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Plausible Argumentation in Eikotic Arguments: The Ancient Weak Versus Strong Man Example

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Abstract

In this paper it is shown how plausible reasoning of the kind illustrated in the ancient Greek example of the weak and strong man can be analyzed and evaluated using a procedure in which the pro evidence is weighed against the con evidence using formal, computational argumentation tools. It is shown by means of this famous example how plausible reasoning is based on an audience’s recognition of situations of a type they are familiar with as normal and comprehensible in their shared common knowledge. The paper extends previous work on this example by using three new multiagent argumentation schemes closely related to the scheme for argument from negative consequences.

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Notes

  1. Plausible reasoning was attacked by Plato, as part of his general denunciation of the Sophists. This attack created a strong prejudice against plausible reasoning throughout the history of philosophy (Kraus 2007, 3–4).

  2. See (Cole 1991) for a discussion of the controversy on whether it should be attributed to Corax or Tisias, or even whether they may be the same person.

  3. Two kinds of argument attack (defeaters) are recognized in the literature that will be distinguished in Sect. 7. A rebutting defeater (also often called a conclusion attack) attacks the conclusion of the target argument. An undercutting defeater attacks the inferential link joining the premises to the conclusion by citing circumstances in which the inferential link fails to hold, even though it may hold generally.

  4. Carneades is open source software, available at http://carneades.github.com/.

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Walton, D. Plausible Argumentation in Eikotic Arguments: The Ancient Weak Versus Strong Man Example. Argumentation 33, 45–74 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9460-3

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