Abstract
The human capacity for language presents a fascinating challenge in our most introspective of scientific pursuits: the study of the mind. Indeed, the language faculty is one of the principal attributes of the human mind which distinguishes us from other species. In our endeavour to understand the nature of this facility, a number of questions arise: What is the nature of the mechanism which permits the unconscious acquisition of language? Once acquired, how is it that people come to process language so rapidly, effortlessly, and indeed, automatically? Is this facility different from or similar to the other perceptual faculties? Which aspects of the language subsystem are innately predetermined, and hence hold universally regardless of the particular language, and which aspects are subject to variation based on linguistic experience? In an effort to shed light on these matters, there have been a number of proposals concerning the architecture and mechanisms which enable these linguistic abilities.
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Notes
Various instances of this strategy, and supporting empirical evidence, have appeared in the literature, including (Kimball 1973), (Frazier 1979), and (Gibson 1991). A more detailed discussion is given in §11.3.2.
Motivation and support for the innatist position goes far beyond the poverty of stimulus arguments. For the underlying philosophical arguments, the reader is referred to (Chomsky 1980) and (Chomsky 1986b). For a more accessible presentation, and discussion of empirical support, see (Pinker 1994).
Witness, for example, the past decade’s debate concerning the context-freeness of natural languages: While the current consensus is against the context-free hypothesis, such inquiry remains useful in its aim of determining the formal and computational power which is required for expressing linguistic theory (see for example (Postal 1964), (Pullum & Gazdar 1982), and (Shieber 1985)).
This is illustrated by the Marcus parser (Marcus 1980), which computes roughly an annotated surface structure, including antecedent-trace relations. The parser does this without making explicit use of the grammar principles, but obeying them nonetheless.
We use this term in the spirit of its original formulation (as the Competence Hypothesis) in (Bresnan 1982).
This is distinct, but possibly related to, the maturation of principles of grammar during the course of acquisition as proposed by Borer and Wexler (see (Borer & Wexler 1987), (Borer & Wexler 1988)).
We will not diverge here into a discussion of how UG and possibly UP has come to be part of the human genetic endowment, the interested reader is referred to (Lightfoot 1982).
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Crocker, M.W. (1996). Introduction. In: Computational Psycholinguistics. Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1600-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1600-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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