Abstract
In chapter eleven of "On The Foundation of Computing," Primiero takes on the implementation debate in computer science. He contrasts his theory with two other views—the Semantic and the specification—artifact. In this paper, I argue that there is a way to fine-tune the implementation concept further. Firstly, contrary to Primiero, I claim it is problematic to separate the implementation relationship from the conditions which make it correct. Secondly, by taking a pluralistic approach to implementation, I claim it is a mistake to try and provide a general theory of implementation for the entire production cycle of computational systems.
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Notes
For an overview of the subject matter covered in Part II and other parts of the book see: Symons and AbuMusab (2020).
The nature of the mind, whether it is physical or non-physical is hardly settled. The literature covering these issues is massive. For an introduction: Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition). Barbara Monetro has made arguments highlighting the difficult task of formulating the mind-body problem itself by questioning whether theorists’ have a handle on the nature of what is the ‘physical,’ see: (Montero 1999, 2009).
Curtis-Trudel (2021). “Why we need implementation theories?”.
Corey Maley disagrees. According to him the mind or brain is literally a computer, just not a digital computer, but an analog machine. See: Maley (2022), “How (and why) to think the brain is literally a computer,” Frontiers in Computre Science. Section: Theoritcal Computer Science https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomp.2022.970396.
See Ritchie and Piccinini (2019) for a survey of issues concerning implementation theories in the philosophy of mind.
I should note that this paper by Turner was published after Primiero’s book.
Turner also provides a another example of finding a physical artifact in a field and the investigator tinkering with its buttons and developing a theory to explain what the artifact likely does (Turner 2011, pg. 8).
Here I should note that In “The Foundation of Computation,” Primiero’s exposition of Turner’s position is not exactly in agreement with mine here. Where Primiero separates the three implementation as somewhat three disconnected theories, I take them as three interrelated components of a single notion.
Although, Primiero’s implementation theory is general and is capable of ranging over all LoAs, the correctness conditions which he goes on to provide seem to indicate otherwise.
For a detailed explanation of the logic of design by Primiero see: Primiero (2019).
For detailed take on the concept of misfunction and dysfunction see Floridi et al. (2015).
Of course, the program ought to perform the functional and procedural goals of the algorithm, but ideally this is captured by the representational theory of implementation (For one such example see: Rescorla 2014).
One concern here might be to question the focus on implementing the algorithm all the way to AEL. Why not focus on the α1, that is the intention of the client, and construe implementation as the implementation of intention from α1 to α5? Thus, frame the correctness conditions by focusing on the intentionality.
In case of CS, it might be more accurate to say a bridge between the gradated ontological domains, from the most abstract to concrete.
Note, one is not required to utilize Primiero’s general implementation theory but are free to pick the most fitting one for the project at hand.
Primiero would certainly disagree with referring to definition 121—functional correctness—as an implementation theory in its own right.
The “- > ” = the direction of governance.
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Acknowledgment
A special thank you goes to John Symons for his valuable feedback. I also thank Giuseppe Primiero for his insightful and generous conversations about his work.
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AbuMusab, S. Implementing a Computing System: A Pluralistic Approach. glob. Philosophy 33, 20 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09663-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09663-5