Abstract
The Analysis of Wonder is a stimulating and worthy introduction to the difficult and unique thought of Nicolai Hartmann. In this venue, the focus is upon criticisms of Cicovacki’s book. The opportunity to elicit further clarification and argumentation from Cicovacki should be fruitful. Hartmann’s philosophy is truly unique in nature and vast. As such, it is worth noting at the outset that, given the nature of Cicovacki’s book and a lack of deeper familiarity with Hartmann’s philosophy, the concerns raised herein may very well be issues in Hartmann that Cicovacki is replicating. The criticisms addressed herein present five sets of worries related to The Analysis of Wonder. The first three may be relatively minor concerns having to do with (1) what is meant by the rediscovery of the world; (2) Cicovacki’s criticisms of post-modernism and existentialism; and (3) Cicovacki’s use of Arendt as a way of framing Hartmann’s value to contemporary philosophy and beyond. The latter two sets of worries are more substantive. They involve (4) Hartmann’s account of the importance of a loving attitude and (5) Hartmann’s theory of personality. Again, these are presented in the spirit of an invitation to dialogue more about Hartmann, a figure who Cicovacki represents well in The Analysis of Wonder.
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Notes
See my review in The Review of Metaphysics 68.2 (2014).
A review by one versed in Hartmann is found in Tremblay, Frederic. Quaestio, 14 (2014): 348–350.
All page numbers in parentheses within the main body of the text refer to pages in The Analysis of Wonder. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.
This is not idle speculation; I base this on the exchanges had in the Hartmann Society’s meeting in conjunction with SPEP in Fall of 2015. Cicovacki himself seemed to endorse the notion that a reaction against Idealism is at least part of what motivated Hartmann. If I’m wrong, it is my error of judgment. But it helps make much more sense of why Hartmann would have thought this was a problem that required solving.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi, trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984: xxiv.
A review of the bibliography of Hartmann’s works cited supports this contention further.
Useless values are values without “any tangible purpose or visible end” (92). One is also unclear as to why love could not have utility, even if it is agreed that love should not be understood solely in terms of utility.
One wonders whether the concept in question is better referred to as personhood.
As I come to complete my comments, a new concern emerges, one that might actually be helpful in dealing with other worries. Hartmann’s understanding of meaning is peculiar. We are told that meaning is given or bestowed by values, especially useless values (67, 91–92, 104, 120). Further it is asserted that, under certain conditions, everything can be meaningful (104). The value of personality is something that has a unique meaning, which may require certain preconditions for one to grasp (136). Is meaning derived only from values? If true, how is one able to make sense of the meaning of a proposition? Further, why believe meaning comes from values instead of the other way around, that values express meanings, i.e. one finds something to have certain meaning, and thus one values it—as opposed to Hartmann’s account which appears to claim that one recognizes a value and only then receives the meaning? The former strikes one as far more plausible.
The frequent association with Nietzsche in connection with radiant virtue seems to warrant use of this term, of course this is intended without any of the vile connotations associated with Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche’s abuse of her brother’s thought. Cicovacki is good to warn us away from any such affiliation in Hartmann’s case.
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Chelstrom, E. Criticisms of Cicovacki’s The Analysis of Wonder . Axiomathes 27, 175–183 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-016-9303-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-016-9303-5