Abstract
This paper discusses the skeptical argument presented by Keith Lehrer in his paper ‘Why Not Scepticism?’. It is argued that Lehrer's argument depends on unacceptable premises, and therefore fails to establish the skeptical conclusion. On the other hand, it is also shown that even if the skeptic's opponent (called a “dogmatist”) knows something, he may be unable to prove this in a way which could convince the skeptic; hence the difficulty of refuting skepticism. The paper also criticises Dretske's attempt to refute skeptical arguments by rejecting the consequence condition for epistemic justification.
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Earlier versions of this paper have been presented in philosophy colloquia at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Göteborg University, and The University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 1980 and 1982. I am grateful to the participants of these colloquia, and especially to Professors Robert Almeder and Robert Audi for their comments and criticisms.
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Hilpinen, R. Skepticism and justification. Synthese 55, 165–173 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485066
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485066