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Rent-seeking for pure public goods

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Abstract

In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, York University, M3J 1P3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

    Eliakim Katz

  2. Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Rosenberg

Authors
  1. Eliakim Katz
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  2. Shmuel Nitzan
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  3. Jacob Rosenberg
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Additional information

We should like to thank Eliezer Prisman of Bar Ilan University and Barry Smith of York University for their very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Katz, E., Nitzan, S. & Rosenberg, J. Rent-seeking for pure public goods. Public Choice 65, 49–60 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139290

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