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Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons

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Abstract

This paper comments on the history of the search for better election procedures, then discusses dimensions relevant to the evaluation and comparison of ompeting procedures. Its aim is to indicate the variety of factors involved in the search and to suggest an integrative perspective that could aid further research.

The dimensions examined include the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and methods of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and financing, and institutional effects.

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Fishburn, P.C. Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons. Theor Decis 15, 371–397 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00162114

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