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Regress Argument Reconstruction

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Abstract

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.

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Notes

  1. The ‘charity’ label derives from Wilson (1959) and has been made popular by Quine and Davidson in the debate on radical interpretation. For the application of Charity to argument reconstruction, cf. e.g. Rescher (1964: 162), Feldman (1993: 115).

  2. ‘Validity’ and ‘soundness’ are used in the usual way, so an argument is valid just in case the conclusion follows from the premises, and it is sound if the premises are true as well.

  3. For a clear statement of these two goals, cf. Johnson (2000: 132, cf. 158). For related reasons, the Charity Rules have been criticized in the literature, and I will turn to this in Sect. 4.

  4. Namely: (1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. (2) Knowledge how to F is knowledge that φ(F). (3) If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the proposition that p.

  5. An alternative reconstruction of Ryle’s IRA in failure format starts from (1*) You have to explain how S performs at least one intelligent action, and concludes to (C*) If you appeal to the fact that S employs knowledge-that anytime you have to explain how S intelligently performs an action, then you never explain how S performs any intelligent action.

  6. Two further structural differences concern their take on infinite regresses (series of necessary conditions vs. series of problem/solution pairs) and the step from the regress to the conclusion (and what kind of premises and inferences are supposed to license this step). For a full comparison, cf. Wieland (ms).

  7. Ryle uses the word ‘circle’. Yet it is clear that he refers to an infinite regress argument, and not to a circularity argument. These two kinds of arguments can and should be kept apart, but I will not go into that here.

  8. To be sure, in both cases one may try to resist the suppressed premises and inferences next to the premises. Yet, in most cases this is not very obvious, if the suppressed premises are general truths and the inferences licensed by classical rules. See the "Appendix” for references.

  9. This last argument relates to the first argument because the strength of the conclusion depends on the number and plausibility of the premises.

  10. A selected number instances might be motivated by Aristotle’s, historically influential, Principle of the Absolute (cf. Beth 1952: 66–68; Peijnenburg 2011).

  11. Or find another way to explain how people perform intelligent actions, if the problem is theoretical (viz. to explain this) rather than practical (i.e. to perform them yourself), cf. fn. 5 above.

  12. I do not think that anyone in the literature exactly fits this description of a Conservative Pluralist. Still, the studies by e.g. Day (1986, 1987) and Gratton (1997, 2010) are far less revisionary than what I am proposing here. A clear example of a Revisionist is Black (1996). Yet, he is no Pluralist, as we have seen in Sect. 2, but Paradox-Monist.

  13. What the list of these general criteria exactly is, I did not say. It may even be a slightly different list for different kinds of arguments. Still, I made three specific suggestions for IRAs in Sect. 3.

  14. This schema has variants where (2) or (3) is rejected rather than (1). See the references below.

  15. This schema has a variant with a conclusion of the form ‘You never φ all items of type i’ rather than ‘You never φ any item of type i’. See the references below.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Anna-Sofia Maurin, Eline Scheerlinck, Maarten Van Dyck, Erik Weber and the reviewer of the journal for excellent advice. The author is PhD fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

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  1. Centre for Logic & Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, Room 2.26, 9000, Ghent, Belgium

    Jan Willem Wieland

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Correspondence to Jan Willem Wieland.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Paradox Schema

  1. (1)

    For all items x of type i, x is F only if such-and-such (e.g. there is a y and x and y stand in R) (HYP).

  2. (2)

    For all items x of type i, such-and-such only if there is a new item y of type i and y is F (PREM).

  3. (3)

    There is at least one item of type i that is F (PREM).

  4. (4)

    There is an infinity of items that are F (1–3).

  5. (5)

    There is no infinity of items that are F (PREM).

  6. (C)

    ~(1): It is not the case that, for all items x of type i, x is F only if such-and-such (1–5).Footnote 14

To obtain instances of this schema, ‘type i’ is to be replaced with a specific domain, and the capitals ‘F’, ‘R’ with predicates which express properties and relations (e.g. items of type i = propositions, F = being justified, R = being a reason for). For details about the inferences (i.e. the suppressed lines and rules), cf. Wieland (ms). Main supporters of this schema are Black (1996) and Gratton (1997, 2010). Parts of this schema have also been discussed or suggested, if only briefly, by Russell (1903), Beth (1952), Yalden-Thomson (1964), Gettier (1965), Schlesinger (1983), Sanford (1984), Day (1986, 1987), Clark (1988), Jacquette (1996), Nolan (2001), Klein (2003), Maurin (2007), Rescher (2010: ch. 2).

1.2 Failure Schema

  1. (1)

    You have to φ at least one item of type i (PREM).

  2. (2)

    For all items x of type i, if you have to φ x, you ψ x (HYP).

  3. (3)

    For all items x of type i, if you ψ x, then there is a new item y of type i, and you φ x only if you φ y first (PREM).

  4. (4)

    For all items x of type i, there is always a new item that you have to φ first, viz. before φ-ing x (1–3).

  5. (C)

    If you ψ all items of type i that you have to φ, then you never φ any item of type i (1–4).Footnote 15

To obtain instances of this schema, ‘type i’ is to be replaced with a specific domain, and the Greek letters ‘φ’, ‘ψ’ with predicates which express actions involving the items in that domain (e.g. items of type i = propositions, φ = to justify, ψ = to provide a reason for). For details about the inferences (i.e. the suppressed lines and rules), cf. Wieland (ms). This schema is my own contribution to the literature. The pioneer of this schema is Passmore (1961). Parts of this schema have also been discussed or suggested, if only briefly, by Russell (1903), Rankin (1969), Armstrong (1974), Johnson (1978), Rosenberg (1978), Schlesinger (1983), Sanford (1984), Day (1986, 1987), Ruben (1990), Johnstone (1996), Gillett (2003), Maurin (2007).

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Wieland, J.W. Regress Argument Reconstruction. Argumentation 26, 489–503 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9264-9

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