Abstract
This paper shows that a relatively easy algorithm for computing the (unique) outcome of a sophisticated voting procedure called sequential voting by veto (SVV) applies to a more general situation than considered hitherto. According to this procedure a sequence of n voters must select s out of m + s options (s > 0, m 3 ⩾ n 3 ⩾ 2). The ith voter, when his turn comes, vetoes k i options (k i ⩾ 1, ∑ k i = m). The s remaining non-vetoed options are selected. Every voter is assumed to be fully informed of all other voters total (linear) preference orderings among the competing options, as well as of the order in which the veto votes are cast. This algorithm was proposed by Mueller (1978) for the special case where s and the k i are all equal to 1, and extended by Moulin (1983) to the somewhat more general case where the k i are arbitrary but s is still 1. Some theoretical and practical issues of voting by veto are discussed.
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Dan Felsenthal, S., Machover, M. Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile. Theor Decis 33, 223–240 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133642
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133642