Notes and references
Austin, J. L.: 1975, How To Do Things With Words, Eds. J. O. Urmson and MarinaSbisa, 2nd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. p. 92.
Searle, J. R.: 1971, ‘Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts’, In Readings in the Philosophy of Language, Eds. J. Rosenberg and C.Travis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, pp. 262–275.
There are other acts which can be distinguished here which Searle calls propositional acts, but these are unnecessary for our present purposes. Cf. Searle, J. R.: Speech Acts, 1969, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 24.
Austin, Speech Acts, 1969, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 103.
Davidson, Donald: 1975 ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. In The Logic of Grammar, D. Davidson and G.Harman, (Eds.) Dickenson publishing Company, Encino, pp. 235–246.
Goldman, Alvin: 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs.
Austin, 1970 A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. p. 101.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. p. 106.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc.:, Englewood Cliffs. p. 106.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc.:, Englewood Cliffs. pp. 130–131.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. pp. 110–111.
Searle, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. pp. 24–29. A propositional act is an act which is performed in the course of performing an illocutionary act. Searle includes only referring and predicating in this class of acts.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. p. 113.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. p. 118.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. p. 116.
Strawson, P. F., ‘Intention, Convention, and Speech Acts’, In Readings in the Philosophy of Language, p. 606.
This was pointed out to me by A. Baier.
Austin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, p. 117.
Anscombe, G.E.M.: 1958, ‘On Brute Facts’, Analysis, Vol. XVIII.
Austin, Ibid., p. 117.
Austin, Ibid., p. 103.
Searle, J. R., Speech Acts, pp. 62–64. Strawson, P. F., Ibid., pp. 608–612.
The examples in (14), (15), and (20) are from Austin, p. 130. See, also, Sadock J. 1977. ‘Aspects of Linguistic Pragmatics’. In Rogers, Wall, and Murphy, (Eds.), Proceedings of the Texas Conference on Performatives, Presuppositions, and Implicatives, Center for Applied Linguistics, Arlington, Virginia p. 68 and p. 75.
Austin, Ibid., p. 131. This is not the schema Austin proposes. His is ‘To say x was to do y. But substitution does not preserve grammaticality.
Austin, Ibid., p. 131.
Austin, Ibid., p. 122. Again these are not the schemata Austin proposes. I have made changes for the same reason as in Note 23.
Lakoff, G: 1970, Irregularity in Syntax, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York. McCawley, J: 1968, ‘Lexical Insertion in a Transformational Grammar without Deep Structure’, In Papers of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago.
Katz, J. J: 1970, ‘Interpretive Semantics vs Generative Semantics’, Foundations of Language, Vol. VI, p. 253.
Chomsky, N.: 1970, ‘Remarks on Nominalizations’, In Readings in English Transformational Grammar, R. Jacobs and P.Rosenbaum (Eds.) Ginn and Co., Waltham. Fodor, J: 1970, ‘Three Reasons for Not Deriving “Kill” from “Cause to Die”’, Linguistics Inquiry, Vol. XIII, Wierzbicka, A: 1975, ‘Why “Kill” Does Not Mean “Cause to Die”: The Semantics of Action Sentences’, Foundations of Language, Vol. XIII,
I take it that to inform someone is to make them aware of certain facts. All that might be required to achieve this is that the hearer understands what the speaker says.
Cf. Cohen, T: ‘Illocutions and Perlocutions’ Foundations of Language Vol. II, pp. 492–503, who makes a similar proposal about the point or purpose of some illocutionary acts.
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A version of this paper was delivered at a conference on speech acts and pragmatics at Dobogoko, Hungary. I would like to thank Annette Baier, Charles E. Caton, David Copp and the referee of this journal for many valuable suggestions for improving this paper.
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Davis, S. Perlocutions. Linguist Philos 3, 225–243 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126511
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126511