Process and Action: Relevant Theory and Logics

Abstract

Whileprocess andaction are fundamental notions, in ubiquitous use, they lack satisfactory logical treatment in two critical respects: in analyses of the fundamentals themselves and in logical development. For what treatment they have so far received, under classical systematisation, leaves significant lacunae and induces much paradox. A relevant logical relocation, carried through in detail here, removes such problems, and provides solid ground-work for a satisfactory treatment.

Firstly, as to fundamentals: processes should be explicated, so it is argued, as certain sorts of (time) directed functions (from inputs to outputs); thus they can be represented through certain ordered pairs of relations. Significant logical structures they can enter into are investigated: notably, process lattice and coupled logics, and a generalized category theory (tolerating nonassociativity of composition).

Actions are types of processes, agent-ascribed process. As stock analyses of the differentia, operators and agency, through intentionality, rationality and so on, demonstrably fail, new causal analyses are proposed.

Secondly, as to logical developments: for the most part, the apparently diverse offering of process and action logics to be encountered in the literature are but multiple modal logics: modal logics enriched with further functors of interesting modal sorts. Some, for example, like advertised “process logics” are dynamic logics (themselves basically multiple modal logics) enriched by tense logical functors, themselves modal in character. In a way that is now becoming nonstandardly standard, these modal enterprises can be reworked on relevant logical bases. A main point to such exercises resembles that of other relevant reworkings: namely, the search for correctness, for adequacy to pre-analytic and linguistic data, and therewith removal of paradoxes and anomalies that accumulate under modal analyses.

Logical components from a properly expanded Humean model of action are supplied with relevant logics and semantics, in particulardoing, trying andstriving, intention andmotivation. The difficult question of formalising practical inference is then addressed.

Relevant dynamic logics, paralleling modal developments, are built up piece by piece, relevant theory change is considered within a dynamic framework, and work on relevant temporal and process logics of programming cast, including functors such asbefore, during andthroughout, is initiated. The present state of logical play is assessed.