Abstract
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’. I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach: defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality. I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Egan (2004) argues that, in general, 2nd order predication (properties of properties) provides counterexamples to necessary coextensiveness as an all purpose criterion of property identity. It does so because properties can themselves can have extrinsic properties (e.g. the extrinsic property of abstract objects endorsed by Plato). There will be some worlds (in which Plato was a nominalist, say) in which the property (or abstract object) doesn’t have this extrinsic property. Properties (and abstract objects) retain their identities across possible worlds. The property repudiated by Lewis cannot be identical with the set or class of its members in all possible worlds, because the same property (or abstract object) is a member of this set in one world, but is not a member in the worlds from which Lewis is absent or in which he is a Platonist.
I put ‘the duplicate of’ in brackets to maintain neutrality between counterpart theory and that of trans-world individuals.
Unless Lewis (1986) is right that there are relations which are neither internal nor external. His example of such a relation—having the same owner—is plainly d-relational.
Thirdly, see note 2, Egan (2004) and the examples immediately to follow.
Another sort of example, where identity is necessary but distinctness is contingent, is the argument relating contingent heterogeneity to what Schaffer (2008) calls ‘priority monism’. If the heterogeneity which underpins metaphysical pluralism is contingent, while identity is necessary, then the logically and ontologically prior identity of the One (the Whole) trumps any indefinite variety of contingent heterogeneities there might be in the universe. This intuition is at work in e.g. anthropic arguments in cosmology which take the Whole to comprise innumerable possible universes whose laws of nature, and hence properties of matter can differ ad libitum. Most are such as not to permit the existence of cognitive subjects. Our universe is one of the few, or perhaps the only one which does permit this. So any knowable universe must be much as we find this universe to be, or it would not have cognitive subjects (i.e. us) in it. The ‘fine tuning’ of a universe with us in it is explained with reference to the logical and ontological priority of a far larger Whole—the ‘Multiverse’—of which we are a necessary but miniscule part.
References
Egan A (2004) Second-order predication and the metaphysics of properties. Australas J Phil 82(1):48–66
Fine K (1994) Essence and modality: the second philosophical perspectives lecture. Phil Persp 8:1–16
Francescotti R (1999) How to define intrinsic properties. Noûs 33(4):590–609
Humberstone IL (1996) Intrinsic/extrinsic. Synthese 108:205–267
Langton R, Lewis D (1998) Defining ‘intrinsic’. Reprinted in Lewis D (1999) Papers in metaphysics and epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 116–132
Lewis D (1983) New work for a theory of universals. Australas J Phil 61:343–377
Lewis D (1986) On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell, Oxford
Lewis D (2001) Redefining ‘intrinsic’. Phil Phenomenol Res 63(2):381–398
Marshall D (2009) Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions? Phil Phenomenol Res 78(3):646–672
Moore GE (1903) Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Quine WV (1972) Review of Munitz M (ed) Identity and Individuation in J Phil 69:488–497
Schaffer J (2008) Monism. In: Zalta EN (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/monism/>
Weatherson B (2001) Intrinsic properties and combinatorial principles. Phil Phenomenol Res 63:365–380
Weatherson B (2007) Intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties. In: Zalta EN(ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/>
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Harris, R. How to Define Extrinsic Properties. Axiomathes 20, 461–478 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9078-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9078-z