Probability is the very guide of life' (Bishop Butler).
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic form of the Dutch Book argument is valid.
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Howson, C. Subjective probabilities and betting quotients. Synthese 81, 1–8 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869341
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869341