Abstract
Plausible (eikotic) reasoning known from ancient Greek (late Academic) skeptical philosophy is shown to be a clear notion that can be analyzed by argumentation methods, and that is important for argumentation studies. It is shown how there is a continuous thread running from the Sophists to the skeptical philosopher Carneades, through remarks of Locke and Bentham on the subject, to recent research in artificial intelligence. Eleven characteristics of plausible reasoning are specified by analyzing key examples of it recognized as important in ancient Greek skeptical philosophy using an artificial intelligence model called the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS). By applying CAS to ancient examples it is shown how plausible reasoning is especially useful for gaining a better understanding of evidential reasoning in law, and argued that it can also be applied to everyday argumentation. Our analysis of the snake and rope example of Carneades is also used to point out some ways CAS needs to be extended if it is to more fully model the views of this ancient philosopher on argumentation.
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Notes
Plausible reasoning was attacked by Plato, as part of his general denunciation of the Sophists, and this attack created a strong prejudice against plausible reasoning throughout the history of philosophy.
This suggests the example was a common trope in ancient times.
It may appear that both arguments are equally plausible, but Aristotle sees a difference, writing (Rhetoric 1402a 11) that only the one is “probable absolutely”. However, he does not explain what he means by this.
It should be recalled that when reporting the views of Carneades, Sextus used the example of testing plausibility by cross-examination of witness testimony in a trial.
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Acknowledgments
Doug Walton and Tom Gordon would like to acknowledge support from our Social Sciences and Humanities Insight Grant. All three of us would like thank the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric for support of our work.
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Walton, D., Tindale, C.W. & Gordon, T.F. Applying Recent Argumentation Methods to Some Ancient Examples of Plausible Reasoning. Argumentation 28, 85–119 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9306-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9306-y