Scriven on The Logic of Cause

Abstract

In a recent article entitled, ‘The Logic of Cause’ Scriven has presented a series of formidable arguments against the possibility of explicating the concept of cause in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Some of his main arguments center on the difficulties of capturing the asymmetry of cause and effect and of handling a certain kind of over-determination he calls linked overdetermination. Scriven's contention that there is no way to capture the asymmetry of cause and effect will be countered by constructing a definition of the concept of causal priority in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Scriven's contention that the existence of linked overdetermination undermines the necessary condidition feature of the definition will be countered by distinguishing two senses of necessary conditionship. My rebuttal of Scriven's arguments, if successful, indicates that the ‘common sense’ view of the cause as a necessary and sufficient condition of its effects may yet prove to be at least roughly accurate.