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Continuity of bargaining solutions

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Abstract

Upper semicontinuous solutions of the bargaining problem are studied and also lower semicontinuous weak solutions of that problem are considered. Though mainly compact bargaining pairs are investigated, extensions to non-compact bargaining pairs are indicated. The continuity properties of some well known bargaining solutions are discussed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Catholic University Nijmegen, Toernooiveld, NL-6525, ED Nijmegen

    M. J. M. Jansen & S. H. Tijs

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  1. M. J. M. Jansen
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  2. S. H. Tijs
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Jansen, M.J.M., Tijs, S.H. Continuity of bargaining solutions. Int J Game Theory 12, 91–105 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01774299

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01774299

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