Abstract
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of existential sentences of the type There is in English or Il y a in French. We point out some problems for McNally’s (Linguistics and Philosophy 31:353–392, 1998) proposal according to which existential sentences select property-denoting arguments. Basing our analysis on French, we propose to distinguish three types of existential sentences, depending on their coda: locative existentials, eventive existentials and enumerative existentials. We show that these three constructions all obey Heim’s (Where does the definiteness restriction apply? Evidence from the definiteness of variables. In: Reuland E, ter Meulen A (eds) The representation of (in)definiteness. MIT Press, Cambridge, 21–42,1987) constraint, according to which existential sentences are incompatible with individual variables in argument positions. And we provide new evidence for Heim’s constraint by examining existential sentences built with quantificational and existential sentences inside relatives.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In this chapter we will present recent analyses of English existential sentences and see how they can be refined in order to account for the French data. Beyond the similarities between there be sentences in English and il y a sentences in French, these constructions also differ in interesting ways. In addition to the difference in verbs (avoir ‘to have’ in French and to be in English) and the presence of two pronouns il and y in French, the two constructions differ with regard to agreement: in French, the verb avoir is always found in the third person singular, regardless of the number (singular or plural) of the DP argument, whereas in English, BE agrees with the DP argument. We will not attempt to explain these syntactic differences here. Nor are we going to examine Landman’s (2003) observation that a definite DP is more easily accepted following il y a in French than following there be in English.
- 2.
To reduce (6a), P in ∃y [snow(y) Ù P(y)] is replaced by the predicate λx exist(x). We thus obtain (i). y is then substituted for x in [exist(x)], yielding (6b).
-
(i)
[∃y [snow(y) Ù (λx exist(x)) (y)]
-
(i)
- 3.
McNally views the constraint in (7) as a selectional restriction comparable to the requirement of plural referents imposed by predicates such as gather, which can be satisfied by morphological plurals (ii) but also by singular DPs that denote groups (iii). Example (i) is excluded, not because the subject is singular but rather because it denotes an atomic individual:
-
(i)
*A girl is gathering around the table.
-
(ii)
The girls are gathering around the table.
-
(iii)
The dense crowd is gathering around the building.
-
(i)
- 4.
- 5.
If negation took scope over the entire sentence, we would have the following representation:
-
(i)
¬ ∃y [snow(y) Ù exist(y)]
This representation is also somewhat paradoxical due to the simultaneous presence of the negated existential quantifier and the predicate exist. It could be paraphrased as: it is false that there exists snow that exists.
-
(i)
- 6.
Prince distinguishes between two kinds of new discourse referents: one kind is “brand new” discourse referents, corresponding to cases where the addressee must create a new entity and introduce it into the universe of discourse; the other kind is ‘unused’ discourse referents, corresponding to cases where the addressee already has a discourse referent in his/her own model and only needs to introduce or copy it into the discourse-model. The referent does not need to be created but merely activated, as it were.
- 7.
We do not adopt Comorovski’s (1995) distinction between the existential and the presentational readings of there is sentences. For Comorovski, the existential reading corresponds to an assertion of existence, as in (i), and the presentational reading, to the introduction of a new referent, as in (ii):
(i)
Il y a peu de neige dehors.
‘There is little snow outside.’
(ii)
Il y a beaucoup de gens qui meurent de froid dehors.
‘There are many people freezing to death outside.’
According to Comorovski, these two readings correspond to different ways of calculating the semantic value of the sentence. Under the existential reading, the denotation of the predicate structure is calculated and combined with the meaning of there be. Under the presentational reading, the denotations of be and the coda XP combine with each other before combining with the denotation of the DP. The expletive “there” contributes nothing to the meaning of the sentence.
- 8.
For this reason, it can be said that it is the proposition associated with DP W that is the focus in the eventive construction, as opposed to the proper existential construction, where the DP is the focus. Lambrecht (2002) claims that in the locative existential construction, W counts as a secondary predicate.
- 9.
It may be noted that the eventive reading can also be obtained by replacing the expletive il and the clitic y with a personal pronoun:
(i)
J’ai eu mon beau-frère qui a fait Paris-Nice.
I have had my brother-in-law who has done Paris-Nice
‘I had my brother-in-law who competed in Paris-Nice’
(ii)
Il y a eu mon beau-frère qui a fait Paris-Nice
There has had my brother-in-law who has done Paris-Nice
‘There was my brother-in-law competing in Paris-Nice.’
- 10.
Presentational relative constructions are not restricted to il y a sentences but are also present in example (i) given in the preceding footnote and in (i)–(ii) below. All these examples are from Lambrecht (2002):
(i)
Je vois le facteur qui arrive
I see the mailman who arrives
‘I see the mailman coming.’
(ii)
Voilà le facteur qui arrive.
Look the mailman who arrives
‘Here comes the mailman.’
- 11.
For a more detailed analysis of the word kind and for more details on the differences between every kind of N and an N of every kind, cf. Wilkinson (1991, 1995). The differences seem to disappear in existential sentences. This seems to be true as well for the expressions Det genre de N and (un/des) N de Det genre in French:
(i)
Il y avait ce genre de médecins à la réunion.
‘There was that sort of doctor at the convention.’
(ii)
Il y avait des médecins de ce genre à la réunion.
‘There were doctors of that sort at the convention.’
- 12.
According to Vaugelas, with toute sorte de ‘all sorts of’, followed by a complement, the singular is used if the noun is singular and the plural is used if the noun is plural:
(i)
Je vous souhaite toute sorte de bonheur.
I you wish every sort of happiness
‘I wish you all sorts of happiness.’
(ii)
Dieu vous préserve de toutes sortes de maux.
God you protect of every.pl sorts of evils
‘May God protect you from all sorts of evil.’
But this is not always the case: thus, for example, we may find toutes sortes de gibier ‘all sorts of game’ in the writings of R. Bazin, or toute sorte de charges ‘every sort of charges’ in the writings of A. Suarès.
- 13.
Note however an interesting contrast between tous les (‘all the’) and tout (‘every’) or chaque (‘each’) in French. Tout and chaque cannot easily appear in existential constructions, even when they are followed by a noun that denotes a kind instead of a token.
- 14.
(i)
* Il y avait tout livre de Beckett dans cette librairie.
there have.impf every book of Beckett in this bookstore
‘There was every book by Beckett in that bookstore.’
(ii)
?? Il y avait chaque livre de Beckett dans cette librairie.
there have.impf each book of Beckett in this bookstore
‘There was each book by Beckett in that bookstore.’
14These examples correspond to the French translation of English examples borrowed from McNally (1998), who uses them in order to illustrate the difference between individual- and property-denoting expressions:
(i)
a.
*They dressed like the eccentric women who they were.
a′.
They dressed like the eccentric women that they were.
b.
*I doubt that Terry is the genius who they consider her to be.
b′.
I doubt that Terry is the genius that they consider her to be.
For reasons not directly related to the topic under discussion here, there are no minimal pairs with definite DPs in French: both (iia) and (iib) are acceptable.
(i)
a.
Elles s’habillaient comme les femmes excentriques, ce qu’elles étaient.
b.
Elles s’habillaient comme les femmes excentriques qu’elles étaient.
References
Carlson, G.N. 1977a. A unified analysis of the English bare plural. Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 413–457.
Carlson, G.N. 1977b. Amount relatives. Language 55(3): 520–542.
Carlson, G. N. 1977c. Reference to kinds in English. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts.
Comorovski, I. 1995. On quantifier strength and partitive noun phrases. In Quantification in natural languages, ed. E. Bach, E. Jelinek, A. Kratzer, and B.H. Partee, 145–177. Dordrecht: Kulwer Academic Publishers.
Dobrovie-Sorin, C. 1995. On the denotation and scope of indefinites, vol. 5, 67–114. Venice Working Papers in Linguistics, University of Venice.
Dobrovie-Sorin, C. 1997a. Types of predicates and the representation of existential readings. In Proceedings of SALT VII, ed. A. Lawson, 117–134. Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press.
Dobrovie-Sorin, C. 1997b. Classes de prédicats, distribution des indéfinis et la distinction thétique-catégorique. Le Gré des Langues 12: 58–97.
Giry-Schneider, J. 1988. L’interprétation événementielle des phrases en il y a. Linguisticae Investigationes XII(1): 85–100.
Heim, I. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Published in 1988, Garland, New York.
Heim, I. 1987. Where does the definiteness restriction apply? Evidence from the definiteness of variables. In The representation of (in)definiteness, ed. E. Reuland and A. ter Meulen, 21–42. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. 1974. An introduction to the X-bar convention. Bloomington: Ms, Indiana University Linguistics Club.
Kratzer, A. 1988. Stage-level and individual-level predicates. In ed. Krifka, 247–284.
Ladusaw, W. 1994. Thetic and categorical, stage and individual, weak and strong. In Proceedings of semantics and linguistic theory IV, ed. M. Harvey and L. Santelmann, 220–229. Ithaca: CLC Publications, Cornell University.
Lambrecht, K. 2002. Topic, focus and secondary predication. The French presentational relative construction. In Romance languages and linguistic theory 2000, ed. C. Beyssade, R. Bok-Bennema, F. Drijkoningen, and P. Monachesi, 171–212. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Landman, F. 2003. Predicates-argument mismatches and the adjectival theory of indefinites. In The syntax and semantics of noun phrases, vol. 1, ed. M. Coene and Y. d’Hulst, 211–237. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Lumsden, M. 1988. Existential sentences: Their structure and meaning. London: Croom Helm.
McNally, L. 1995a. Bare plurals in Spanish are interpreted as properties. In ed. G. Morrill and R. Oehrle, 197–222.
McNally, L. 1995b. Stativity and theticity. Columbus: Ms, Center for Cognitive Science, Ohio State University.
McNally, L. 1998. Existential sentences without existential quantification. Linguistics and Philosophy 31: 353–392.
McNally, L., and V. van Geenhoven. 1998. Redefining the weak/strong distinction. Ms, Universitat Pompeu Fabra & Max Planck Institut Nijmegen, Barcelona/Nijmegen.
Milner, J.-C. 1982. Ordres et raisons de langue. Paris: Le Seuil.
Milsark, G. 1977. Towards the explanation of certain peculiarities of existential sentences in English. Linguistic Analysis 3: 1–29.
Partee, B.H. 1987. Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles. In Studies in discourse representation theory and the theory of generalized quantifiers, ed. J. Groenendijk, D. de Jongh, and M. Stokhof, 115–144. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
Partee, B.H., and M. Rooth. 1983. Generalized conjunction and type ambiguity. In Meaning, use, and interpretation of language, ed. R. Bauerle, C. Schwartze, and A. von Stechow, 115–143. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Prince, E. 1981. Towards a taxonomy of given-new information. In Radical pragmatics, ed. P. Cole, 223–256. New York: Academic.
Rando, E., and D.J. Napoli. 1978. Definiteness in there-sentences. Language 54: 300–313.
Safir, K. 1982. Syntactic chains and the definiteness effect. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Sasse, H.-J. 1987. The thetic/categorical distinction revisited. Linguistics 25: 511–580.
Strawson, P.F. 1959. Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Routledge.
Ulrich, M. 1985. Thetisch und Kategorisch. Tübingen.
van Geenhoven, V. 1996. Semantic incorporation and indefinite descriptions: Semantic and syntactic aspects of noun incorporation in West Greenlandic. Ph.D. dissertation, Tübingen. Published in 1998 by CSLI.
Wilkinson, K. 1991. Studies in the semantics of generic noun phrases. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Wilkinson, K. 1995. The semantics of the common noun kind. In The generic book, ed. G.N. Carlson and F.J. Pelletier, 383–397. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dobrovie-Sorin, C., Beyssade, C. (2012). Existential Sentences. In: Redefining Indefinites. Studies in Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, vol 85. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3002-1_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3002-1_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-3001-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-3002-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawSocial Sciences (R0)