colleagues often used anti-Shia jokes with me.

People have assumed on more than one occasion that I am not a Shia and have made some rather offensive remarks. On finding out I am in fact a Shia they are rather disappointed, rarely apologetic. I have been advised by colleagues not to disclose to other colleagues that I am a Shia. Where I work currently, I am subjected to a weekly Dars [religious lecture], I can't avoid. The ladies who come to give the Dars were very appreciative that I being rather younger than the rest of the lot took part in the weekly Dars and as a token of appreciation they gave me a magazine named 'Safaa' and a newspaper named 'Salaar'. Both official publications of Jamaat ud Dawa Pakistan [a radical Salafi Jihadist group banned by the United Nations] with Hafiz Saeed [founder of the group] making all the headlines on the front page for all his ‘selfless’ work that he does (NOT).

Subtle remarks about Shia majalis [mourning speeches] being too loud and causing disturbance. About how Shias revere Hazrat Ali more than the Prophet (PBUH) and equate Ali to God. About how Shias open their fast (roza) incorrectly in Ramzan. Also, more specific hostility by a colleague who did not know I was a Shia. So, sitting at a lunch with her and other colleagues one day, the topic turned to the Shia / Sunni rift, to which she openly declared that all Shias are kafirs because of xyz reasons. I heard her out and then very quietly informed her and everyone that we are a very intolerant bunch of people and insensitive. Also as we never know who is a Shia and who is not and therefore should refrain from making unfair, incorrect and biased statements.. Then I looked at her in the eye and said "I am a Shia". She was all apologies after that and even tried to justify her statement but the damage had been done.

Comment by co-workers in workplace referring to a Shia majority country such as Iran and Iraq saying that those are disbelievers.

Anti-Shia remarks are more common by frank Sunni colleagues and bosses who are perhaps not ill-meant but are surely insensitive.

The interviews suggest that it is not just the colleagues who offend or harass Shia Muslims but some employers and managers also play their role. For example, one of the participants mentioned that he lost his job only because the employer came to know that he was a Shia.

I was working in xxx Private Limited [a designer boutique owned by a singer turned Islamist] in Karachi. They fired me from my job and said you are a Shia, that’s why we can’t hire you.

Another participant (a male banker from Balochistan) shared his experience of insensitivity shown by his manager:

I was transferred to the Zhob branch at xxx (bank), and it is about 325 km away from Quetta. I kept requesting our district manager for my transfer to Quetta city as we have branches in that city, e.g. Alamdar Road branch which was safe for me because of being a Shia. [Anti-Shia target killing was very frequent in that region during those years.] However, he always said that either resign from job or you have to go to Zhob branch.

Some participants mentioned about discrimination they faced in terms of career progression:

They target us on number of occasions; corner me in the time of promotion or incentives only because I am a Shia.

I worked for [a newspaper]. I was not given a formal letter of appointment for one full year because according to the Executive Editor, the owner was reluctant to issue the letter because I was (am) a Shia.

The participants also identified some workplaces where Shia Muslims faced discrimination or were not employed at all. Almost 40% of the participants reported that there were some organizations where Shia Muslims faced some kind of discrimination.

The [xxx] group, xxx Industries (they make deep freezers) are two about whom I know first-hand. In the latter case, a Sunni graduate of Imamia Polytechnic, Lahore was refused job under the mistaken assumption that he was Shia. The institution changed its name to Pak Polytechnic after that.

Most of the private business run by right wingers leaning towards Jamaat e Islami’s and Jamaat ud Dawa's ideology strongly discourage Shia employees.

xxx Private Limited’s COO Mr xxx is a Salafi and has very hostile attitude towards Shias

Many schools being run by Deobandis in Islamabad are anti-Shia. In xxx School, a high level of hatred towards Shia community can be noticed.

xxx Fertilizers Limited is biased against Shias. Its owners prefer not to hire Shia employees.

xxx Group of Colleges is sectarian in subtle ways. I saw two posters of Jamaat ud Dawa inside the chemistry lab of the college. Professors speak indirectly against Shia beliefs.

Some organizations are providing recruitment forms for places like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. At the top of the form, it is stated specifically that only Sunnis can apply.

On some of Pakistan army's deployments to Saudi Arabia, I heard Shia officers and soldiers were not chosen.

Some firms have sect option on employment form asking question about sect. Some employers or managers who do this strongly reject Shia candidates.

Media organizations especially Islam newspaper of banned Al-Rasheed Trust, xxx Bank associated with the Darul Uloom Seminary, xxx Blood Bank, xxx TV, several pharmaceutics companies and educational institutions [discriminate against the Shia].

xxx University Islamabad is Saudi-funded and tends not to admit Shia students looking for higher studies.

A few participants also acknowledged that, at least in a few instances, their Shia identity added to their social capital and was beneficial for them when the interviewer or the organization’s owner was a Shia Muslim.

Effects of Anti-Shia Environment on Jobs

The interviews indicate how the current climate of hate, bias and violence against Shia Muslims in Pakistan is affecting their daily social and work lives. The participants’ accounts point towards violence against Shia professionals, businesspersons and entrepreneurs, particularly in Karachi, Quetta and D.I. Khan. This causes a lot of insecurity amongst Shia professionals and employees.

One cannot be very vocal or open about one’s Shia belief. It has to be kept pretty much under wraps, especially living in a city like Karachi, you never know when you may be targeted for your religious inclinations.

If you do not feel safe, then it affects your whole life. You are not focused on your work.

Even unsure about returning back safely from work.

What is happening around surely affects your mental and physical conditions. The sense of insecurity is limiting mobility.

Unable to interact and socialize. Go to office with a lot of fear.

Can't concentrate on my work. Always feel danger around me.

My life and work are enormously affected by current law and order situation particularly the anti-Shia violence.

It creates an atmosphere of fear in my family. We have been told to not use our full names so as to not sound like we are Shia for example my name is Syed …. …. Zaidi. I use …. …. in general usage as my full name makes me look like a Shia. It is true for all members of my family. We avoid using "Shia" names.

We can't travel far, or to some places, just due to the fear of Shia target killing, and this is affecting our business and education also our lives.

I am from Quetta and it is very difficult for us to go for our jobs and the businessmen are also afraid to go to their business. It is very hard to live in Pakistan then in Quetta at all, every moment an incident happens here, where should we go, what should we do? Mind is disturbed day to day, everything in routine is disturbed by this LeJ/SSP terrorism.

Shia professionals in Karachi are particularly treading the path of death on a daily basis.

Fear of going out to work especially because my work hours are at night.

I have been forced out of my city (D.I. Khan), left my job.

The levels of anxiety and fear varied from place to place. For example, several participants based in Islamabad and Punjab did not feel that much insecure in comparison to those in Quetta or Karachi.

Violence

The fourth level of the Pyramid, Bias-Motivated Violence, indicates that when biases and discrimination are unchecked, these may result in violence. The fifth level, Genocide, may grow from low-intensity violence and target killing to large-scale attacks not only on people and places of worship but also on culture, symbols, and traditions of the targeted community.

The study indicates the enormous scale of genocidal violence facing the Shia Muslims of Pakistan. 66% of the participants reported that one or more of their family members or friends died or injured in anti-Shia violence. This suggests high level of risk which Shia employees face while traveling to work or at work.

My paternal uncle was shot in his clinic.

My best friend his dad has been killed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), anti-Shia terrorists, when he was working at a bicycle stand in Zulfiqar Market, Quetta.

My uncle Professor Dr. xxxx was killed in Lahore in 2012.

My aunt, a female doctor, was murdered by Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in 2003.

My friend's father was killed in a bomb blast. He was a doctor, an ophthalmologist. My aunt's relative was targeted, he was a lawyer. Another I know personally was targeted at his shop.

SSP terrorists attacked Syed Ijaz Haider in Karachi while he was coming back from work. He had received a phone call threating him. And after 2 or 3 days he was shot. He was an English teacher and he used to teach in a couple of institutions, one of them a popular Shia school. That is what the terrorist didn’t like.

My wife's relative (a female medical doctor by profession) was killed in an attack by Sipah-e-Sahaba in South Punjab.

Our family friend Mukhtar Abbas Advocate was gunned down [in Karachi] by Wahhabi terrorists of outlawed outfit in July 2011, he was an advocate of Sindh High Court.

It may be noted that in common discourse in Pakistan, the term ‘Wahhabi’ is used to refer not only to the Ahl-e-Hadith community of South Asia but also to the Salafis of Saudi Arabia and the Deobandis of South Asia. This is despite the fact that there are important differences of jurisprudence between Salafi and Deobandi communities although both of them remain, in general, politically aligned to Saudi ‘Wahhabi’ clerics and are vehemently anti-Shia and anti-Sunni Barelvi/Sufi.

The findings also point towards how violence against the Shias affects employment and economic situation of the victims and/or their families. The results indicate that in many instances, victims’ families suffered immensely because either their businesses declined or were closed down and in several instances, they lost their sole breadwinner.

Two friends who were killed by Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP/ASWJ) were very decent and kindhearted people. One of them worked for a local post office at a management position. He was the only bread winner of the house. Their family was shattered.

My best friend who died in 2004 was the eldest son and engineering final year student then. His family was seriously counting on him.

Well, very poor. He has four children and now three of them left school to work to support his family.

My uncle was a farmer and due to his departure, his family was supported by his brother who had to sell his land and go abroad for earning.

It affected them in every way: social, economic. He was a lawyer and his son was studying to become a lawyer.

He was a government servant; he was the only earning individual of his family and the only son.

My cousin was martyred by the LeJ. He was a businessman; he owned a goldsmith shop at Liaqat Bazar Quetta which suffered badly.

She was a medical doctor. Her loss had a huge impact on the lives of their children both economically and socially.

Businessman, got killed. He was the only bread earner of the house.

Doctor. Family now moved abroad to grandparents.

Doctor. His kids and family are spending hardest days of life.

They have suffered financially and whole family is spiritually shocked. Now their families are helpless.

xxx, 30, teacher in a Language Centre, was son of my mother’ friend, gunned down by terrorists in Karachi. He left two little children and a widow behind him.

Injured, there was a financial impact because of his recovery which took two years.

The uncle who lost his life in xxx blast left behind a widow, one 13 year old son and two infant daughters. He had a small business of clocks and watches. His family is now dependent on martyr's elder brother.

She was a medical doctor, owned and managed a good quality hospital. The hospital was practically closed and rented out after her murder.

xxx used to recite Quran at religious gatherings at my place, was going to Gilgit Baltistan when he was taken off the bus, identified and shot. Left behind his wife and little children.

English Teacher. He was the only one running the home. He had his own two kids in addition to his younger brother and his parents. They belonged to a relatively lower middle class area.

He was a lecturer at a university in Karachi. His death led to the migration of his entire immediate family to the United States as they feared for their lives in Pakistan.

He was a teacher. His family is looked after by his brothers.

Who is Responsible for Violence and Lack of Security?

Majority of the participants identified Takfiri militants, emanating from an extremist fringe within the Deobandi sub-sect of Sunni Islam, for the killing and persecution of Shia Muslims. However, most of them did not blame mainstream Sunni Muslims for their persecution and target killing. This suggests that the anti-Shia violence is not considered a Shia Sunni issue, at least from Shia Muslims’ perspective. It is interesting to note that 42% of the participants held the media responsible for its misrepresentation of or silence on violence against Shias.

In terms of responsibility, about 90% of the participants said that Shias were being killed by Takfiri Deobandi and pro-Wahhabi groups such as SSP (aka ASWJ), LeJ and Taliban. 80% of them stated that Pakistani State had failed to protect them at the hands of the Islamist militant groups and their allies, some of which had been created by the state for strategic purposes in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Only 5% blamed all Sunni Muslims.

Well, the seeds of hate were promoted and protected by the state by providing military training to freelance jihadists for proxy jihad in Afghanistan. Also, the foreign powers that created this menace during the Afghan 'jihad', viz. USA, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Media is to be blamed because we expect a more positive role from media. A role where the media encourage religious harmony and present programs which promote brotherhood rather than focusing on programs that spread hatred and extremism.

Pakistani media often misrepresents Shia genocide as a Sunni-Shia issue which is a blatant lie.

Pakistan Army during the Afghan jihad and after that continued to train Deobandi and Salafi/Wahhabi groups which then mutated out of control and waged their own war against the Shia, Sunni Barelvis, Sufis, Christians etc..

There was a clear tendency among the participants not to blame the Sunni Muslims overall. Instead there was a unity discourse towards Sunnis while separating the extremist or Takfiri groups from the majority of peaceful and tolerant Sunnis.

Sunnis are absolutely brothers to us. Even many Sunnis that I know, join the Ashura procession for mannat (religious vows) and faith. Only Takfiris (SSP or ASWJ) are responsible for this violence. The kill both Shias and Sunnis.

I haven't checked "All Sunni Muslims" because they are not directly responsible. But in a way they too are responsible because they have maintained silence over Shia killings.

It was early 1980s. A large group of [extremists] came running towards the Ashura procession near Numaish [Karachi]. They carried big sticks to beat up people and chanted ‘kafir kafir Shia kafir’ [the usual slogan of SSP, ASWJ and LeJ that Shias are non-Muslims]. My husband and I could not reach our car. A Sunni guy stopped his bike and told us to sit. He told us not to waste a second as remaining there would be hell. He kept on cursing Wahhabis and he also was very mad at my husband for bringing me for ziarat as everyone knew about the threat it seemed except for us!

What Can Organizations Do to Help?

The participants also described what, in their view, organizations could do to ensure equality and well-being of Shia Muslims in the workplace. 78% of the participants said that organizations must strongly discourage anti-Shia remarks, jokes, all visible and subtle forms of anti-Shia discrimination, and develop tolerance and understanding of Sunni-Shia differences by training and awareness sessions. 70% said that organizations must provide equal opportunities in recruitment, training, promotion and salary. 50% of them said that organizations must ensure physical safety of Shia employees by providing better security at the workplace. 33% said that organizations must provide work from home option where necessary and possible. 20% of them said that organizations must provide armed security guards with the official/company transport. Some of the responses are given below:

Forbid religious preaching at workplace. Religious mania has done more harm than good in Pakistan.

Simply, employer is not supposed to discuss non-business topics and must implement zero tolerance against discussion of religion.

Organizations must not employ the extremists; this must be checked during the job interview.

Discussion

The findings suggest that religion continues to function as a macro social force affecting business and society (Van Buren et al. 2019) in Pakistan, and that Shia Muslim professionals and employees face a pyramid of hate right from their social and academic experiences to religious practice and employment. The religious bias and the climate of hate they face in the wider society permeate into their professional lives and exposes them to biased action, discrimination, harassment and violence. As a result, their lives are engulfed by a pyramid of hate where they are worried about physical, social and economic security of themselves and their loved ones. In several cases, such discrimination and hate has led to devastating physical, psychological and economic effects.

The findings also indicate Shia Muslims’ individual agency and the resistance in terms of dealing with this hatred. However, most participants do not blame all Sunnis and instead are quite reconciliatory and pragmatic in their approach.

The study points towards the heterogeneity of individual experiences on the basis of ethnicity. For example, Hazara Shias of Quetta are particularly vulnerable because of their ethnically distinct features which makes it easy for the anti-Shia groups to spot and target them. This results in more vulnerability and more fear, with many of them leaving their jobs or country in search of legal or illegal immigration, often in precarious circumstances.

Limitations of the Study

A notable limitation of the study is the fact that most of the participants were male. This may be attributed to the fact that female employment in Pakistan’s formal economic sector is very low. Men, more often than women, are subject to violence because of their more visibility in public space including work, markets and transport. In most (not all) cases of anti-Shia violence, males are the victims. Future scholars may wish to conduct research on issues and challenges female religious minority employees and professionals focusing on the aspects of intersectionality of gender and religion which are not covered in the present study.

Practical Implications

In terms of its practical implications, policy makers, practitioners and business leaders in organizations in Pakistan and elsewhere may conduct awareness and sensitivity sessions on the pyramid of hate that may prevail within and outside the workplace and how this could be addressed by ensuring that organizational structures and routines remain free of all forms of religious bias and harassment, uncivil and offensive conversations and discrimination. Clear policies may be formulated and implemented which categorically prohibit religious preaching and conversations at work and ensure strict action against those responsible for harassing and insulting remarks or actions. Employers may also consider to provide additional security to their Shia employees—at work and also while commuting—if the possibility of violence is high or give them the option to work from home. In light of Oetzel’s (2009) study on the role business can play in creating sustainable peace, organizations can actively engage in conflict reduction including promoting economic development, the rule of law, contributing to a sense of community, and other similar diversity and reconciliation practices.

Conclusion

This paper has provided a ‘pyramid of hate’ perspective on issues and challenges facing Pakistani Shia Muslim professionals and employees in a climate that seems to give permission to hate and has failed to protect Shia. The qualitative study has shown how biased attitudes and behaviors within and outside the workplace create an environment that legitimizes insensitivity and hostility towards a minority community. The study suggests that unless this pyramid of hate is tackled at multiple levels, particularly addressing the biased attitudes and stereotypes at the base of this pyramid, it will be difficult to stop biased actions, discrimination and violence facing Shia Muslims in Pakistan.