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Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D

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Abstract

We compare the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D competition. If a firm’s marginal cost is lower than that of its rival, then this firm (its rival) is referred to as the more (less) efficient firm. Under each mode of competition, there are three types of equilibria: blockaded-entry, deterred-entry, and accommodated-entry. Moreover, the presence of R&D investment makes it harder for the less efficient firm to survive. Cournot competition entails a unique equilibrium, whereas Bertrand competition may yield two equilibria. It is harder for the less efficient firm to survive under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Versus Cournot competition, Bertrand competition yields higher industry output, and it shifts production from the less efficient firm to the more efficient firm. This result, together with the known size effect, explains the following three findings. First, the more efficient firm has a normal output ranking, whereas the less efficient firm may demonstrate an output reversal. Second, the more efficient firm may demonstrate a R&D reversal, whereas the less efficient firm has a normal R&D ranking (its Cournot R&D effort exceeds its Bertrand R&D effort). Third, Bertrand competition is more welfare-efficient than Cournot competition.

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Notes

  1. As a matter of fact, in the model of Bester and Petrakis (1993), firms do not compete in R&D, because only one firm can undertake R&D.

  2. To illustrate, imagine that firm 1 does more process R&D and thereby lowers its marginal cost. Under Cournot competition, firm 1’s reaction curve shows a rightward shift, thus discouraging its rival’s production, which is beneficial to firm 1. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, firm 1’s reaction curve shows a leftward shift, thus inducing its rival to cut its price, which is detrimental to firm 1. [As shown in Figure 1 in Clarke and Collie (2003, p. 664), each reaction curve slopes upward, but firm 1’s reaction curve is steeper than firm 2’s.]

  3. Actually, we can allow firms to differ with respect to the initial primary demand price, because, as mentioned, a decrease in one good’s marginal cost can be viewed as an increase in its primary demand price.

  4. Zanchettin (2006, p. 1000) refers to this effect as the selection effect. However, we follow Chang and Peng (2012, p. 468) to emphasize the distinction between “output level” and “output structure.”

  5. Theilen (2002, Proposition 1) establishes that increased competition raises R&D spending. However, he assumes that the two firms compete á la Cournot, and uses two parameters of an inverse demand function to measure the degree of competition. Let us relate our Result A to Theilen’s result. It has been widely held that Bertrand competition is more competitive than Cournot competition (Chang and Peng 2012, p. 467). Accordingly, Result A means that increased competition reduces the R&D spending of the less efficient firm, whereas increased competition either reduces or raises the R&D spending of the more efficient firm depending on the degree of asymmetry.

  6. Basically, we use the formulae given by Zanchettin (2006). However, we make four kinds of improvements. First, we explicitly present the relevant assumptions and discuss whether these assumptions are reasonable. Second, we explicitly state the condition that determines whether a firm is active or not. Third, we relate the formulae to general terms. Fourth, we use a mixed strategy to present an interior Bertrand equilibrium (see Footnote 16).

  7. For a survey for this static study, please refer to Chang and Peng (2012, Sect. 3). In the previous literature, the two crucial effects (the output-level effect and the output-structure effect) are based on the assumption that each equilibrium is an interior equilibrium. We relax this assumption in Sect. 3.

  8. It is easy to show that \(U\) is strictly concave with respect to \(\mathbf{x }\) if and only if \(0\le \gamma <1\). However, we leave aside the trivial case of independent demands, \(\gamma = 0\).

  9. In this paper we assume that \(P_1^1=P_2^2\) and firms do not differ with respect to \(k\). If we relax this assumption, then the equilibrium characterization presented in Sects. 4 and 5 is robust. Please refer to Chang and Ho (2012).

  10. To illustrate this assumption, take Figure 2 of Clarke and Collie (2003). If \(p_1\le b_1\), then \(p_2\) is a best response for firm 2 as long as \(p_2\) is equal to or exceeds the price which just chokes off firm 2’s demand. [If \((p_1,\hat{p}_2)\) belongs to the \(y_2=0\) line, then \(\hat{p}_2\) is the choke-off price.] Note that the thick line segment of the \(y_2=0\) line is a subset of firm 1’s reaction curve. It follows that each point belonging to the thick line segment is an equilibrium as long as it lies to the southwest of point \((b_1,c_2)\), i.e., point B. [In general, if \(c_2>d_2\), then there exists a continuum of equilibria.] Fortunately, each equilibrium is Pareto dominated by B, because B is the best choice for firm 1, and, under each equilibrium, firm 2’s profit is the same (i.e., zero). If the assumption is made, then B represents the unique equilibrium. We argue that the assumption not only simplifies the presentation, but also is reasonable.

  11. Parts (i) and (iii) of Fact 3.1 follow from Lemma 1 of Chang et al. (2012). Zanchettin (2006, p. 1004) points out that \(x_2^B>0 \Leftrightarrow \mu _2>\gamma /(2-\gamma ^2)\), which means that \(x_2^B>0\Leftrightarrow \mu _2>\eta ^B\mu _1\). [Zanchettin sets \(\mu _1\) at 1.] Part (ii) thus follows.

  12. From (2.1) it follows that \(\eta ^P<1\). Equation (2.4) implies that \(\eta ^C<\eta ^B<\eta ^P\).

  13. In Zanchettin’s notation, the inequality \(a\ge 1-\gamma /2\) identifies the monopoly region. In our notation, this inequality means that \(\mu _2\le \eta ^C \mu _1\).

  14. Inequality (8) of Zanchettin (2006) identifies this region. In our notation, this inequality means that \(\mu _2\in (\eta ^C\mu _1,\eta ^B\mu _1]\).

  15. It is easy to show that if \(\mu _2=\eta ^C\mu _1\), then \(x_1^C(\mu _1,\mu _2)=\tilde{x}_1^M\) and \(x_2^C(\mu _1,\mu _2)=0\).

  16. Singh and Vives (1984, Table 1) use the parameters of the demand functions to present the Bertrand equilibrium, whereas Zanchettin (2006, p. 1004) uses the parameters of the inverse demand functions to present the Bertrand equilibrium. In contrast, we offer a mixed strategy: \(\alpha _i\) and \(\gamma \), two parameters of the inverse demand functions, together with \(b\), a parameter of the demand functions, are used to present the Bertrand equilibrium. Comparing (3.12) with (3.9) indicates that this strategy highlights the difference between the two equilibria. This is because, as emphasized by Chang and Peng (2012, p. 485), compared with Cournot competition, Bertrand competition replaces \(P_i^i\) (i.e., \(-1\)) with \(1/X_i^i\) (i.e., \(-1/b\)).

  17. It is easy to establish that if \(\mu _2=\eta ^B\mu _1\), then \(x_1^B(\mu _1,\mu _2)=x_1^L\) and \(x_2^B(\mu _1,\mu _2)=0\), and that if \(\mu _2=\eta ^C\mu _1\), then \(\tilde{x}_1^M=x_1^L\).

  18. Zanchettin (2006, p. 1003) restricts the parameter space to be, in his notation, \(S_r=\{0<\gamma \le 1;0\le a<1-\gamma /2\}\). The inequality \(0\le a<1-\gamma /2\) means that \(\eta ^C\mu _1<\mu _2\le \mu _1\).

  19. According to Proposition 6.3 of Chang and Peng (2012), for Case a, (3.16) holds. Consider Case b. According to Proposition 6.3 of Chang and Peng (2012), \(x_1^C+x_2^C< x_1^B+x_2^B\). It remains to establish that \(x_1^B+x_2^B<x_1^P+x_2^P\). We can show that if \(\mathbf{x }^P\) is a corner equilibrium, then \(x_1^P=\mu _1\) and \(x_2^P=0\). Equation (3.12) thus implies that \(x_1^P+x_2^P-(x_1^B+x_2^B)=[(1+\gamma -\gamma ^2)\mu _1-\mu _2]/[(2-\gamma )(1+\gamma )]\), which is positive, because \( \mu _2\le \mu _1\). We next consider Case c, where \(x_1^B=x_1^L\), \(x_1^P=\mu _1\), and \(x_2^B=x_2^P=0\). Equation (3.1) thus implies that \(x_1^B+x_2^B<x_1^P+x_2^P\). According to (3.1) and (3.9), \( x_1^L-(x_1^C+x_2^C)\) is equal to \(2(\mu _2-\eta ^C \mu _1)(2-\gamma )/[\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)] \), which, according to (2.1), is positive.

  20. According to Proposition 6.3 of Chang and Peng (2012), (3.17) holds. Consider Case b. According to Proposition 6.3 of Chang and Peng (2012), \(H(\mathbf{x }^C)< H(\mathbf{x }^B)\). Fact 3.1 implies that \(x_1^P>0\) and \(x_2^P=0\), and hence \(H(\mathbf{x }^P)=1\). It follows that \(H(\mathbf{x }^B)< H(\mathbf{x }^P)\). It remains to consider Case c. Fact 3.1 implies that \(x_1^B>0\), \(x_1^P>0\) and \(x_2^B=x_2^P=0\). Equation (3.19) thus follows.

  21. For Cases b and c, (3.20) follows from (3.23). It remains to analyze Case a. Because \(H(\mathbf{x }^C)<H(\mathbf{x }^B)\) means that \(x_1^C/x_2^C<x_1^B/x_2^B\), from \(x_1-x_2=x_2\times (x_1/x_2-1)\) it follows that (3.17), together with (3.22), implies (3.20).

  22. Equation (3.21) follows from Lemma 1 of Zanchettin (2006). The assumption of positive primary outputs (PPO) means that \(X^i(\mathbf{c })>0\), \(i=1,2\). Therefore, for Case a, PPO are satisfied, and hence (3.22) follows from Lemma 2 of Zanchettin (2006). Consider Cases b and c, where PPO are violated. According to Lemma 2 of Zanchettin (2006), \(x_1^B>x_1^C\) and \(x_2^C\ge x_2^B\), with the second inequality being strict if \(\mu _2\not = \eta ^P\mu _1\). Chang (2010, Corollary 3.2) demonstrates that \(x_1^C> x_2^C\). [Chang (2010, p. 89) notes that his Corollary 3.2 holds for Cournot competition.] Equation (3.23) thus follows.

  23. Hsu and Wang (2005, p. 186) similarly demonstrate that, in the case of complementary goods, price reversal for low-quality firms is never significant enough to make welfare lower under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.

  24. In Case c, \(x_2^B=0\), and hence (3.16) implies that \(x_1^B>x_1^C+x_2^C\). It remains to consider Cases a and b, in which (3.9) and (3.12) are valid. We can show that \(x_1^B-(x_1^C+x_2^C)=[\cdot ] (\eta ^S\mu _1-\mu _2)/(4-\gamma ^2)\), \(\eta ^P-\eta ^S=\gamma ^2(2-\gamma )/\{(2-\gamma ^2)[\cdot ]\} \), and \( \eta ^S-\eta ^B=\gamma (1-\gamma )/[\cdot ] \) where \([\cdot ]=2 +\gamma ^3/(1-\gamma ^2)>0\).

  25. Note that when \(\mathbf{q }\) belongs to the boundary of \(\mathbf{T }\), a derivative represents a one-sided derivative. For example, when \(\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{T }^1,\,\Pi _1^1(\mathbf{q })\) is a right-hand derivative since \(\partial \mathbf{T }^1\) is a left boundary of \(\tilde{\mathbf{T }}\).

  26. Bain (1956, p. 172) emphasizes that we should classify strategies according to the established firm’s reactions. Note that in the blockaded-entry strategy, firm 2 is not a real threat (i.e., it does not exert competitive pressure on its rival), and hence firm 1 behaves like a monopolist. In contrast, in the deterred-entry strategy, firm 1 should modify its behavior to drive firm 2 out of the market. Please also refer to Tirole (1988, p. 306) for the meanings of the following three terms: “blockaded entry,” “deterred entry,” and “accommodated entry.”

  27. Proof in Appendix.

  28. This is because \(\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^{CL} \le \bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1/ \eta ^{CM}\Leftrightarrow \eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1\le \eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_2\), which implies that the results obtained for Case B apply to Case B\('\) provided that the indices 1 and 2 are interchanged.

  29. According to (4.11), \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^C\bar{\mu }_1,\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1]\Rightarrow \bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1\). Therefore, we can refer to firm 2 as a less efficient firm.

  30. Equation (2.3) implies that \(1/(1+1/b)=1/(2-\gamma ^2)\). Hence, \((1+1/b)\hat{\Delta }-1/(1+1/b)= \gamma ^4(3-\gamma ^2) /[(4-\gamma ^2)^2(2-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma ^2)]\), which, according to (2.5), is positive.

  31. Equation (3.3) implies that (5.2) is more restrictive than (4.2). Therefore, we will deal with those cases in which (4.2) is satisfied, but (5.2) is violated. For example, please refer to Fact 8.4-(ii).

  32. Proof in Appendix.

  33. For the proof of these two results, please refer to the proof of Lemma 5.1.

  34. \(1/\eta ^L-\eta ^L =(4-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma ^2) [(k-\tilde{r})^2-\hat{r}^2]/\{\gamma [(2-\gamma ^2)k-1]k\}\), where \(\tilde{r}\equiv (2-\gamma ^2)/[ (4-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma ^2)]\) and \( \hat{r}\equiv \gamma /[ (4-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma ^2)]\).

  35. It is easy to show that \(\tilde{r}+\hat{r}>(1+\gamma +1/b)\hat{\Delta }\).

  36. Because \(\eta ^B=\gamma /(1+1/b)\), from (5.3) it follows that \(\gamma k>\eta ^B\).

  37. This is an example of Case A2, because the inequality \(\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2<\eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1\) is satisfied (\(\eta ^{BL}=0.32967 \) and \(\eta ^L=0.333333\)).

  38. If \(q_2\in [0,\hat{q}_2^L)\) where \(\hat{q}_2^L=2.17133\) and if firm 1 chooses a point belonging to \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\), then its profit is \(\pi _1^A\equiv 0.110919(1584.42-0.5q_2)^2\) where the superscript \(A\) denotes “accommodate.” In contrast, if firm 1 chooses a point belonging to \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)\), then its profit is \(\pi _1^D\equiv 3.5(240.267-q_2)(331.162+q_2) \) where the superscript \(D\) denotes “deter.” We can show that \(\pi _1^A-\pi _1^D=3.5237(q_2-q_2^J)(q_2+40.66684)\) where \(q_2^J=0.25794\).

  39. In contrast, in the deterred-entry equilibrium under Cournot competition, firm 2 is not a real threat to its rival in the second stage, and hence firm 1 sets \(q_1\) at \(q_1^{CL}(0)\).

  40. According to (5.2), \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1 \Rightarrow q_1^{BL}(0)<q_1^L\). According to (8.21), if \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), then \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets \({\varvec{\Pi }}_2^2(0)\) at point \((q_1^{BL}(0),0)\), implying that \(\lim _{\bar{\mu }_2\rightarrow \eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1^+} q_1^*=q_1^{BL}(0)\).

  41. In contrast, as shown in Fig. 5, \(q_i^C\) (\(i=1,2\)) can be regarded as a continuous function of \(\bar{\mu }_2\).

  42. From \(1/b=1-\gamma ^2\) it follows that \((1+\gamma +1/b)\hat{\Delta }>(2+\gamma )\Delta \).

  43. We can show that \(\eta ^{BL}=2\eta ^{CL}/(1+1/b)\), which, together with (2.4), implies (6.1).

  44. \(\check{k}-(\tilde{r}+\hat{r})=2\gamma (2-\gamma ^2)/[(1-\gamma )(4-\gamma ^2)^2]>0\).

  45. According to (3.25), if \(\mathbf{q }\) lies below the curve \(\{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{R }_+^2:\bar{\mu }+q_2=\eta ^S\times (\bar{\mu }+q_1)\}\), then \(x_1^B(\bar{\mu }+q_1,\bar{\mu }+q_2)\) even exceeds \(x_1^C(\bar{\mu }+q_1,\bar{\mu }+q_2)+x_2^C(\bar{\mu }+q_1,\bar{\mu }+q_2)\).

  46. As shown in Fig. 8, this intersection point belongs to curve \(\{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{R }_+^2:\bar{\mu }+q_2=\eta ^P\times (\bar{\mu }+q_1)\}\), which meets the \(q_1\)-axis at point \(((1/\eta ^P-1)\bar{\mu },0)\). For Cournot competition, according to Fact 4.1, we can demonstrate that \( \Pi _1^1(q_1,q_2)=4(2-\gamma ^2)(\bar{\mu }+q_1)/(4-\gamma ^2)^2-kq_1\) if \( q_2=\eta ^P\times (\bar{\mu }+q_1)-\bar{\mu }\). We also can use Fact 5.1 to establish that the above result similarly holds for Bertrand competition.

  47. According to Fact 3.1, \(\eta ^P=\gamma \). \(\eta ^E\) can be written as \([\cdot ]\gamma / \{\cdot \} ,\) where \( [\cdot ]= (4-\gamma ^2)^2[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2]k\) and \( \{\cdot \}= (4-\gamma ^2)^3k^2-8(4-\gamma ^2)(2-\gamma 2)k+8(2-\gamma ^2)\). We can show that \([\cdot ]-\{\cdot \}=2(4-\gamma ^2)(4-3\gamma ^2)k-8(2-\gamma ^2)\), which is positive, because, according to (5.3), \(k>(1+1/b)\hat{\Delta }=2(2-\gamma ^2)^2/[(4-\gamma ^2)^2(1-\gamma ^2)]\).

  48. For example, assume that \(\bar{\mu }_2\in [\eta ^P\bar{\mu }_1,\eta ^E\bar{\mu }_1)\). There is an output reversal in the presence of R&D competition. However, according to (3.8), this is not the case in the absence of R&D competition.

  49. It is understood that \(p_2^C\) denotes \(P^2(x_1^C,x_2^C)\) regardless of whether \(x_2^C\) is equal to zero or not. In contrast, it is common practice to assume that \(p_2^B=c_2\) if \(x_2^B=0\) (Clarke and Collie 2003), implying that \(p_2^B\) may not represent \(P^2(x_1^B,x_2^B)\). Fortunately, in the Bertrand deterred-entry equilibrium, according to (3.7), \( P^2(x_1^B,x_2^B)=c_2\), implying that \(p_2^B\) indeed represents \( P^2(x_1^B,x_2^B)\) regardless of whether \(x_2^B\) is equal to zero or not. [We do not consider the blockaded-entry equilibrium.]

  50. We can establish that, given \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), if \(\gamma \) exceeds 0.5857, then \( p_1^C>p_1^*\). (Proof in Appendix.) Accordingly, in order to construct a counterexample, \(\gamma \) should be small enough. This is why, in Fact 6.2, \(\gamma \) is assumed to be equal to 0.5.

  51. According to Lemmas 5.1, 5.2, if \(\bar{\mu }_2<\eta ^{BL}\mu _1\), then \(p_1^B\) is either \(p_1^L\) or \(p_1^*\). However, according to Fact 6.2, if \(\gamma =0.5,\,k\in (\hat{k},\tilde{r}+\hat{r})\), and \(\bar{\mu }_2\) is close enough to \(\eta ^{BL}\mu _1\), then \(p_1^L>p_1^*> p_1^C\).

  52. In the simulation analysis, \(\gamma \) and \(k\) are randomly selected, but subjected to the two constraints (2.1) and (5.11). [As shown in footnote 34, both \(\tilde{r}\) and \(\hat{r}\) mentioned in (5.10) are determined by \(\gamma \).] Moreover, it is assumed without loss of generality that \(\bar{\mu }_1=1,000\). In contrast, \(\bar{\mu }_2\) is randomly selected subject to the inequality constraint \(\eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \bar{\mu }_1\). As mentioned in Lemma 5.1-(ii), if \(\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1\), then either one of \(\mathbf{q }^*\) and \((q_1^L,0)\) is potentially an equilibrium. We thus conduct two kinds of simulations. In the first (second) kind of simulation, we pretend that Bertrand competition entails \(\mathbf{q }^*\) (\((q_1^L,0)\)) if \(\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1\). The welfare ranking is the same for each kind of simulation.

  53. According to (4.1), \(q_1^{CL}(0)=2\bar{\mu }_2/\gamma -\bar{\mu }_1\), which, together with (4.10), implies that \(\bar{\mu }_2= \eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1 \Leftrightarrow q_1^M=q_1^{CL}(0)\). According to (4.10), \(q_1^M\) is independent of \(\bar{\mu }_2\). It thus follows that \(\partial [q_1^M-q_1^{CL}(0)]/\partial \bar{\mu }_2=-2/\gamma <0\), and hence \(q_1^M-q_1^{CL}(0)\) decreases with \(\bar{\mu }_2\), implying that (8.5) is satisfied. Equation (4.3), together with Fact 4.1, implies that \(\Pi _1^1(q_1,0)=r_{11}^1\bar{\mu }_1+r_{12}^1\bar{\mu }_2+(r_{11}^1-k)q_1\). It thus follows that \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)=k\bar{\mu }_1 +[r_{12}^1+2(r_{11}^1-k)/\gamma ]\bar{\mu }_2= k(\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2)/\eta ^{CL}\). We can show that \(r_{12}^1+2(r_{11}^1-k)/\gamma \) is equal to \(-2[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]/ [\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)]\), which, according to (4.4), is negative, implying that (8.4) is satisfied.

  54. Because \( \bar{q}_2\) solves \( \Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(q_2),q_2)=0\), Eqs. (4.1) and (4.3) imply that \( \bar{q}_2=\gamma k\bar{\mu }_1/[2(k-2/ (4-\gamma ^2))]-\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2.\) Because \( \hat{q}_2^M\) solves \( q_1^M=q_1^{CL}(q_2)\), Eqs. (4.1) and (4.10) imply that \( \hat{q}_2^M=\gamma k\bar{\mu }_1/(2k-1)-\bar{\mu }_2= \eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2\). It follows that \( \bar{q}_2-\hat{q}_1^M=\gamma ^3 k\bar{\mu }_1 /\{2[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2](2k-1)\} \), which, according to (4.4), is positive.

  55. Because \(\partial \mathbf{T }^1\) is upward sloping, if \((q_1,q_2)\in \partial \mathbf{T }^1\), then \(q_1\ge 0\) and \(q_2\ge q_2^{CL}(0)\). The desired result thus follows from \(\Pi _1^1(0,q_2^{CL}(0))=0\), SOC and SS.

  56. Since \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) is upward sloping, if \((q_1,q_2)\in \partial \mathbf{T }^2\) and if \(q_2\le \bar{q}_2\), then \(q_1\le q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2)\). The equality \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2),\bar{q}_2)=0\), together with SOC and SS, implies (8.6).

  57. According to (5.1), \(q^{BL}_1(0)=(1+1/b)\bar{\mu }_2/\gamma -\bar{\mu }_1\), which, together with (5.13), implies that \( \eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1\) is equal to the \(\bar{\mu }_2\) which solves \(q^{BL}_1(0)=q^L_1\). We can show that \(\partial [q^L_1-q_1^{BL}(0)]/\partial \bar{\mu }_2=[1-(1+1/b)k]/(\gamma k)=-1/\eta ^L<0\), implying that \( q^L_1-q^{BL}_1(0)\) decreases with \( \bar{\mu }_2\), and hence (8.12) is satisfied. Equation (5.13), together with (4.1), implies that \(\eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1 \) is equal to the \(\bar{\mu }_2\) which solves \( q_1^L=q_1^{CL}(0)\). We can show that \( \partial [q_1^L-q_1^{CL}(0)]/\partial \bar{\mu }_2=(1-2k)/(\gamma k)=-1/\eta ^{CM}<0\). Therefore, (8.13) is satisfied.

  58. Equation (8.20) straightforwardly implies that \((0,q_2^{BL}(0))\) belongs to \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^1\cup \mathbf{L }^1)\). According to (5.1), \(q_2^{BL}(0)=\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^B-\bar{\mu }_2\). Fact 5.1 implies that \(\Pi _1^1(0,q_2)=\hat{r}_0^1+\hat{r}_{12}^1q_2=2\gamma (2-\gamma ^2)[q_2^{BL}(0)-q_2]/[(4-\gamma ^2)^2(1-\gamma ^2)\). It thus follows that \(\Pi _1^1(0,q_2^{BL}(0))=0\), implying that \((0,q_2^{BL}(0))\) belongs to \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\).

  59. We can continue to use the notation \(\bar{q}_2\), which however will take different values.

  60. We can use Fact 5.1 to establish that \(\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\) is equal to the \(\bar{\mu }_2\) which solves \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{BL}(0),0)=0\). Moreover, \(\partial \Pi _1^1(q_1^{BL}(0),0)/\partial \bar{\mu }_2= -(1+1/b)[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]/[\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)]\), which, according to (5.3), is negative.

  61. Totally differentiating \(\Pi ^1\) yields that \(\hbox {d}\Pi ^1=\Pi _2^1\hbox {d}q_2\) (note that \(\Pi _1^1\hbox {d}q_1=0\)). Moreover, \(\Pi _2^1(\mathbf{q })=R_2^1(\mathbf{q })= -2 \gamma x_1^B(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1,\bar{\mu }_2+q_2)/[ b((1+1/b)^2-\gamma ^2)] <0\), \(\forall \mathbf{q }\in \tilde{\mathbf{V }}\).

  62. This is because \(\eta ^B>\eta ^C\). Moreover, \(\eta ^{CM} \gtreqqless \eta ^B\), if \(k \lesseqqgtr 1/\gamma ^2\), implying that \(\eta ^B\) may either exceed or fall below \(\eta ^{CM}\). We can show that \(\hbox {sign}(\tilde{r}+\hat{r}-1/\gamma ^2)=\hbox {sign}(4-7\gamma ^2-\gamma ^3+2\gamma ^4)\) and that \(4-7\gamma ^2-\gamma ^3+2\gamma ^4\) can have either sign, implying that \(k-1/\gamma ^2\) indeed can have either sign.

  63. Partially differentiating (8.7) and (8.14) with respect to \(\bar{\mu }_i\) yields that \( \partial (q_i^C-q_i^*)/\partial \bar{\mu }_i=-2\gamma ^4[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]k^2/\{(4-\gamma ^2)^3(1-\gamma ^2)\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_B\}<0.\)

  64. \( 1-\eta ^E= \{ (4-\gamma ^2)^3(1-\gamma )k^2-2 (4-\gamma ^2) (8-4\gamma -4\gamma ^2+\gamma ^3)k + 8 (2-\gamma ^2)\}/[ (4 -\gamma ^2)^3k^2-8 (4-\gamma ^2) (2-\gamma ^2)k+8(2-\gamma ^2)]\). According to (5.3), \([\cdot ]\) is positive. Moreover, according to (5.4), \( \{\cdot \}\) is positive. Hence, \(\eta ^E<1\). Moreover, \(\eta ^E-\eta ^{BL} =\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)\{\cdot \}k/\{ (2-\gamma ^2) [ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2] [(4-\gamma ^2)^3k^2-8 (4-\gamma ^2) (2-\gamma ^2)k +8(2-\gamma ^2)]\} ,\) where \(\{\cdot \}= (4-\gamma ^2)^3(1-\gamma ^2)k^2 - 4 (4-\gamma ^2) (2-\gamma ^2)^2k + 4(2-\gamma ^2)^2\). According to (5.4), \(\{\cdot \}\) is positive. Therefore, \( \eta ^E>\eta ^{BL}\).

  65. \( \eta ^e-\eta ^{CL}= \gamma ^3 (4 -\gamma ^2)^3k\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C/[\cdot ] ,\) where \([ \cdot ]=2 [ (4 -\gamma ^2)k-2 ][(4 -\gamma ^2)(16 - \gamma ^2+\gamma ^4)k^2-16 (4 -\gamma ^2)k+16 ] \) , according to (5.3), is positive. \(\eta ^{BL}-\eta ^e= 2 \gamma ^3 k\{(4 -\gamma ^2)^2(4 +\gamma ^2)k ^2-16(4-\gamma ^2) k+16 \}/ (2 -\gamma ^2)/[\cdot ] \) where \(\{\cdot \}\) is positive.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the National Science Council of Taiwan for financial support received under Grant 98-2410-H-008-024. The authors are especially grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and detailed comments, which have greatly aided in the improvement of this study.

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Correspondence to Ming Chung Chang.

Appendix

Appendix

The proof of Fact 4.1

Partially differentiating (3.9) with respect to \(\mu _i\) and \(\mu _j\), respectively, leads to

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial x_i^C\over \partial \mu _i} ={2\over 4-\gamma ^2}>0,\quad i=1,2;\quad {\partial x_1^C\over \partial \mu _2} ={\partial x_2^C\over \partial \mu _1}={-\gamma \over 4-\gamma ^2}<0. \end{aligned}$$
(8.1)

Differentiating (3.11) with respect to \(\mu _i\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial \phi _i^C\over \partial \mu _i}=2 x_i^C{\partial x_i^C\over \partial \mu _i} >0,\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.2)

According to (8.1), \(\partial x_i^C/ \partial \mu _i\) is a constant. Therefore, partially differentiating (8.2) with respect to \(\mu _k\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial ^2 \phi _i^C\over \partial \mu _k\partial \mu _i}=2{\partial x_i^C\over \partial \mu _i} {\partial x_i^C\over \partial \mu _k},\quad i, k=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.3)

From \( R^i(q_1,q_2)=\phi _i^C(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1,\bar{\mu }_2+q_2)\) it follows that \( R_i^i=\partial \phi _i^C/ \partial \mu _i\), \(R_{ik}^i=\partial ^2 \phi _i^C /[\partial \mu _k\partial \mu _i]\), \(i,k=1,2\). Therefore, (8.2) and (8.3), together with (8.1), lead to the desired result. \(\square \)

The proof of Eq. (4.11)

The two critical constants can be rewritten as \(\eta ^{CM}=\gamma /(2-1/k)\) and \(\eta ^{CL}=\gamma /\{ 2-4/[(4-\gamma ^2)k]\}\). Accordingly, from \(\eta ^C=\gamma / 2\) it follows that \(\eta ^{CM}>\eta ^C\). Moreover, from \(4/(4-\gamma ^2)>1\) it follows that \(\eta ^{CL}>\eta ^{CM}\). In summary, \(\eta ^C< \eta ^{CM}<\eta ^{CL} \). It follows that \(1/\eta ^{CL} <1/ \eta ^{CM} <1/\eta ^C.\,1/\eta ^{CL}- \eta ^{CL}=(\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)\times (4-\gamma ^2)^3 / \{2\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)[ (4-\gamma ^2)k- 2]k \} \), which, according to SC and (4.4), is positive. Hence, \(\eta ^{CL}<1<1/\eta ^{CL}\). \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 4.2

Let us begin with presenting two basic facts. As mentioned, \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the \(q_2\)-axis at point \((0,q_2^{CL}(0))\) from below. It remains to study how \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the boundary of \(\mathbf{T }\) from above. Since \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) is a downward-sloping line segment, it meets the \(q_1\)-axis or \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\):

Fact 8.1

(i) If \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)<0\), then there exists a unique \(\tilde{q}_1^C\in (0, q_1^{CL}(0))\) such that \(\Pi _1^1(\tilde{q}_1^C,0)=0\), and hence, as shown in Fig. 2, \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis at point \((\tilde{q}_1^C,0)\). (ii) If \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)\ge 0\), then there exists \(\bar{q}_2\ge 0\) such that \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2),\bar{q}_2)=0\), and hence, as shown in Figs. 3 and 4, \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) at point \((q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2),\bar{q}_2)\).

Proof

According to Fact 4.1, \(\Pi _1^1(0,0)>0\). Therefore, Part (i) follows from SOC. According to (4.1), \(q_1^{CL}(q_2)\) increases with \(q_2\). Therefore, SOC and SS together imply that \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(q_2),q_2)\) decreases with \(q_2\). According to Fact 4.1, \(\Pi _{11}^1\) and \(\Pi _{12}^1\) are constants, and hence \(\lim _{q_2 \rightarrow \infty }\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(q_2),q_2)<0\). Part (ii) thus follows. This completes the proof of Fact 8.1. \(\square \)

We have the following fact regarding \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\):

Fact 8.2

If \(q_1^M\ge q_1^{CL}(0)\), then \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is not empty, and, as shown in Fig. 4, there exists a unique \(\hat{q}_2^M\ge 0\) such that \(q_1^{CL}(\hat{q}_2^M)=q_1^M\), and \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) at point \((q_1^{CL}(\hat{q}_2^M),\hat{q}_2^M)\). Otherwise, \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is empty.

Proof

In the \((q_1,q_2)\) space, \(\mathbf{N }^2\) is the region lying to the right of \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) (\(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) included). As mentioned, \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((q_1^{CL}(0),0)\), and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) is upward sloping. It follows that \((q_1,q_2)\in \mathbf{N }^2 \Rightarrow q_1\ge q_1^{CL}(0)\). Accordingly, \(\{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{N }^2:q_1=q_1^M\}\not =\emptyset \) if and only if \(q_1^M\ge q_1^{CL}(0)\). This completes the proof of Fact 8.2.

We are in a position to study how \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the boundary of \(\mathbf{T }\) from above, and whether \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is empty. We can show thatFootnote 53

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi _i^i(q_i^{CL}(0),0)\gtreqqless 0, \quad \hbox { if }\bar{\mu }_j \lesseqqgtr \eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_i,\quad i=1,2,\end{aligned}$$
(8.4)
$$\begin{aligned} \qquad q_i^M\gtreqqless q_i^{CL}(0), \quad \hbox { if }\bar{\mu }_j \lesseqqgtr \eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_i,\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.5)

In Cases A, B\('\) and C\('\), (4.11) implies that \(\bar{\mu }_2\) exceeds not only \(\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1\) but also \(\eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1\). Therefore, according to (8.4) and (8.5), \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)<0\) and \(q_1^M<q_1^{CL}(0)\). From Facts A.1-A.2 it thus follows that \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis and \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is empty. In Case B, from \(\eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1\) it follows that \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)\ge 0\) and \(q_1^M<q_1^{CL}(0)\), implying that \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) and \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is empty. In Case C, \(\bar{\mu }_2\) falls below not only \(\eta ^{CM}\bar{\mu }_1\) but also \(\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1\). Therefore, \(\Pi _1^1(q_1^{CL}(0),0)>0\) and \(q_1^M\ge q_1^{CL}(0)\), implying that \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) and \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is not empty.

We are in a position to prove Part (iii), the most complex part. Note importantly that, in Case C, \(\hat{q}_2^M< \bar{q}_2\),Footnote 54 implying that \(\Pi ^1(q_1,q_2)\), regarded as a function of \(q_1\), is single-peaked for each given \(q_2\). Recall that \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets the \(x_2\)-axis and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) at \((0,q_2^{CL}(0))\) and \((q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2),\bar{q}_2)\), respectively. Accordingly, from \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) is downward sloping it follows that \(q_2^{CL}(0)>\bar{q}_2\), which, together with \(\hat{q}_2^M<\bar{q}_2\), implies that \(\hat{q}_2^M<\bar{q}_2<q_2^{CL}(0)\), and hence there are four cases.

First, assume that \(q_2\ge q_2^{CL}(0)\). From \(q_2>\hat{q}_2^M\) it follows that firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) if its opportunity set is \(\mathbf{N }^2\). Note that \(\Pi _1^1(\mathbf{q })\le 0, \forall \mathbf{q }\in \partial \mathbf{T }^1\),Footnote 55 where \(\Pi _1^1\) denotes a right-hand derivative. As a result, firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^1\) if its opportunity set is \(\tilde{\mathbf{T }}\). This implies that the former best point is dominated by the later best point since \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\subset \tilde{\mathbf{T }}\). Similarly, \(\partial \mathbf{T }^1\) is dominated by \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^1)\) since \(\partial \mathbf{T }^1\subset \mathbf{N }^1\). In summary, if \(q_2\ge q_2^{CL}(0)\), then the reaction curve is \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^1)\).

Second, assume that \(q_2\in (\bar{q}_2,q_2^{CL}(0))\). Again, from \(q_2>\hat{q}_2^M\) it follows that firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) if its opportunity set is \(\mathbf{N }^2\). It is clear that \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) is dominated by \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) since, again, \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\subset \tilde{\mathbf{T }}\). In summary, if \(q_2\in (\bar{q}_2,q_2^{CL}(0))\), then the reaction curve is \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\).

Third, assume that \(q_2\in (\hat{q}_2^M,\bar{q}_2]\). It is clear that firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) if its opportunity set is \(\mathbf{N }^2\). If \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) at point \((q_1^{CL}(\bar{q}_2),\bar{q}_2)\), thenFootnote 56

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi _1^1(\mathbf{q })\ge 0,\quad \forall \mathbf{q }\in \{\mathbf{q }\in \partial \mathbf{T }^2:q_2\le \bar{q}_2\}, \end{aligned}$$
(8.6)

where \(\Pi _1^1\) denotes a left-hand derivative. Equation (8.6) implies that firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) if its opportunity set is \(\tilde{\mathbf{T }}\). In summary, if \(q_2\in (\hat{q}_2^M,\bar{q}_2]\), then the reaction curve is \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\).

Forth, assume that \(q_2\in (0,\hat{q}_2^M]\). It is clear that firm 1 will choose a point belonging to \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) if its opportunity set is \(\tilde{\mathbf{T }}\), but this strategy is dominated by the blockaded-entry strategy. Hence, the reaction curve is \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\).

We can apply the same procedure to prove Parts (i) and (ii). \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 4.2

Parts (ii) and (iii) easily follow from (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 4.1 and Eqs. (3.1), (4.1) and (4.10). It remains to prove Part (i). According to Lemma 4.1-(i), \( \mathbf{q }^C\) solves \(\Pi _1^1(\mathbf{q })=0 \) and \( \Pi _2^2(\mathbf{q })=0\), namely,

$$\begin{aligned} q_i^C={ 2(k-{2\over 4-\gamma ^2}) \bar{\mu }_i-\gamma k\bar{\mu }_j \over (\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)/\Delta },\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.7)

Note that \(\mu _i=\bar{\mu }_i+q_i^C,\,i=1,2\). Therefore, (8.7), together with (3.9), implies that

$$\begin{aligned} x_i^C=(4-\gamma ^2)kq_i^C/4,\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.8)

According to (4.4), \(k-2/(4-\gamma ^2)>0\). The desired results thus straightforwardly follow from (8.7) and (8.8). \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 4.1

If the accommodated-entry equilibrium prevails, then the desired result follows from Proposition 4.2-(i). Otherwise, \(q_2^C=x_2^C=0\), and the desired result thus straightforwardly follows. \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 4.5

It suffices to consider Cases A-C. In either of Cases A and B, \(\mathbf{q }^C\in \tilde{\mathbf{T }}\), implying that \(\mathbf{p }^C-\mathbf{c }\) is given by (3.10). In Case C, where only firm 1 is active, the second-stage equilibrium is characterized by (3.4)–(3.5), implying that \(p_1^C-c_1=x_1^C\). \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 4.2

It remains to prove Part (iv). If the accommodated-entry equilibrium prevails, then the desired result follows from Part (i). Otherwise, firm 2 is inactive, and hence \(p_2^C\le c_2\), together with \(p_1^C>c_1\), implies the desired result. \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 5.1

Partially differentiating (3.12) with respect to \(\mu _i\) and \(\mu _j\), respectively, leads to

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial x_i^B\over \partial \mu _i}&= {1+1/b\over (1+1/b)^2-\gamma ^2} >0,\quad i=1,2,\end{aligned}$$
(8.9a)
$$\begin{aligned} {\partial x_1^B\over \partial \mu _2}&= {\partial x_2^B\over \partial \mu _1}={-\gamma \over (1+1/b)^2-\gamma ^2} <0. \end{aligned}$$
(8.9b)

Differentiating (3.14) with respect to \(\mu _i\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial \phi _i^B\over \partial \mu _i}= {2\over b} x_i^B{\partial x_i^B\over \partial \mu _i} >0,\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.10)

According to (8.9a), \(\partial x_i^B/ \partial \mu _i\) is a constant. Therefore, partially differentiating (8.10) with respect to \(\mu _k\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} {\partial ^2 \phi _i^B\over \partial \mu _k\partial \mu _i}={2\over b}{\partial x_i^B\over \partial \mu _i} {\partial x_i^B\over \partial \mu _k},\quad i,k=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.11)

From \(R^i(q_1,q_2)=\phi _i^B(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1,\bar{\mu }_2+q_2)\) it follows that \(R_i^i=\partial \phi _i^B/ \partial \mu _i,\,R_{ik}^i=\partial ^2 \phi _i^B/ [ \partial \mu _k\partial \mu _i],\,i,k=1,2\). Therefore, (8.10) and (8.11), together with (8.6), lead to the desired result. \(\square \)

The proof of Eqs. (5.8)–(5.9)

\(\eta ^L-\eta ^{BL}=\gamma ^3 k/\{(2-\gamma ^2)[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2][(2-\gamma ^2)k-1]\}\), which, according to (5.3), is positive. \(1/\eta ^B-\eta ^{BL}= 2(k-\hat{r}_{11}^1)/\{\gamma \hat{\Delta }[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]\}\), which, according to SOC and (5.3), is positive. \(\eta ^{BL}\) can be rewritten as \(\gamma /\{ (1+1/b)(1-2/[(4-\gamma ^2)k]\}\). According to (5.3), \(1>2/[(4-\gamma ^2)k]>0\). Therefore, from \(\eta ^B=\gamma /(1+1/b)\) it follows that \(\eta ^B<\eta ^{BL}\). Equation (2.4) straightforwardly implies that \(\eta ^{BL}>\eta ^{CM}\). This completes the proof of (5.8), which, together with (4.11), implies that \(\eta ^C< \eta ^{CM}<\eta ^{BL}\). It remains to prove that \(\eta ^{BL}<1/\eta ^{BL}.\,1/\eta ^{BL}-\eta ^{BL}= 2 (\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2) /\{\gamma ^2 \hat{\Delta }[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]k\}\) which, according to SC and (5.3), is positive. \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 5.2

In the \((q_1,q_2)\) space, \(\mathbf{L }^2\) is the region lying between \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\) and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) (\(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\) included). As mentioned, \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((q_1^{BL}(0),0)\), and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((q_1^{CL}(0),0)\). Moreover, both \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\) and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) are upward sloping. As a result, \((q_1,q_2)\in \mathbf{L }^2 \Rightarrow q_1\ge q_1^{BL}(0)\). Accordingly, \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)=\emptyset \Leftrightarrow q_1^L< q_1^{BL}(0)\). Moreover, given that \(q_1^L\ge q_1^{BL}(0)\), if \(q_1^L\le q_1^{CL}(0)\) (resp. \(q_1^L\ge q_1^{CL}(0)\)), then \({\varvec{\Pi }}_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)\) meets the \(q_1\)-axis (resp. \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\)) from above. It remains to compare \(q_1^L\) with either one of \(q^{BL}_1(0)\) and \(q^{CL}_1(0)\). We can show thatFootnote 57

$$\begin{aligned}&q_i^L \gtreqqless q_i^{BL}(0),\quad \hbox { if }{\bar{\mu }}_j \lesseqqgtr \eta ^L{\bar{\mu }}_i, \end{aligned}$$
(8.12)
$$\begin{aligned}&q_i^L\gtreqqless q_i^{CL}(0),\quad \hbox { if }{\bar{\mu }}_j \lesseqqgtr \eta ^{CM}{\bar{\mu }}_i. \end{aligned}$$
(8.13)

\(\square \)

The proof of Fact 5.3

By definition, \(\Pi ^1(\mathbf{q }^*)=\pi _1^*\), \(\Pi ^1((\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^*)/(\gamma k),q_2^*)=\hat{\pi }_1^*\), \(\Pi ^1(q_1^L,0)=\hat{\pi }_1^L\) and \(\Pi ^1(\tilde{q}_1^B,0)=\tilde{\pi }_1\) where \(\pi _1^*\equiv \phi _1^B(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1^*,\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^*)-k(q_1^*)^2/2\), \(\hat{\pi }_1^*\equiv \phi _1^L(\bar{\mu }_1+(\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^*)/(\gamma k),\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^*)-k[(\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^*)/(\gamma k)]^2/2\), \(\hat{\pi }_1^L\equiv \phi _1^L(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1^L,\bar{\mu }_2)-k(q_1^L)^2/2\) and \(\tilde{\pi }_1\equiv \phi _1^B(\bar{\mu }_1+\tilde{q}_1^B,\bar{\mu }_2)-k(\tilde{q}_1^B)^2/2\). By definition, \(\mathbf{q }^*\) belongs to \(\mathbf{T }\), and it can be obtained by solving \(\Pi _1^1(\mathbf{q })=0\) and \(\Pi _2^2(\mathbf{q })=0\):

$$\begin{aligned} q_i^*={(1+1/b)(k-{2\over 4-\gamma ^2}) \bar{\mu }_i-\gamma k \bar{\mu }_j\over (\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)/\hat{\Delta }} ,\quad i=1,2, \end{aligned}$$
(8.14)

which, together with (3.12) and (3.14), implies

$$\begin{aligned} \pi _1^*={ (k-\hat{r}_{11}^1)k[(1+1/b)(k-{2\over 4-\gamma ^2}) \bar{\mu }_1-\gamma k \bar{\mu }_2]^2\over 2(2-\gamma ^2)(\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)^2/\hat{\Delta }}. \end{aligned}$$
(8.15)

We next examine whether \(\mathbf{q }^*\) is an equilibrium. Equation (8.14), together with Fact 5.2-(i), implies that \(q_2^*\gtreqqless \hat{q}_2^L\) if \(\bar{\mu }_2\gtreqqless 332.794\). The condition \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1]\) means that \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (329.67,333.333]\), implying that \(q_2^*\) can either exceed or fall below \(\hat{q}_2^L\). It follows that \(\mathbf{q }^*\) is an equilibrium if \(\bar{\mu }_2\ge 332.794\). It remains to analyze those cases with \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (329.67, 332.794)\). Equations (5.5) and (5.6) imply that \(\hat{\pi }_1^*= 4.81251(535.842-\bar{\mu }_2)(\bar{\mu }_2-48.5268)\), which, together with (8.15), implies that \(\pi _1^*-\hat{\pi }_1^*=4.85064(\bar{\mu }_2-331.162)(\bar{\mu }_2-296.3)\). From \(\bar{\mu }_2>296.3\) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \pi _1^*\lesseqqgtr \hat{\pi }_1^*,\quad \hbox {if }\bar{\mu }_2\lesseqqgtr \eta ^D\bar{\mu }_1 \end{aligned}$$
(8.16)

where \(\eta ^D\equiv 0.331162\). In summary, if \(\bar{\mu }_2\ge \eta ^D\bar{\mu }_1\), then \(\mathbf{q }^*\) is an equilibrium.

It remains to study whether \((q_1^L,0)\) is an equilibrium. Using Fact 5.1 yields that \(\tilde{q}_1^B=\hat{r}_0^1/(k-\hat{r}_{11}^1)\), which, together with (3.12) and (3.14), implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\pi }_1={[(1+1/b)\bar{\mu }_1 -\gamma \bar{\mu }_2]^2k\over (4-\gamma ^2)^2 (1-\gamma ^2)(k-\hat{r}_{11}^1)}. \end{aligned}$$
(8.17)

Equation (5.5), together with (5.13), implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\pi }_1^L={[2\gamma k \bar{\mu }_1-(2k-1)\bar{\mu }_2]\bar{\mu }_2\over 2 \gamma ^2k}. \end{aligned}$$
(8.18)

Subtracting (8.18) from (8.17) yields \(\tilde{\pi }_1-\hat{\pi }_1^L=3.52773(\bar{\mu }_2-331.42)(\bar{\mu }_2-290.54)\). From \(\bar{\mu }_2>290.54\) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\pi }_1\lesseqqgtr \hat{\pi }_1^L\quad \hbox { if }\bar{\mu }_2\lesseqqgtr \eta ^I\bar{\mu }_1 \end{aligned}$$
(8.19)

where \( \eta ^I\equiv 0.33142\). In summary, if \(\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^I\bar{\mu }_1\), then \((q_1^L,0)\) is an equilibrium. \(\square \)

The proof of Lemma 5.1

Let us begin with establishing some basic results. As mentioned, (4.6) still holds if \(\mathbf{N }^i\) is replaced by \(\mathbf{N }^i\cup \mathbf{L }^i\). It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{\Pi }_i^i(0;\mathbf{N }^i\cup \mathbf{L }^i)=\{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{N }^i\cup \mathbf{L }^i:q_i=0\}=\{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{R }_+^2:q_i=0,q_j\ge q_j^{BL}(0)\}\nonumber \\ \end{aligned}$$
(8.20)

where \(\mathbf{\Pi }_i^i(0;\mathbf{N }^i\cup \mathbf{L }^i)\equiv \{\mathbf{q }\in \mathbf{N }^i\cup \mathbf{L }^i:\Pi _i^i(\mathbf{q })=0\}\). Again, as mentioned, (4.8) still holds, implying that Fact 8.2 still holds.

Fact 5.1, together with SS, SOC and SC, implies that \(\mathbf{\Pi }_i^i(0)\) is an upward sloping line segment, \(i=1,2\), and that \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\) is steeper than \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\). Moreover, \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\) meets \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^1\cup \mathbf{L }^1)\) at point \((0,q_2^{BL}(0))\),Footnote 58 whereas \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) meets \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0;\mathbf{N }^2\cup \mathbf{L }^2)\) at point \((q_1^{BL}(0),0)\). It is easy to show that Fact 8.1 still holds if \(q_1^{CL}\), \(\tilde{q}_1^C\) and \(\partial \mathbf{T }^2\) are replaced by \(q_1^{BL}\), \(\tilde{q}_1^B\) and \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\), respectively.Footnote 59 According to this fact, it is important to sign \(\Pi _i^i(q_i^{BL}(0),0)\):Footnote 60

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi _i^i(q_i^{BL}(0),0)\gtreqqless 0,\quad \hbox { if }\bar{\mu }_j \lesseqqgtr \eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_i. \end{aligned}$$
(8.21)

It follows that if \(\bar{\mu }_2 > \eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), then there exists \(0<\tilde{q}_1^B<q_1^{BL}(0)\) such that \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0) \) meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((\tilde{q}_1^B,0)\).

The above basic results yield the following fact:

Fact 8.3

If \(\eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1< \bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^B\), then firm 1’s reaction curve is the union of \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\) and \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^1\cup \mathbf{L }^1)\).

Since Fact 8.3 is a counterpart of Fact 4.2-(i), its proof is omitted. We also have the following fact:

Fact 8.4

(i) If \(\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^L\), then firm 2’s reaction curve is \( \mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\cup \mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0;\mathbf{N }^2\cup \mathbf{L }^2)\). (ii) If \(\eta ^C\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1\), then \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)=\emptyset \), and firm 2’s reaction curve is simply the whole \(q_1\)-axis.

Proof

The inequality \(\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^L\) can be rewritten as \(\eta ^L\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2/\eta ^B\). Hence, Part (i) follows from Fact 8.3, because the firms’ positions are symmetric. It is proven next that \(\eta ^C\bar{\mu }_1<\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1 \Rightarrow \mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)=\emptyset \). From \(\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1\) it follows that there exists \(q_2^a\ge 0\) such that \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\) meets the \(q_2\)-axis at point \((0,q_2^a)\). It is shown next that \(\Pi _2^2(0,q_2^a)\le 0\). By definition, \(q_2^a\) solves \( q_1^{BL}( q_2)=0\). It follows that \( q_2^a=\bar{\mu }_1 \gamma /(1+1/b)-\bar{\mu }_2\). According to Fact 5.1, \(\Pi _2^2(0,q_2^a)=[ (1+1/b)\bar{\mu }_2-\gamma \bar{\mu }_1]k/(2-\gamma ^2)\). It follows that \(\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1\Rightarrow \Pi _2^2(0,q_2^a)\le 0\). From \( \Pi _2^2(0,q_2^a)\le 0\) it follows that \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) is empty because each point belonging to \(\mathbf{V }\) lies to the northeast of \((0,q_2^a)\). This completes the proof of Fact 8.4.

Note that, in either one of Cases A1 and A2, \(\bar{\mu }_2\) always belongs to \((\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^L)\), and hence Fact 8.4-(i) can be applied. [In Fig. 7, we depict firm 2’s reaction curve for Case A2.] Fact 8.4-(i), together with Fact 8.3, implies that, in Case A1, \(\mathbf{q }^*\) is the equilibrium. We next examine Case A2. It is cleat that \(\mathbf{q }^*\) is potentially an equilibrium. Fact 8.4-(i), together with Fact 5.2-(ii.a), implies that firm 2’s reaction curve also meet \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)\) at point \((q_1^L,0)\), implying that \((q_1^L,0)\) is potentially an equilibrium. \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 5.4

Since \((q_1^L,0)\) is an equilibrium, \(\Pi ^1(q_1^L,0)\ge \Pi ^1(\tilde{q}_1^B,0)\). We can demonstrate that when \(\mathbf{q }\) moves downward and to the right along \( \mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\), \(\Pi ^1(\mathbf{q })\) increases.Footnote 61 It follows that \(\Pi ^1(\tilde{q}_1^B,0)>\Pi ^1(\mathbf{q }^*)>\Pi ^1(0,q_2^{BL}(0))\). We can draw two implications from this inequality. First, \(\Pi ^1(q_1^L,0)>\Pi ^1(\mathbf{q }^*)\). Second, \(\Pi ^1(\mathbf{q }^*)>0\), because \(\Pi ^1(0,q_2^{BL}(0))=0\). We can apply the same line of reasoning to prove that \(\Pi ^2(\mathbf{q }^*)>0\). It is clear that \(\Pi ^2(q_1^L,0)=0\). It thus follows that \(\Pi ^2(q_1^L,0)<\Pi ^2(\mathbf{q }^*)\). \(\square \)

The proof of Lemma 5.2

In either one of Cases B and C, \(\bar{\mu }_2\) may belong to either \((\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^L)\) or \((\eta ^C\bar{\mu }_1,\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1]\).Footnote 62 According to Fact 8.4, if \(\bar{\mu }_2>\eta ^B\bar{\mu }_1\), then \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) meets the \(q_2\)-axis and firm 2’s reaction curve is the union of \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) and \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0;\mathbf{N }^2\cup \mathbf{L }^2)\); otherwise, \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)=\emptyset \) and firm 2’s reaction curve is the whole \(q_1\)-axis. Because \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\) meets \(\partial \mathbf{V }^2\), it is always true that \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\cap \mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)=\emptyset \), regardless of whether \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) is empty or not. It follows that the equilibrium is the point at which firm 1’s reaction curve meets the \(q_1\)-axis. Hence, firm 1 should be active whereas firm 2 should be inactive. We can show that, in Case B, \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)\) is not empty, and it meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((q_1^L,0)\), whereas \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)=\emptyset \), implying that the equilibrium is \((q_1^L,0)\). In Case C, \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{L }^2)\) is not empty, but it does not meet the \(q_1\)-axis. Moreover, \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0;\mathbf{N }^2)\) is not empty, and it meets the \(q_1\)-axis at \((q_1^M,0)\), which is thus the equilibrium. \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 5.1

Part (ii) follows form Lemma 5.2-(i) and Eqs. (3.1) and (5.13). It remains to prove Part (i). Since \(\mu _i=\bar{\mu }_i+q_i^*\), \(i=1,2\), Eq. (8.14), together with (3.12), implies that

$$\begin{aligned} x_i^B=(4-\gamma ^2)kq_i^*/(4-2\gamma ^2),\quad i=1,2. \end{aligned}$$
(8.22)

The desired results thus straightforwardly follow from (8.14) and (8.22). [According to (4.4), \(k-2/(4-\gamma ^2)>0\).] \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 5.1

If the accommodated-entry equilibrium prevails, then the desired result follows from Proposition 5.1-(i). Otherwise, \(q_2^B=x_2^B=0\), and the desired result thereby follows. \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 5.5

If and only if \(\mathbf{q }^B\in \tilde{\mathbf{V }}\), then \(\mathbf{p }^B-\mathbf{c}\) is given by (3.13). Part (i) thus follows. In the deterred-entry equilibrium, the second-stage competition is characterized by (3.7), implying that \(p_1^B-c_1=\mu _1-x_1^B\). Part (ii) thus follows. \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 5.2

It remains to prove Part (ii). If the accommodated-entry equilibrium prevails, then the desired result follows from Part (i). If the deterred-entry equilibrium prevails, then, according to (3.7), \(p_2^B=c_2\), implying that \(p_1^B-c_1>p_2^B-c_2\). \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 6.1

According to Fact 4.1 and (4.3), \(\tilde{q}_1^C=r_0^1/(k-r_{11}^1) \). Similarly, \(\tilde{q}_1^B= \hat{r}_0^1/(k-\hat{r}_{11}^1) \). It is clear that either one of \(\tilde{q}_1^C\) and \(\tilde{q}_1^B\) decreases with \(k\). Moreover,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{q}_1^C-\tilde{q}_1^B={2\gamma ^3 (1-\gamma )(k-\check{k}) \bar{\mu }\over (1-\gamma ^2)(4-\gamma ^2)^2(k-r_{11}^1)(k-\hat{r}_{11}^1)} \end{aligned}$$

where \( \check{k}\equiv 4(2-\gamma ^2)/[(1-\gamma )(4-\gamma ^2)^2]>0\). Therefore, \(\tilde{q}_1^C-\tilde{q}_1^B\) and \(k-\check{k}\) share the same sign. Furthermore, it is easily shown that when \( k=\check{k}\), \( \tilde{q}_1^C=\tilde{q}_1^B=(1/\eta ^P-1)\bar{\mu }\). The desired results thus follow. \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 6.2

(i): In Case A, \(x_i^C\) and \(x_i^B\) (\(i=1,2\)) are given by (8.8) and (8.22), respectively. Therefore, \(x_1^B+x_2^B-x_1^C-x_2^C\) is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} { \gamma ^2(4-\gamma ^2)[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2](\bar{\mu }_1+\bar{\mu }_2)k \over (1+\gamma )(4-\gamma ^2)^3k^2-2(4-\gamma ^2)(8+4\gamma -4\gamma ^2-\gamma ^3)k+8(2-\gamma ^2)}, \end{aligned}$$

whose sign is independent of the degree of asymmetry. The desired result thus follows from the known result stating that \( x_i^B>x_i^C\), \(i=1,2 \) if the two firms are symmetric. In Case B1, \(x_i^C\) (\(i=1,2\)) is given by (8.8), and \(x_1^B=x_1^L\) and \(x_2^B=0\), implying that \(x_1^B+x_2^B-x_1^C-x_2^C\) is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} {2[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]\over \gamma [(4-\gamma ^2)(2+\gamma )k-4]k}(\bar{\mu }_2-\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1), \end{aligned}$$

which, according to (5.3), is positive.

(ii): It is clear that \(q_1^C=q_1^{CL}(0)\), \(q_2^C=0\), \(x_1^C=\tilde{x}_1^M\), \(x_2^C=0\), \(q_1^B=q_1^L\), \(q_2^B=0\), \(x_1^B=x_1^L\) and \(x_2^B=0\). Equation (3.1) thus implies that \(x_1^C= (\bar{\mu }_1+q_1^{CL}(0))/ 2\) and \(x_1^B=\bar{\mu }_2/ \gamma \). According to (4.1), \(q_1^{CL}(0)=\bar{\mu }_2/\eta ^C-\bar{\mu }_1\). It thus follows that \(x_1^C=x_1^B\). As a result, \(x_1^C+x_2^C=x_1^B+x_2^B\). \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 6.3

The following lemma will be used to prove Proposition 6.3: \(\square \)

Lemma 8.1

Assume that \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^{BL})\). There exists \(\eta ^E\in (\eta ^{BL},1)\) such that (i) \(q_1^C \lesseqqgtr q_1^*\), if \(\bar{\mu }_2\lesseqqgtr \eta ^E\bar{\mu }_1\), and (ii) \(x_2^C(\bar{\mu }_1+q_1^C,\bar{\mu }_2+q_2^C) \gtreqqless x_2^*\), if \(\bar{\mu }_2\lesseqqgtr \eta ^E\bar{\mu }_1\).

Proof

According to (6.1), from \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^{BL})\) it follows that \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1/\eta ^{CL})\). Lemma 4.1-(i) thus implies that \(\mathbf{q }^C\) belongs to \(\mathbf{T }\), and hence it is given by (8.7). In this section, we let \(\det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C\) denote \(\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2\) in (8.7). Similarly, \(\det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_B\) stands for \(\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2\) in (8.14). Note that both \(\det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C\) and \(\det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_B\) are positive. We can use (8.14) and (8.7) to show that \( \partial (q_1^C-q_1^*)/ \partial \bar{\mu }_2= 2 \gamma ^3 \{\cdot \} / \{ (1-\gamma ^2)(4 -\gamma ^2)^5k\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_B \}\), which is positive, because (5.3) guarantees that \(\{\cdot \}=(4 -\gamma ^2)^3k^2-8 (4 -\gamma ^2)(2 -\gamma ^2)k+8 (2 -\gamma ^2)>0\). We can use (8.8) and (8.22) to establish that \(\partial (x_2^C-x_2^B)/ \partial \bar{\mu }_2 =(4-\gamma ^2)k/4\times \partial [q_2^C-2q_2^*/(2-\gamma ^2)]/\partial \bar{\mu }_2\), which is negative, because \( \partial (q_2^C-q_2^*)/\partial \bar{\mu }_2\) is negativeFootnote 63 and \(\partial q_2^*/\partial \bar{\mu }_2\) is positive. Furthermore, \(q_1^C=q_1^*= 4(2-\gamma ^2)[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2]\bar{\mu }_1/\{ \cdot \}\) and \(x_2^C=x_2^B= \gamma (4 -\gamma ^2)^2k^2\bar{\mu }_1/\{\cdot \} ,\) if \( \bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^E\bar{\mu }_1\) where \(\eta ^E\equiv \gamma (4-\gamma ^2)^2[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2]k/\{\cdot \} \). We can show that \(\eta ^{BL}<\eta ^E<1\).Footnote 64 This completes the proof of Lemma 8.1.

Since Bertrand competition yields an accommodated-entry equilibrium, according to Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, \(\bar{\mu }_2\) should belong to \((\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1]\) and \(\mathbf{q }^B=\mathbf{q }^*\). Parts (iii) and (iv) thus follow straightforwardly from Lemma 8.1. The counterpart for firm 2 of Lemma 8.1-(i) states that \(q_2^C \lesseqqgtr q_2^*\), if \(\bar{\mu }_1\lesseqqgtr \eta ^E\bar{\mu }_2\). From \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1)\) it follows that \(\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1\), which, together with \(\eta ^E<1\), implies that \(\bar{\mu }_1> \eta ^E\bar{\mu }_2\). Part (i) thus follows. Part (ii) similarly follows from the counterpart for firm 2 of Lemma 8.1-(ii). \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 6.1

According to Proposition 6.3, \(\eta ^E<1\), which, together with \(\bar{\mu }_2\le \eta ^E\bar{\mu }_1\), implies that \(\bar{\mu }_2<\bar{\mu }_1\). Therefore, Corollaries 4.1 and 5.1 imply that \(q_1^C>q_2^C\), \(q_1^B>q_2^B\), \(x_1^C>x_2^C\) and \(x_1^B>x_2^B\). Parts (i) and (iii) thus follow straightforwardly from Proposition 6.3. It is clear that (ii) follows from (i). Moreover, either one of (iv) and (v) follows from (iii). \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 6.4

From (8.7) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} q_1^C-q_2^C={ 2(k-{2\over 4-\gamma ^2}) +\gamma k \over (\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)/\Delta }(\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2). \end{aligned}$$

From (8.14) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} q_1^*-q_2^*= {(1+1/b)(k-{2\over 4-\gamma ^2}) +\gamma k \over (\Pi _{11}^1\Pi _{22}^2-\Pi _{12}^1\Pi _{21}^2)/\hat{\Delta }}(\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2). \end{aligned}$$

\((q_1^*-q_2^*)-(q_1^C-q_2^C)=2 \gamma ^3 (4 -\gamma ^2)k(\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2)/[\cdot ]\) and \((x_1^B-x_2^B)-(x_1^C-x_2^C)=\gamma ^2 (4 -\gamma ^2) \{(4 -\gamma ^2)k-2 \}k(\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2)/[\cdot ]\) where \([\cdot ]=(4 -\gamma ^2)^3 (1-\gamma )k^2-2 (4 -\gamma ^2)(8 -4 \gamma -4 \gamma ^2+\gamma ^3)k + 8 (2\ -\gamma ^2)\), which is guaranteed by (5.4) to be positive. Moreover, according to (5.3), \(\{\cdot \}\) is positive. Parts (i) and (ii) thus follow. In order to prove (iii) it suffices to establish that \( x_1^B/x_2^B>x_1^C/x_2^C\). We can show that \( x_1^B/x_2^B-x_1^C/x_2^C= \gamma ^3 (4-\gamma ^2)[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2]k(\bar{\mu }_1^2-\bar{\mu }_2^2)/\{2[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2]\bar{\mu }_2-\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)k\bar{\mu }_1\}/ \{(2 -\gamma ^2)[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2]\bar{\mu }_2-\gamma (4-\gamma ^2)k\bar{\mu }_1 \}\), which, according to (5.3), is positive. \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 6.5

(i): Since Bertrand competition yields a deterred-entry equilibrium and Cournot competition yields an accommodated-entry equilibrium, according to Lemmas 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, \(\bar{\mu }_2\in (\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1,\eta ^L\bar{\mu }_1]\). Since Bertrand competition yields a deterred-entry equilibrium, \(q_1^B=q_1^L ,~q_2^B=0,~ x_1^B=x_1^L\) and \( x_2^B=0\). Since Cournot competition yields an accommodated-entry equilibrium, (8.7) is valid. We can use (5.13) and (8.7) to show that \( \partial (q_1^C-q_1^B)/ \partial \bar{\mu }_2 =-[(4 -\gamma ^2)(16 -4 \gamma ^2+\gamma ^4)k^2-16 (4 -\gamma ^2)k+16 ]/\{ \cdot \}\), which, according to (5.3), is negative,where \( \{\cdot \}=\gamma (4 -\gamma ^2)^3k\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C.\) Moreover, \( x_1^B-x_1^C=-\{ 4[ (4-\gamma ^2)k-2 ]^2k( \eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1-\bar{\mu }_2)\}/ \{\cdot \}\), which is positive since \( \bar{\mu }_2>\eta ^{CL}\bar{\mu }_1\). Furthermore, \( q_1^C=q_1^B\) when \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^e\bar{\mu }_1\) where

$$\begin{aligned} \eta ^e\equiv {8 \gamma [ (4 -\gamma ^2)k-2]k \over (4 -\gamma ^2)(16 - \gamma ^2+\gamma ^4)k^2-16 (4 -\gamma ^2)k+16 }. \end{aligned}$$

We can show that \( \eta ^{CL}<\eta ^e<\eta ^{BL}\).Footnote 65

(ii): Equations (8.12) and (8.13) imply that \( q_1^{BL}(0)<q_1^L<q_1^{CL}(0)\). Therefore, the desired result follows from the proof of Proposition 6.2-(ii). \(\square \)

The proof of Corollary 6.2

Part (i) follows from Proposition 6.2; Part (ii) from Proposition 6.5-(ii). \(\square \)

The proof of Proposition 6.6

Since the Cournot equilibrium is an interior equilibrium, \(p_2^C>c_2\). In Case B1, \(p_2^B=c_2\), implying that \(p_2^C>p_2^B\). It remains to study Case A. Let \(p_i^*\) (\(i=1,2\)) represent the price of good \(i\) when Bertrand competition entails an accommodated-entry equilibrium. If \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), then \(\mathbf{\Pi }_1^1(0)\) and \(\mathbf{\Pi }_2^2(0)\) meet at point \((q_1^{BL}(0),0)\), i.e., \(\mathbf{q }^*=(q_1^{BL}(0),0)\), implying that \(p_2^*=c_2\) and hence \(p_2^C>p_2^*\). We can show that \(\partial (p_i^C-p_i^*)/\partial \bar{\mu }_2=\gamma ^3[(4-\gamma ^2 )k-2]^2k^2/[(4-\gamma ^2)^3(1-\gamma ^2)\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_C\times \det [\Pi _{ij}^i]_B]>0\), \(\forall \bar{\mu }_2\in [\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1,\bar{\mu }_1]\). It follows that if \(\bar{\mu }_2\in [\eta ^{BL},\bar{\mu }_1]\), then \(p_2^C>p_2^*\). \(\square \)

The proof of Fact 6.2

Since \(\bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), Cournot competition entails the accommodated-entry equilibrium. Accordingly, (3.10), together with (8.7)–(8.8), implies that \(p_1^C\doteq 0.4952(k-0.7279)(k-0.4209)k\bar{\mu }_1/[(k-0.4267)(k-0.5333)(k-0.7111)]\). Similarly, (3.13), together with (8.14) and (8.22), implies that \(p_1^*\doteq 1.60714k\bar{\mu }_1/(3.75k-2)\). From (3.7) it follows that \(p_1^L=\bar{\mu }_1+q_1^L-x_1^L\) which , together with (3.1) and (5.13), implies that \(p_1^L\doteq (0.14297+1.6071 k)\bar{\mu }_1/(3.75k-2)\). With some subtractions, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} p_1^L-p_1^*\doteq 0.0381\bar{\mu }_1/(k-0.5333)\\ p_1^*-p_1^C\doteq 0.6667(0.8250-k)(k-0.3940)k\bar{\mu }_1/[(k-0.7111)\\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \times (k-0.5333)(k-0.4267)] \\ p_1^L-p_1^C\doteq 0.6667(0.9680-k)(0.179-0.8224k+k^2) \bar{\mu }_1/[(k-0.7111)\\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \times (k-0.5333)(k-0.4267)] \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

According to footnote 34, from \(\gamma =0.5 \) it follows that \(\tilde{r}+\hat{r} =0.8\). Equation (5.11) thus means that \(k>0.8\). It follows that \(p_1^L>p_1^*.\) Moreover, the denominators of \( p_1^*-p_1^C\) and \(p_1^L-p_1^C\) are positive. We can show that \(0.179-0.8224k+k^2>0\). Hence, the desired result follows from

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} p_1^*\gtreqqless p_1^C\Leftrightarrow k\lesseqqgtr \hat{k}\equiv 0.8250,\\ p_1^L\gtreqqless p_1^C\Leftrightarrow k\lesseqqgtr \tilde{k}\equiv 0.9680. \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square \)

The proof of footnote 50

We can show that if \( \bar{\mu }_2=\eta ^{BL}\bar{\mu }_1\), then

$$\begin{aligned} p_1^C-p_1^*={ (4-\gamma ^2) \gamma ^2\delta (k)k\bar{\mu }_1\over (2-\gamma ^2)[(4-\gamma ^2)k-2] \{ \cdot \} } , \end{aligned}$$

where \( \delta (k)=(4-\gamma ^2)^2(2- \gamma ^2 )k^2-8(4-\gamma ^2)k+8\) and \( \{\cdot \} =(4-\gamma ^2)^3k^2-16(4-\gamma ^2)k+16.\) Equation (5.3) implies that \(\{\cdot \}\) is positive. It follows that \(p_1^C-p_1^*\) and \(\delta (k)\) share the same sign. It is clear that \( \delta ''(k)>0\). Note that, according to (5.11), \(k\) should exceed \( \tilde{r}+\hat{r}\). Let \( k^\delta \) denote the \(k\) which solves \( \delta '(k)=0\). From \( \tilde{r}+\hat{r}-k^\delta =\gamma (2-2\gamma +\gamma ^2)/[(4-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma )(2-\gamma ^2)]>0\) it follows that \( \tilde{r}+\hat{r}>k^\delta \). Accordingly, \(\delta (k)>\delta (\tilde{r}+\hat{r})\) if \(k> \tilde{r}+\hat{r}\). We can show that \(\delta (\tilde{r}+\hat{r})\) equals to \( -\gamma ^2(2-4\gamma +\gamma ^2)/(1-\gamma )^2\), which is positive if \(\gamma \in (0.5857 ,1).\) \(\square \)

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Chang, M.C., Ho, YC. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D. J Econ 113, 133–174 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0370-4

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