Skip to main content
Log in

A New Halpern-Pearl Definition of Actual Causality by Appealing to the Default World

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Axiomathes Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Halpern and Hitchcock appealed to the normality of witness worlds to solve the problem of isomorphism in the Halpern-Pearl definition of actual causality. This paper first proposes a new isomorphism counterexample, called “bogus permission,” to show that their approach is unsuccessful. Then, to solve the problem of isomorphism, I propose a new improvement over the Halpern-Pearl definition by introducing default worlds. Finally, I demonstrate that my new definition can resolve more potential counterexamples than similar approaches in the current literature, including the Lewisian causal dependence, Menziesian causal dependence, and modified version of the Halpern-Pearl definition. Some other advantages of my definition are also discussed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For simplicity, I followed the literature that omits the explicit reference to the exogenous variables in the following discussion.

  2. Based on the so-called default role of normal causality in that paper.

  3. SE refers to structural equations.

  4. I changed the original formation slightly.

  5. Halpern’s modified definition states that \({B}_{1}=1\wedge {B}_{2}=1\wedge C=1\) is the actual cause, and \(C=1\) is part of a cause. Halpern seems to think this understanding is enough. However, I believe that philosophers aim to find the complete definition of actual causality. Either the part of a cause should be counted as the cause, or it should not. By applying ACmod, neither of \({B}_{1}=1,{B}_{2}=1,C=1\) is the cause.

References

  • Blanchard T, Schaffer J (2017) Cause without default. In: Beebee H, Hitchcock C, Price H (eds) Making a Difference. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 175–214

    Google Scholar 

  • Briggs R (2012) Interventionist counterfactuals. Philos Stud 160:139–166

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenton-Glynn L (2017) A proposed probabilistic extension of the Halpern and Pearl definition of actual cause. Br J Philos Sci 68(4):1061–1164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Galles D, Pearl J (1997) Axioms of causal relevance. Artif Intell 97(1–2):9–43

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall N (2007) Structural equations and causation. Philos Stud 132:109–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpern J (2016) Actual causality. MIT Press, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Halpern J, Hitchcock C (2013) Compact representations of extended causal models. Cogn Sci 37(6):986–1010

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpern J, Hitchcock C (2015) Graded causation and defaults. Br J Philos Sci 66(2):413–457

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpern J, Pearl J (2005) Causes and explanations: a structural model approach—part I: causes. Br J Philos Sci 56:843–887

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpern J, Pearl J (2001) Causes and explanations: a structural model approach—part I: causes. In: Proc. Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2001), pp 194–201

  • Halpern J (2008) Defaults and normality in causal structures. In: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proc. Eleventh International Conference, pp 198–208

  • Halpern J (2015) A modification of the Halpern-Pearl definition of causality. In: Proc. 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), pp 3022–3033

  • Hart A, Honor M (1959) Causation in the law. Oxford University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Hiddleston E (2005) Causal powers. Br J. Philos Sci 56(1):27–59

    Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock C (2001) The intransitivity of causation revealed in equations and graphs. J Philos 98(6):273–299

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock C (2007) Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philos Rev 116:495–532

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock C, Knobe J (2009) Cause and norm. J Philos 106(11):587–612

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D (1973) Causation. J Philos 70:556–567

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Menzies P (2004) Difference-making in context. In: Collins J, Hall N, Paul L (eds) Counterfactuals and Causation. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 139–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Menzies P (2007) Causation in context. In: Price H, Corry R (eds) Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 191–223

    Google Scholar 

  • Menzies P (2009) Platitudes and counterexamples H. In: Beebee, Menzies P, Hitchcock C (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 341–367

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearl J (2009) Causality: models, reasoning and inference. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Yablo S (2002) De facto dependence. J Philos 99(3):130–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yablo S (2004) Advertisement for a sketch of an outline of a proto-theory of causation. In: Collins J, Hall N, Paul L (eds) Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press, Cambridge, Mass, pp 119–137

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Feng Ye, Mu Liu, Jiangjie Qiu, Hao Li, Sisi Yang, Ge Song, and members of the Reading Group: Causal Reasoning and Causal Modeling for their helpful comments and discussions.

Funding

No funds, grants, or other support was received.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Contributions

FZ contributed to the study conception and design. The draft of the manuscript was written by FZ.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fan Zhu.

Ethics declarations

Conflicts of interest

The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix 1

Appendix 1

Proofs of theorems require a property of interventionist counterfactuals that have been proved by Galles and Pearl (1997).

Composition. If \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \left[ {\vec{X} = \vec{x}} \right]\vec{W} = \vec{w}\), then: \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \left[ {\vec{X} = \vec{x},\vec{W} = \vec{w}} \right]\vec{Y} = \vec{y}\), if and only if, \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \left[ {\vec{X} = \vec{x}} \right]\vec{Y} = \vec{y}\).

Theorem 1

Let \(\overrightarrow{X}=\overrightarrow{x}\) be \(X=x\), \(\varphi\) be \(Y=y\), and they are Boolean variables, the following conditions hold:

  1. (1)

    If they have Menziesian causal dependence, they satisfy AC2def (a).

  2. (2)

    If they satisfy AC2def and for any \(x^{\prime}\), \(\left( {M,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x^{\prime}} \right]\vec{W} = \vec{w}\) where \(\overrightarrow{W}=\overrightarrow{w}\) is the contingencies, then they have Menziesian causal dependence.

Proof:

(1) Let \(\overrightarrow{W}\) be \(\varnothing\). AC2def (a) trivially holds.

(2) Assuming that \(X = x\) and \(Y = y\) satisfy AC2def, and \(\left( {M,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x} \right]\vec{W} = \vec{w}\), we at least have \(\left( {M,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x,\vec{W} = \vec{w}} \right]Y = y\) and \(\left( {M,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x} \right]\vec{W} = \vec{w}\). By composition, \(\left( {M ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {\vec{X} = \vec{x}} \right]Y = y\). Since \(X = x\) and \(Y = y\) satisfy AC2def, we have there is a \(X = x^{\prime}\) such that \(\left( {M ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x^{\prime},\vec{W} = \vec{w}} \right]\neg \left( {Y = y} \right)\). Therefore, \(\left( {M_{X = x^{\prime}} ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {\vec{W} = \vec{w}} \right]\neg \left( {Y = y} \right)\). Since \(\left( {M_{X = x^{\prime}} ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \vec{W} = \vec{w}\), again by the composition, \(\left( {M ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x^{\prime}} \right]Y = y^{\prime}\).

Theorem 2

Let \(\overrightarrow{X}=\overrightarrow{x}\) be \(X=x\), and \(\varphi\) be \(Y=y\), and they are Boolean variables, if AC2def holds when taking \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{W} = \vec{w}\) as contingencies and \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash X = x\), then for the same \(\vec{W} = \vec{w}\), they satisfy AC2mod (b), and hence AC2org (b).

Proof:

Assuming that \(X = x\) and \(Y = y\) satisfy AC2def when taking \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{W} = \vec{w}\) as the contingency, for all subsets \(\vec{Z}^{\prime}\) of \(\vec{Z}\) and \(\vec{z}^{*}\) such that \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*}\), we have \(\left( {M_{{\vec{W} = \vec{w}}} ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x,\vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*} } \right]Y = y\). Let \(\vec{Z}^{\prime}\) be \(\vec{Z}\), since \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{W} = \vec{w}\), we have \(\left( {M_{{\vec{Z} = \vec{z}^{*} ,\vec{W} = \vec{w}}} ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) = \left( {M_{{\vec{W} = \vec{w}}} ,\vec{u}} \right) = \left( {M,\vec{u}} \right)\). Since \(\left( {M_{{\vec{Z} = \vec{z}^{*} ,\vec{W} = \vec{w}}} ,\vec{u}^{d} } \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x} \right]Y = y\), \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x} \right]Y = y\). Because \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash X = x\), we have \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash Y = y\). s\(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{W} = \vec{w} \wedge X = x \wedge \vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*}\) for all subsets \(\vec{Z}^{\prime}\) of \(\vec{Z}\) and \(\vec{z}^{*}\) such that \(\left( {M,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*}\). Therefore, for the same \(\vec{W} = \vec{w}\) and \(\vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*}\), \(\left( {M_{{\vec{W} = \vec{w}}} ,\vec{u}} \right) \vDash \left[ {X = x,\vec{Z}^{\prime} = \vec{z}^{*} } \right]Y = y\).

proof from AC2mod (b) to AC2org(b) is trivial.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Zhu, F. A New Halpern-Pearl Definition of Actual Causality by Appealing to the Default World. Axiomathes 32 (Suppl 2), 453–472 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09613-z

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09613-z

Keywords

Navigation