Abstract
Realism need not to be opposed to relativism. It may certainly be opposed to various other positions.1 But, as I maintain in this paper, in philosophy of science the two doctrines play complementary roles. Consequently, every departure from realism, the philosophy which I defend, is a step towards accommodating some views characteristic of relativism. At the same time, it is obvious that uncompromising, orthodox realism is untenable. In particular, I argue that any acceptable version of realism must substantially revise one of the main components of the doctrine — Tarski’s conception of truth.
This paper was written during my stay at the Center for Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh. I wish to express my gratitude for the excellent conditions I enjoyed while there. Also, I want to thank Beth J. Singer and Susan Haack for their critical comments on an early version of this paper.
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Wójcicki, R. (1994). Realism vs Relativism in Philosophy of Science (Some Comments on Tarski’s Theory of Truth). In: Woleński, J. (eds) Philosophical Logic in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 228. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8273-5_23
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