Summary
This paper begins with a discussion of the logical apparatus of Frege, where his use ofSinn suggests a modification of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Then, it turns to Strawson's “basic particulars” with its essentially Kantian orientation. This brings forward the logical ground upon which the Identity Thesis rests. Finally, following Frege with some modifications, the paper suggests that an “ontological list” where concepts can be treated as objective (materially dependent) subsistent entities would be necessary in order to avoid errors of J. J. C. Smart and other analytic philosophers who hold the Identity Thesis.
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References
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Bertman, M.A. Basic particulars and the Identity Thesis. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3, 1–8 (1972). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800815
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800815