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Cognitive Neuroscience and the Hard Problems

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Abstract

This paper argues that the fundamental problem of cognitive neuroscience arises from the neuronal description of the brain and the phenomenal description of the conscious mind. In general philosophers agree that no functional approach can explain phenomenal consciousness; some even think that science is forever unable to explain the qualitative character of our experiences. In order to overcome these challenges, I propose a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the brain according to which brain states are characterized by intrinsic properties, whereas the brain under the causal influence of an organism’s environment acquires extrinsic properties. These extrinsic properties may account for both phenomenal experiences as well as our thoughts about these experiences. At the end I discuss this proposal viability in relation to higher-order theories.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Copenhagen, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Jan Faye

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  1. Jan Faye
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Correspondence to Jan Faye.

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Faye, J. Cognitive Neuroscience and the Hard Problems. Axiomathes 29, 561–575 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09440-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09440-3

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