Summary
We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy “strategy-proofness,” “individual rationality”, “no exploitation” and “non-bossiness”. Any such procedure is a scheme of “semi-convex cost sharing” determined by “the minimum demand principle”.
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I wish to thank Professors Salvador Barbera, Matthew Jackson, Herve Moulin and William Thomson for their helpful suggestions and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Conversations with Professors Hideo Konishi, Shinji Oseto Ken-ichi Shimomura and Stephen Ching were helpful. This work is supported by the Japan Economic Research Foundation and Research Grants PB89-0294 and PB89-0075 from the Direcion General de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnica, Spanish Ministry of Education.
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Serizawa, S. Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies. Econ Theory 7, 501–512 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213663
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213663