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Between Hilbert and Gentzen: four-valued consequence systems and structural reasoning

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Abstract

Structural reasoning is simply reasoning that is governed exclusively by structural rules. In this context a proof system can be said to be structural if all of its inference rules are structural. A logic is considered to be structuralizable if it can be equipped with a sound and complete structural proof system. This paper provides a general formulation of the problem of structuralizability of a given logic, giving specific consideration to a family of logics that are based on the Dunn–Belnap four-valued semantics. It is shown how sound and complete structural proof systems can be constructed for a spectrum of logics within different logical frameworks.

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Notes

  1. In the interests of brevity, I will refer to them simply as ‘structural’ and ‘logical’ rules respectively.

  2. A consequence relation in Tarski’s sense is usually understood as a relation that obeys reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity (cut), all of which are purely structural principles.

  3. Cf. also an interesting distinction between the ‘structure-free’ and ‘structure-dependent’ rules for logical connectives presented by Nuel Belnap in [7, p. 31].

  4. A clause in disjunctive form is a disjunction of literals, where literal is an atomic formula or its negation.

  5. Usually one considers an ‘implicative form’ of clauses \(\varphi _1 \wedge \ldots \wedge \varphi _m \rightarrow \psi _1 \vee \ldots \vee \psi _n\) with an arrow instead of turnstile. The latter is more appropriate for the purposes of the present paper, however.

  6. Linear resolution is presented in detail in [30, pp. 61–80]. For an explanation of the relationship between resolution and cut see, e.g., [9, pp. 286–287].

  7. It is widely acknowledged that Hertz’s ideas were critical for the emergence of structural reasoning; for example, [28] stresses that the “very idea of sequent calculi and of structural rules was first conceived by Hertz”. Schroeder-Heister in [35] gives a detailed explanation of Hertz’s contribution, remarking that the calculi that were developed in the 1920s by Paul Hertz are structural systems. Remarkably, Hertz’s systems deal with sequents that have only one formula in the succedent, i.e., sequents that take the form \(\Gamma \vdash \psi \).

  8. Note, that Definition 1.2 employs a rather general idea of substitution, whereby any formula can be (simultaneously) substituted by some other formula; such substitutivity simply ensures structural invariance of a rule to which it is applied. This idea of substitutivity is compliant with Łoś and Suszko’s [29] structurality condition imposed on Tarskian consequence operation Cn: \(\varepsilon Cn(\varphi ) \subseteq Cn(\varepsilon \varphi ),\) for every endomorphism \(\varepsilon \) and every formula \(\varphi \). In this sense it is clear why the rule \(\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \varphi \) cannot be regarded as structural under this definition: substituting, for example, \(\chi \) for \(\varphi \wedge \psi \) results in an invalid rule \(\chi \vdash \psi \).

  9. In referring to basic properties of connectives and consequence relations, I refer to properties that are exactly determined by primitive axioms and rules. Of course, there may also be derivative properties that are reflected by theorems of the system under consideration, as well as derivable (or even admissible) rules. Such derivative properties can be of a mixed, logical-structural nature, depending of the types of axioms and rules that are needed to obtain them. Moreover, as noted by an anonymous referee, [7] observes, that some properties of conjunction and disjunction are structure-dependent; this can be made more explicit by replacing Gentzen’s rule for \(\wedge \) and \(\vee \) by Ketonen’s.

  10. The subscript stands here of course for ‘conjunction, disjunction, negation’.

  11. Observe that, in [21], Gentzen deals with sequents of the Set-Set type when formulating sequent calculus for classical logic LK, albeit without the non-emptiness restriction. His calculus for intuitionistic logic LJ is an example of a system constructed in the finite Set-Fmla framework.

  12. Dunn’s original dissertation of 1966, which is now published in [16] contains (on pp. 115–116) essentially the same system with a reference to [4].

  13. Clearly, FDE is a Gentzen system in the sense of Definition 1.1 (as are all the consequence systems considered in this paper.) Interestingly, Anderson and Belnap, in using \(\rightarrow \) instead of \(\vdash \), treat their system as ‘a Hilbert-style formalism’ for axiomatizing the set of ‘tautological entailments’. In the final section, I will show how the systems constructed in this paper incorporate linearity of inferences; this is an important feature of Hilbert-style systems.

  14. In [38] another structural system FDE(-) was formulated, in which disjunctive and conjunctive contexts were taken separately. Adam Přenosil has pointed out to me that the deductive equivalence of FDE(-) with FDE remains in doubt, and that combined disjunctive-conjunctive (conjunctive-disjunctive) context can do a better job.

  15. Font and Verdú remark that for their purposes it is enough to deal with algebras \(\mathbb {A} = (A, \wedge , \lnot )\) of type (2, 1), and define as usual \(x \vee y = \lnot (\lnot x\wedge \lnot y)\), see [19, p. 389].

  16. Observations of the last two paragraphs, together with Lemma 6.4, was inspired by a comment of an anonymous referee.

  17. Inherent already by Hertz’s systems. As Schroeder-Heister observes, “Hertz was the first to consider tree-like proof structures, an idea that became essential for Gentzen’s later development of natural deduction and of the full sequent calculus” [35, p. 251].

  18. As Schroeder-Heister states: “Two particular features of structural reasoning which go beyond Gentzen style sequent calculi are the following:

    Sequents may occur as assumptions.

    and

    Cut is an indispensable rule which cannot be eliminated.

    The first feature normally implies the second one” [35, p. 247].

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Adam Přenosil and Nadiia Kozachenko for valuable feedback concerning axiomatization of the system FDE\(_\textsc {s}\). I also thank the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University, Kryvyi Rih, 50086, Ukraine

    Yaroslav Shramko

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Shramko, Y. Between Hilbert and Gentzen: four-valued consequence systems and structural reasoning. Arch. Math. Logic 61, 627–651 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00153-021-00806-2

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