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A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem

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Abstract.

We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to the source.

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Correspondence to Leticia Lorenzo.

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Finicial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia and FEDER, and Xunta de Galicia through grants BEC2002-04102-C02-01 and PGIDIT03PXIC30002PN is gratefully acknowledged.

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Bergantiños, G., Lorenzo, L. A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem. Math Meth Oper Res 59, 393–403 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400352

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400352

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