Abstract
This paper studies the intraday payment behaviour between heterogeneous banks as well as optimal intraday pricing schemes. The paper shows the social optimality of payment sequencing, which allows a bank to delay payments until the bank receives payments from the counterparty. The payment sequencing allows a bank with high liquidity cost to ‘recycle’ payment inflow from another bank with lower liqudity cost, reducing the aggregate cost of funding of banks to settle all payments. But we also see that the banks have an incentive to delay payments more than the payment sequencing requires. This underscores the importance of social planner’s role reducing settlement delay, while leaving socially efficient payment sequencing. In this context, we compare two different pricing schemes, a standard throughput guideline and a time-varying intraday tariff, to discuss the optimal incentive mechanisms in payment systems for the ‘socially efficient sequential settlement’.
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Notes
The banks have to pledge collateral to the central bank to obtain cash, even though the borrowing rate is normally zero across countries. The cost of liquidity is one measure of the opportunity cost of the collateral.
This income transfer from late payers to early payers are ensured through full cost recovery. See Sect. 5.2 for the detail.
The author is grateful for the anonymous referee’s helpful suggestion on this literature.
The distribution over the interval \([t^{begin},t^{end}]\) is assumed to be uniform here, although this is not an essential assumption.
The assumptions A3 and A6 are unnecessary for the proposition. The assumption A7, \(\theta =0\), can be eased to \(\theta \ge 0\), but we need to have \(\alpha +\theta <0\), \(\alpha <0\), to ensure the existence of internal solutions.
If A3 does not hold and if \(\alpha +\delta <0\), then \(E[d_{i}^{1st}]>0\) when \(\mu +2\beta >0\) (a slightly stronger condition than the condition of Proposition 1, since the social planner counts the externality effects of two banks—the intuition of the condition is the same as the Proposition 1). This is because \(\alpha +\delta <0\) implies that the private benefit of own delay (\(\alpha \)) outweighes its negative externality (\(\delta \)). Ie delay is socially optimal until the (net) benefit is dominated by the increase of the delay cost (\(\mu \)). We do not consider this case further since the assumption \(\alpha +\delta <0\) is counterintuitive.
If \(\alpha +\delta >0\) then \(d_{i}^{1st}\) has a negative constant term. It does change the overall argument below. \(\theta >0\) also provides a negative constant term.
Even if A6 does not hold and \(\gamma +\eta \ne 0\), the main arguments below are unchanged as long as \(\eta >0\). See “Appendix” for the detail.
If \(\theta >0\) (easing assumption A7) or \(\alpha +\delta \ne 0\) (easing A3), the optimal tariff function takes a slightly different form, because the expected first-best solution has a non-zero constant term, as we have seen in footnote 5.
Focusing on the case \(\alpha +\delta \ne 0\), \(d_{i}^{1st}\) has a constant term \(\frac{(-1)\left( \alpha +\delta \right) }{\mu +2\beta }\). The optimal tariff function has to incorporate this, so we have the following:
\(t(d_{i})=t_{0}-\left\{ \alpha -.\frac{\left( \alpha +\delta \right) \left( \mu +\beta \right) }{\mu +2\beta }\right\} \cdot d_{i}\)
This is still a linear function against \(d_{i}\), and the characteristics of the function are unchanged.
Assumption A6 is irrelevant to the proposition.
This is what Matsushima (2004) discusses on the review strategy. He aruges that the principle (payment system operator in this case) cannot commit to the review strategy as well, since the principle has an incentive to shorten the review period when the agent (bank) loses the incentive to choose proper payment timing honestly.
To be precise, the actual fee paid is the gross fee minus a lump-sum exemption, so the effective hourly fee is smaller than 1.5 basis point.
For the first 14,000 transfers per month, as of December 2010.
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A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Intraday two-part tariff in payment systems”, a Bank of England working paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Bank of England and Goldman Sachs. The author is grateful for the helpful guidance provided by the editor and the anonymous referee. The author also wishes to thank Matthew Brewis, James Chapman, Rodney Garratt, John Jackson, Marius Jurgilas, Thomas Nellen, Ben Norman, Jochen Schanz, Anne Wetherilt, and seminar participants at the Bank of England and Swiss National Bank for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are of course the responsibility of the author.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
The first-order conditions of the function 6, with respect to \(d_{1}\) and \(d_{2}\) are:
That of \(d_{2}\) is defined in the same way. Substituting these and assume \( \lambda _{j}=0\) for all \(j\in \{1,2,3,4\}\), we have:
Solving for \(d_{1}\),
From A3 and A6, we have:
The first-best solution is, therefore,
\(\gamma \left( \mu -2\beta \right) ^{-1}<0\) thus \(d_{1}^{1st}\) is a positive function of \(\varepsilon _{1}\) and a negative function of \( \varepsilon _{2}\). \(\lambda _{1}\) and \(\lambda _{2}\) can be non-zero if \( d_{1}^{1st}=0\): the derivation of these is skipped. Since we have assumed a sufficiently large T, \(\lambda _{3}=\lambda _{4}=0\) in any case. \(\square \)
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
We keep the assumptions made in Proposition 1, which ensures internal solutions, but we still need to formulate the Kuhn–Tucker conditions because we have the tariff function.
The best response function \(d_{1}^{BR}\) is then derived.
Substitute this into the equation \(E[d_{2}^{BR}(E[d_{1}],\varepsilon _{2})]\) , which is defined in a similar way, and we have:
\(E[d_{1}^{BR}(E[d_{2}],\varepsilon _{1})]\) is defined in the same way. We will design the function t to eliminate the source of deadweight loss \( (-1)\alpha \left( \mu +\beta \right) ^{-1}\), so we have the following simultaneous equations:
for \(i\ne j\in \{1,2\}\). By solving these equations, we have
Integrating these, with \(\lambda _{i}\cdot d_{i}=0\), we have \( t(d_{i})=t_{0}-\alpha d_{i}\). \(\square \)
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 5
The aggregate loss of the system under the tariff \(t(d_{i})\) for given \( \varepsilon _{1}\) and \(\varepsilon _{2}\), \(L(d_{1}^{**},d_{2}^{**},c,\varepsilon _{1},\varepsilon _{2})\), is defined as follows:
If \(\varepsilon _{1}>0\) and \(\varepsilon _{2}>0\), we have:
From A3 (\(\alpha +\delta =0\)) and A6 (\(\gamma +\eta =0\)), we have:
Notice that \(L(d_{1}^{**},d_{2}^{**},c,\varepsilon _{1},\varepsilon _{2})\) can be positive when \(\left( \beta +\mu \right) /\mu >\frac{1}{2}\) and \(\varepsilon _{1}\simeq \varepsilon _{2}>0\). If \( \varepsilon _{1}>0\) and \(\varepsilon _{2}\le 0\), \(L(d_{1}^{**},d_{2}^{**},c,\varepsilon _{1},\varepsilon _{2})\) with A3 and A6 is:
Since the banks are almost symmetric, we have a similar welfare for the case \(\varepsilon _{1}\le 0\) and \(\varepsilon _{2}>0\).
If \(\varepsilon _{1}\le 0\) and \(\varepsilon _{2}\le 0\), \(L(d_{1}^{**},d_{2}^{**},c,\varepsilon _{1},\varepsilon _{2})\) is trivially zero.
Substituting these into the Eq. 7:
The first term can be written as follows:
The second term is:
The third term is equivalent to the second one. Now we have:
Since \(\beta <0\), \(\left( \beta +\mu \right) /\mu <1\) and it is sufficient to show the following:
Since the aggregate loss under the throughput guidelines, \(E\left[ L(0,0,c,\varepsilon _{1},\varepsilon _{2})\right] \) is obviously zero (\( d_{1}=d_{2}=0\) for any cases), now we complete proving that the aggregate loss under the tariff is smaller than the loss under the throughput guidelines. \(\square \)
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Ota, T. Sequential payments and optimal pricing in payment systems. Ann Finance 12, 441–463 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-016-0287-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-016-0287-3