Abstract
It has become almost a cliché that Anglo-American and Continental European (including Ibero-American) philosophy are separated by a gulf, widest at the English Channel. Such clichés and the underlying metaphors of gulfs, curtains, and blocks can become dangerous once we become resigned to them.2 But blocks can be crushed, curtains can be raised, and gulfs can be bridged. My preference is for trying to build bridges.
Reprinted from Alexander Pfander, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, pp. 86–92. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
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Notes
Among those who have resigned prematurely I suspect the editor of the Colloque de Royaumont on La Philosophie analytique (Paris, 1962), Leslie Beck, whose Avant-Propos expresses serious doubt about the success of this particular dialogue. His own evidence is hardly that discouraging. Thus he tells us that “when Merleau-Ponty asked `Isn’t our program the same?’ the firm and clean-cut answer (of Gilbert Ryle) was `I hope not.’ ” But if one looks up the main text the only place where this answer occurs is in reply to Merleau-Ponty’s question of whether Ryle in his studies was always “in strict accord with the program outlined at the beginning of the century by Russell and refined by Wittgenstein and some others” (p. 98). Austin, who took a leading part in the discussion, was perhaps even more conciliatory than Ryle, at least as shown in the published text of the Proceedings.
Philosophie aufphänomenologischer Grundlage. Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
A Plea for Excuses,“ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,LVII (1957), 1–30; also in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961), p. 130.
La Philosophie analytique,p. 333. Stanley Cavell in “Austin at Criticism” (Philosophical Review LXXIV, 1965) reprinted in Must We Mean What We Say (New York: Scribner’s, 1969, p. 99), believes that in spite of his hesitation Austin did not retract this label. Unfortunately my inquiries with other students of Austin have not yet yielded clear information on this point.
In Memoriam J. L. Austin 1911–1960,“Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,LX (1960), i-xiv.
Ibid.,LVII (1957), 11; Philosophical Papers,p. 132.
Logik (Halle, 1921), p. 33. For a translation of the Introduction see A. Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation,Northwestern University Press, 1967.
Philosophie auf phänomenologischer Grundlage. Zusammengestellt and eingeleitet von Herbert Spiegelberg. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
See his Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,LXII (1957), 11 n. 5: “And forget for once and for a while, that other curious question, Is it true? May we?’ ”
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Spiegelberg, H. (1981). “Linguistic Phenomenology”: John L. Austin and Alexander Pfänder. In: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. Phaenomenologica, vol 80. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3_5
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