Abstract
This paper deals with the question of what the most appropriate semantic theory for theoretical terms would be. Traditionally, in the contemporary literature of philosophy of language, there have been two widely held semantic theories: the descriptivist theory and the causal theory. Comparing theoretical terms with natural kind terms, I attempt to show that the causal theory of reference applies to natural kinds owing to certain ontological and epistemological assumptions of natural kinds realism. I argue that there is no reason to keep these assumptions with respect to theoretical entities. Consequently, the causal theory of reference cannot be applied to theoretical terms. Instead, because of certain ontological and epistemological features of theoretical entities, the rival semantic theory, i.e., the descriptivist theory of reference, properly explains how the referents of these terms get fixed and how these terms find their referents. The paper is structured as follows: the first part deals with the question of how a theoretical entity/kind should be distinguished from non-theoretical ones. The second part facilitates a comparison between theoretical kinds and natural kinds to reveal the ontological and epistemological features of each category. In the third part, I argue why the causal theory of reference fails to be a plausible semantic for theoretical terms, and why its rival theory, i.e., the descriptivist theory, provides an appropriate semantic for such terms. Finally, I raise two potential objections regarding my proposed view and try to show how these objections can be overcome.
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Notes
Viruses might be an example of such entities. See Andreas (2017).
The duck–rabbit example that Wittgenstein uses in his “Philosophical Investigation” might provide a sense of what the theory-ladenness of an observation means. See Ibid.
The non-ostensibility condition of theoreticity is suggested by Enc (1976) who defines an entity as theoretical if it is not ostensible. I agree with Enc; however, I believe that ostensibility is just a necessary condition for theoreticality. There are some entities which are not ostensible; but we are not aware of them. To be theoretical means to be posited by a theory for the sake of explaining some phenomena; thus, we should be aware of the entity. Also, it is worth noting that theoretical entities are not limited to scientific inquiries. Wherever, a non-ostensible entity is posited by a theory, either philosophical, or scientific or etc., the entity is regarded as theoretical in this picture. In this way, metaphysical entities such as tropes, forms, abstract objects, etc. all are counted as theoretical entities as well.
This issue does not entail that entities that are mind-dependent and satisfy the mentioned test are unreal and illusory. It is true that all unreal things are mind-dependent; but the converse does not hold. Being mind-dependent is a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, of being unreal. Rather, an item needs to satisfy some other conditions to be counted as non-existent. The independence principle, described here, only draws a line regarding the ontological status of two categories: mind-dependent entities and mind-independent entities. Artifacts and social entities, for instance, are all mind-dependent based upon this test; nevertheless, they are all real and play causal role in the world. However, the reality of mind-dependent things depends on mental states.
As we see, these epistemic principles only hold for cases that are ontologically objective and mind-independent. Since natural kind are supposed to be mind-dependent and objective, then these epistemological principles apply to them, but they do not uniquely belong to natural kind realism.
These features do not uniquely belong to natural kinds; the occurrence of ignorance and error regarding an entity or kind only shows that the causal theory of reference is a reliable semantic to explain how a term signifies the entity. The occurrence of the ignorance principle about natural kind terms can also be understood through the lens of Kripke’s semantic, epistemic, and modal arguments against descriptivism. See Salmon (1981).
As mentioned in the fourth footnote, being mind-dependent does not necessarily mean that theoretical entities are unreal and illusory. Rather, they only belong to the categories of mind-dependent entities since they are introduced and posited via a human activity. It is worth noting that theoretical kinds are not discovered by human being; the process of discovery occurs to something that is potentially perceptible and ostensible. Theoretical kinds, by definition, lack these features. Hence, no one really discovers theoretical entities; rather they are just stipulated within a theory to explain certain observable phenomena. It is also worth mentioning what I say here only pertains to the theoretical aspects of scientific activities; it is wrong to assume that all scientific inquiries are theoretical.
As I argued, a competent user of a theoretical term is either a scientist who contributed in the development of the theory in which the term is defined or is a person who has a sort of familiarity with the theory.
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Hashemi, A. How Does a Theoretical Term Refer?. Axiomathes 32, 957–968 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09555-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09555-6