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The Kisceral: Reason and Intuition in Argumentation

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Abstract

Gilbert’s four modes of communication include the logical, the emotional, the visceral and the kisceral, which last has not received much attention at all. This mode covers the forms of argument that rely on intuition and undefended basal assumptions. These forms range from the scientific and mathematical to the religious and mystical. In this paper these forms will be examined, and suggestions made for ways in which intuitive frameworks can be compared and valued.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

    Michael A. Gilbert

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  1. Michael A. Gilbert
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Correspondence to Michael A. Gilbert.

Additional information

A previous version of this paper entitled, “Reason and Intuition: The kisceral mode of communication,” was presented at The Seventh Conference of the International Society for the study of Argumentation in Amsterdam. Thanks go to all commentators and referees. This work has been supported by a Canada Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Standard Grant # 410-2008-1999.

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Gilbert, M.A. The Kisceral: Reason and Intuition in Argumentation. Argumentation 25, 163–170 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9210-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9210-2

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