Abstract
A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social.
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Engel, P. The norms of thought: Are they social?. Mind & Society 2, 129–148 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02512078
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02512078