Abstract
Regarding scientific research, value ladenness and the value-free ideal represent two poles. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the influential view was science as “value-free” (Wertfrei), whereas in the first decade of the twenty-first century the dominant perspective is science as “value-laden.” After considering the historical setting on values in science, the analysis here deals with the characteristics and relations between axiology of research and ethics of science. This involves taking into account the option in favor of holism of values and the alternative in terms of fractional orientations, either in “internal” terms or in “external” ones. Thus, the presence of values in basic science and in applied science is considered. After that, economics as a relevant case study is addressed through the distinction between positive economics and normative economics. There is also a coda with final remarks on the topics analyzed.
Introduction
“Value-free” and “value-laden” are notions that characterize two different approaches to scientific research. In the first case, science is a content that is and ought to be neutral from an axiological perspective, whereas in the second position science is a human activity developed under the direct influence of values. These conceptions can be seen in historical terms as well as in thematic ones. From a historical point of view, the first view was explicitly proposed at the beginning of the twentieth century and with the focus of attention on the social sciences, whereas the second option was increasingly assumed in the last decades of that century until the present stage, when there is a broad consensus in favor of value-ladenness and within a general perspective (i.e., as a feature that might be, in principle, in any science).Footnote 1
From a thematic viewpoint, value-free and value-laden perspectives summarized two poles of the philosophical analysis on science. They are clearly connected with the possibility, characteristics and limits of axiology of research. But value-free and value-laden outlooks are also linked to ethics of science in a discernible way. Thus, after the historical setting on values in science, the paper deals with the duality “axiology of research”–“ethics of science,” which is followed by the consideration of the main lines of interpretation: holism of values and fractional orientations. Thereafter, the consequences of these observations for basic science and applied science are seen. Then, due to its special interest for this volume, the case of economics is considered through the usual distinction between “positive economics” and “normative economics,” because it involves different kinds of values. A coda adds final remarks in order to complete the analysis made.
Historical Setting of Values in Science
Certainly there is a remarkable difference between the outset of the twentieth century, when Max Weber proposed his philosophical reflections on science as “value-free” (Wertfrei), and the recent decades of that century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, when “value-laden” became generally assumed by the philosophers of science.Footnote 2 Thus, nowadays the presence of values is openly accepted in the consideration of the empirical sciences, not only in the social sciences – those of Weber’s concern – but also in the natural sciences and in the sciences of the artificial.Footnote 3
Max Weber defended that science – in particular, social sciences – was “value-free,” because he understood that the axiological neutrality was a complement needed for objectivity of social sciences (which includes political science) and, therefore, for these disciplines, in order to be “sciences.” Meanwhile, in our contemporary times, the thesis of scientific research as “value-laden” is commonly accepted as compatible with the objectivity in science, including the social science, and so it is generally taken on as a trait of scientific research. This conception is obviously clearer in those thinkers that endorse scientific realism in any of the main kinds (cf. [29] and [39]; an alternative approach is in [54]), but it is also the case of supporters of different versions of pragmatism, including pragmatic idealism.Footnote 4
Weber made it explicit around 1904 that he was in favor of objectivity in social science and social policy (cf. [83]). His view can be seen as a modulation of the famous dichotomy between Erklären (explanation) and Verstehen (understanding), because he offers his own approach in the historical set of positions on this controversy (cf. [26] pp. 33–50; especially, p. 35). On the one hand, his view adopts a methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences. On the other hand, he moves towards a Verstehen that is not linked to a form of methodological relativism (i.e., a Historismus),Footnote 5 because he defends the objectivity of social sciences. His position is, then, enlarged with the idea of the social sciences as an enterprise “value-free” (Wertfreiheit) (cf. [84]; on Weber's approach see [11, 12]).
To be sure, Weber’s approach goes beyond the disciplines that he was interested in (mainly, sociology, political science, and economics) and even the region of social sciences, to get to the general territory of science as a whole. (i) His proposal of objectivity of social sciences (among them, economics) is associated with Verstehen as the adequate method, which is different and complementary to the method of Erklären. Thus, objectivity in economics could be compatible with a methodological differentiation with respect to natural sciences. (ii) His defense of social sciences as value-free involves a methodological conception in favor of the unity of science: it supposes that economics is “neutral” regarding values in a similar way as is any science which studies nature.
As a matter of fact, during several decades of the last century – from the mid-1920s to the beginning of the 1960s–, the main philosophical tendencies considered science as a content that is or might be objective, impersonal and, in principle, independent of the context. Usually, the logico-methodological approaches – verificationism and falsificationism – assumed this view. They also accepted that the epistemological contents have a special weight in the analysis of the results of scientific achievements. Thus, scientific values, in general, and ethical values, in particular, were not commonly among the contents to be considered philosophically during those decades.
Nevertheless, important thinkers of the “received view” and relevant authors of the critical rationalism made comments on values. Usually, the remarks of logical empiricists were on science as related to human values, such as in the case of Carl Gustav Hempel (cf. [35]), whereas Karl Popper developed his own views on the moral responsibility of the scientist at the end of 1960s (cf. [66]), when he was very much involved in evolutionary epistemology. Later, Popper added some interesting considerations on how the principles of fallibility, rational discussion and approximation to the truth are both epistemological and ethical principles. In this regard, he seems to assume truth as an ethical value.Footnote 6 Other critical rationalists, such as Gerard Radnitzky, explicitly discussed the thesis of the science as “value-free” (cf. [69]; on the analysis of the value-free ideal see [15, 49]).
Nonetheless, the big change in values came with the new emphasis on science as a human activity instead of previous insistence on the contents of science. This involves the idea of science as an activity that is oriented to ends, which is context-dependent and so is under social influence. This change happens with the development of the “historical turn” in philosophy of science, which is noticeable after the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Footnote 7 Thomas Kuhn focuses attention on the scientific communities doing science with the use of wide frameworks (“paradigms”) and within a social milieu.
A few years later, in his Postscript – 1969, Kuhn explicitly mentions values as an element in the disciplinary matrix: on the one hand, values “are more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic generalizations or models” ([46] p. 184), and, on the other hand, values “do much to provide a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole” ([46], p. 184; Kuhn developed his views on objectivity, value judgment and theory choice in [47]). Through the analysis of the ideas on values that are shared by scientists and the problems on the application of values, it seems clear that we can think of scientific research as a human activity that can have values regarding ends (the selection of goals is made according to some principles) and values concerning means (there are some criteria that show that some means are more worthy than others).
But it is in the 1980s that the philosophical move in favor of values in science is consolidated. Thus, in 1982 Ernan McMullin presented a paper in the PSA on “Values in Science.”Footnote 8 It was two years before Larry Laudan’s Science and Values, a book that stressed the relevance of cognitive values regarding aims of science as well as methodological norms and rules. The volume recognized that “the question of precisely how one distinguishes cognitive values or aims from noncognitive ones is quite complex” ([51], p. xi). At the same time, Laudan accepted the existence of ethical values in science: “Ethical values are always present in scientific decision making and, very occasionally, their influence is of great importance” ([51], p. xii). Since then, the assumption that science is “value-laden” was a common one, although it has not always been understood in the same way.
Axiology of Research and Ethics of Science
Generally, “value” is a term understood with a broad sense: as something worthy that should modulate ends and means of scientific research, either internally or externally.Footnote 9 Sometimes value appears as a principle that should regulate scientific activity from the beginning, whereas in other occasions it seems to be one criterion among others that should be taken into account. Thus, value might be used either to orientate scientific research or to reflect something that is going while scientists are doing science. In the first case, value might be understood in terms of “ideal” (i.e., something that should be searched for but will never be actually attained) or in the form of “goal” (i.e., an objective that might be attainable).
Following these positions on the sense of value, the distinction between “fact” and “value” is certainly useful,Footnote 10 because they are different. Thus, the reference of value is not something tangible (i.e., an item of the natural, social, or artificial world) but rather an intellectual content that might be related to a diversity of realms (such as cognitive, methodological, sociological, economic, ethical, esthetical, etc.). The content itself should be worthy, and this worthiness makes it preferable to other possibilities or mere preferences. In this regard, insofar as value connects with human needs, the discussion of the validity of the values can lead us towards objectivity.Footnote 11
Using these elements of the sense and reference of “value” in science is easier to think of value-free and value-laden in thematic terms, which is the complementary view to the historical one. In this regard, the study of values in science as a whole has followed thematically two main lines of analysis: (a) the consideration of values in general, or some kind of them with a wide spectrum of possibilities regarding scientific research; and (b) the direction to ethical values, either in science in general or in a particular science. In this distinction, in the first case the scope is larger than in the second possibility, insofar as it is open to all possible value in science. Nevertheless, the cognitive values commonly have a special role in scientific research, even when the position adopted is a holism of values instead of a fractional orientation on values.
Axiology of research has interest in all kinds of values (cognitive, social, etc.) and embraces the first line of philosophical reflection (see [25, 32, 56]), whereas ethics of science has a more specific range because it is devoted to a kind of values (those connected to moral issues). Thus, it includes the variety of options indicated within the second line of analysis. According to this distinction, axiology of research is a broader area of reflection than ethics of science, insofar as its focus is, in principle, on the whole set of values around scientific research (i.e., internal and external values), even though it might end up working on only a relevant class of them (cognitive, social, economic, ecologic, etc.).
Thus, axiology of research takes care of “internal values” of science (linguistic, structural, epistemological, methodological, ontological, etc.) as human activity and also considers “external values” (sociological, cultural, economic, political, ecological, etc.) related to “scientific progress.” Axiology of research reflects on values regarding ends and means of basic science as well as on goals, means, and outcomes of applied sciences. These values are frequently understood as selection criteria that have a role in the decision-making of the researches and their institutions.
Consequently, axiology of research is the broad study of values in science. It deals with values regarding scientific discoveries as well as with those of scientific justifications. In this regard, it can be accepted that there are values that are “internal” to scientific activity and values that are “external” to that human undertaking. In this analysis, internal is those values that belong to the aims, processes and results of scientific research itself, whereas external is the values assumed by scientific institutions, private or public organizations related to R + D + i, etc. However, there are values, such as economic ones, that can be internal (e.g., those assumed in scientific designs, such as profitability) and external (e.g., those on the processes seen from the perspective of their social or institutional acceptability in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, etc.) (cf. [31]).
Undoubtedly, the stress might be on internal values, external values, or the attempt for equilibrium between both. Those thinkers of recent decades who are sympathetic to the social concern on science (i.e., the “social turn” in philosophy and methodology of science) have called attention to the external values in science (cf. [28]). At the same time, other philosophers who are aware of the width of this “social turn,” such as Philip Kitcher (cf. [41]), still emphasize the role of “internal values” (such as truth or objectivity) over “external values,” and accord particular weight to contents (semantic, epistemic, methodological, etc.) of science over contextual factors of scientific activity.Footnote 12 Even Kuhn, who has had a remarkable influence on the “social turn” in philosophy and methodology of science of recent decades, was also in favor of giving more weight to internal values than to external ones.Footnote 13
When the attention goes directly to ethical values (honesty, carefulness, responsibility, etc.) (cf. [77], Chap. 3, pp. 53–63; see also [6] and [7]), we have “ethics of science.” From a philosophical viewpoint, its realm of analysis might be diversified in three important directions: (i) ethical values in scientific research as a human activity, when the focus is on the processes involved in discovery and justification of scientific findings; (ii) ethical values in the professional use of scientific findings, insofar as there is a distinction between science (basic and applied) and application of science;Footnote 14 and (iii) ethical values in the context of social responsibility of the scientists as citizens (i.e., their contribution to the common good of the society as a whole).Footnote 15
Usually, the ethical reflection on science as a human activity includes two different angles to be considered: the endogenous perspective and the exogenous viewpoint. Thus, the ethical analysis of science can be developed according to these main orientations. In the first case, the presence of values is assumed as an intrinsic part of the scientific activity (aims, processes and results), whereas in the second case a set of contextual ethical values is at stake (social, cultural, historical, etc.), which eventually can end up in the form of legislation (e.g., in biomedical research, particularly in the case of human cloning, or in economic matters with corporate social responsibility) (cf. [58]).
Endogenous ethics is an intellectually feasible task insofar as science is a free human activity. This includes ends and means that might be chosen after deliberation.Footnote 16 As with any human undertaking, if science is freely done, then it involves the possibility of an ethical evaluation. Thus, insofar as there is free decision-making in science, ethical categories (good/bad, right/wrong, fair/unfair, responsible/irresponsible, etc.) can be used to evaluate the activities themselves developed by scientists (as individuals or even as a group).Footnote 17 So, any scientist – either in basic science or in applied science – is responsible for his or her actions while doing research. When a team makes the research, the team has a collective responsibility for the actions performed in their laboratories or work places.Footnote 18
Exogenous ethics is a task that is intellectually clearer than endogenous ethics, due to its components, which are more visible than in the previous case. As a matter of fact, ethical values are more noticeable when they include a social dimension. De facto, the existence of social consequences of scientific research is what commonly matters for citizens as individuals and for society as a whole. This is particularly valid for applied sciences, as can be seen in ethical businessFootnote 19 or in biomedical ethics,Footnote 20 and it is even more visible in the case of applications of science (i.e., in the use of science by scientists, where medicine might be the paramount example). Moreover, insofar as the consequences are more manifest for citizens and society as a whole, the legislation (regional, national or international) can show up. This legislation assumes, in principle, some kind of ethical values in order to inspire the norms.
Holism of Values and Fractional Orientations
Both philosophical enterprises on values in science – axiology of research and ethics of science – can be seen from different angles, according to the degree of generality. In axiology of research the vision might be either from a holistic perspective or from the viewpoint of a particular set of values, those that are considered as the most relevant for scientific research. In ethics of science the focus might be on science, in general, or on a particular science. But again the tendency can be on ethical values as a “system” (a network of relations) or a conception where a value (e.g., responsibility, utility, solidarity, etc.) is central.
Concerning the first option of the axiology of research, the main thread is values understood as a system (i.e., as an interrelation in terms of interdependence), whereas in this second choice, there is a “privilege” kind of values (such as cognitive, social, economic, ecological, … values) that offers the key for understanding, interpreting, and applying values to scientific research (mainly in empirical sciences, i.e., in the three branches: natural, social, and of the artificial).
Holism of values is the first option of philosophical analysis, and the orientations upon some values represent the second choice, because fractional accounts work on a part of values conceived as the relevant ones. In the latter, the emphasis can be either on “internal” values (cognitive, methodological, etc.) or on “external” values (social, cultural, etc.). In these perspectives of a fractional orientation, the focus of attention is on some kinds of values instead of the system of values altogether (cf. [68]), and on placing them largely in one of the realms involve (aims, processes or results).
A configuration of values in science from a holistic approach is in Nicholas Rescher, because he thinks that values form a system in science. This view involves values (cognitive, social, economic, etc.) being interrelated within a certain whole and, thus, there are various forms of interdependence of values. Meanwhile, the second choice of fractional orientation, with stress on “internal” values is in Laudan, among others, whereas the prominence on the “external” values is in several conceptions of the “social turn” in philosophy and methodology of science (such as the “strong program,” some views on ethnomethodology, the thesis of finalization in science, etc.) (cf. [29], pp. 9–11).
Rescher has offered a wide framework for the role of values in science, both in terms of the number of values to be considered and in the levels involved. He defends a “holism of values in science,”Footnote 21 where the scientific values could be a matter of distinction (“internal” and “external,” cognitive and social, etc.) but this aspect does not authorize separations. In his view, holism of values follows from the interconnection between scientific goals and other human goals: they can be seen as a “system.” Moreover, he thinks that the distinction between internal and external values of science is a “distinction” but not a separation (cf. [24], p. 22).
For Rescher, there is a set of levels involved in this issue: (1) the structure of human needs and goals is larger than mere human cognition alone. Thus, the aim of controlling reality is only one valid human aim among others. De facto, there are many other valid human needs and desiderata. (2) Although knowledge is not an all-sufficient be-all and end-all, it is itself a human need – a situational requisite of ourselves as the sort of creatures that we are – and, certainly, knowledge is particularly relevant in scientific research. (3) The internal values of science (such as consistency, generality, etc.) are what they are because this is necessary to achieve effectively the applicative aims of science (effective prediction and control), and these aims of science are what they are because they inhere in the large situational requirements of us humans as homo sapiens.Footnote 22
Hence, Rescher’s perspective offers a holism that binds the sphere of values together, and he sees them as a matter of the effective servicing of human needs. De facto, he proposes a practical framework for the role of values in science. Within it there is a clear space for different kinds of values (such as economic values), which he conceives that have a role in science as a human project and, consequently, they are values that are related to human needs. Meanwhile, in the fractional orientations, such as that defended by Laudan, there is a dominant class of values for scientific research. Moreover, in his conception, the cognitive values are those that are shaping scientific rationality (cf. [51], p. xii).
Unquestionably, there are values in science, such as cognitive values, which have a singular place within science, in general, and scientific progress, in particular. These values on knowledge, either in themselves or in their methodological consequences, are commonly highlighted both for basic science and applied science. This emphasis on cognitive values can be seen in different authors, such as Laudan, even though he considers them as different from “epistemic values,”Footnote 23 and Rescher, who certainly has a broader vision of values, a perspective that is connected to human needs: “the fact that knowledge represents a subordinate (albeit functionally appropriate) need for a creature such as ourselves integrates the values at issue in science (internal and external like) into one cohesive fabric.”Footnote 24
Cognitive values are not alone in scientific research: they are related to other values (social, operative, etc.), because science is a human activity within a complex setting (social, cultural, economic, political, ecological, etc.). This contextual aspect should be present in an articulation of values regarding scientific research. So, the difference in scope in the philosophical approaches – the fractional orientations and the holistic views – is patent when we are discussing scientific research as value-laden.
Laudan insists on cognitive values in science without emphasizing the role of other values (such as economic values or ethical ones), and he places values in the sphere of goals and aims.Footnote 25 Thus, he proposes an axiology of research with a clear status that it is different from other spheres, such as methodology of science or empirical studies of science, but interconnected with them. Meanwhile Rescher offers an image of values that we can call “transversal,” because he explicitly accepts values in several steps: (a) in the case of aims, (b) in the dominion of theory, (c) in the methodological process of constructing science, and (d) in its applications (cf. [72], Sect. 3.6, pp. 93–96).
According to Rescher’s holistic line on values in science, it seems that ethical values are a part of the system as a whole. Thus, ethical values are then a set within the total collection of values that have any relevance for science. They accompany the other kind of values within the network of relations of this human activity. In this regard, even though there is a clear connection between both sides involved here – “axiological” and “ethical” –, it seems to me valuable to keep the philosophical distinction between axiology of research – the study of values in general – and ethics of science (the analysis of the specific moral values on this human undertaking).
On the one hand, there are practical reasons for this philosophical distinction: ethical values are indeed very important for science as a human activity and as a part of collective life of society. Thus, applied sciences, such as economics and medicine, are taking special care of ethical values in the philosophical analysis.Footnote 26 On the other hand, there are also theoretical reasons to differentiate the studies, due to the existence of several levels of analysis to be considered: ethical values in scientific research, ethical values in the professional used of scientific findings, and ethical values in the context of social responsibility of the scientists as citizens.Footnote 27
Even though the distinction between axiology of research and ethics of science is valuable for philosophical reasons, it seems rather obvious that there is an interweaving between ethical values and other kinds of values in science (cognitive, economic, social, ecological, etc.). This can be seen clearly in the philosophical analysis regarding the research made in the field of biomedicine. A good example is given by John Worrall’s study of clinical trials and randomization, where ethical values are directly related to epistemological and methodological considerations (cf. [85, 86]).
Values in Basic Science and in Applied Science
Until now it has been emphasized here that values are a component of scientific activity. They accompany the other constitutive elements of science, such as language, structure, knowledge, method,....Footnote 28 In this regard, axiology of research should be considered in the philosophical analysis of science, in addition to other analyses that are more traditional in the field (semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, etc.). In this framework, ethics of science is a complementary philosophical subject that deals with the specific values of scientific activity with a moral component (e.g., responsibility, honesty, reliability, respect, etc.).
Scientific activity can follow two main courses: basic science and applied science,Footnote 29 which might be differentiated in structural terms and in dynamic ones. These differences can be seen from the structural point of view of the models (explanatory and predictive, in the first case, or predictive and prescriptive, in the second one) or from the dynamic perspective of the aims, processes and results.Footnote 30 Each stage of this sequence is, in principle, under the influence of some kind of values. Initially, these values have a role for the selection of aims or goals of scientific undertakings, which might be crucial (e.g., in the case of cognitive values). But later, the values can go beyond that point, and they can have also a repercussion on the processes as well as on results of scientific activities.
Basic science and applied science, insofar as they involve values in several stages of scientific activity, need an axiology of research. They are under the influence of different kinds of values (cognitive, social, economic, cultural, etc.). In this regard, the whole set of values in science (“internal” and “external,” cognitive and social, epistemic and practical, etc.) is studied by axiology of research. This is certainly a domain of philosophy of science, and it has been intensively developed in the recent decades. In my judgment, axiology of research is a philosophical domain that accompanies the main areas of this field: semantics of science, logic of science, epistemology, methodology of science, ontology of science, and ethics of science (cf. [31], pp. 85–112; especially, pp. 93–96).
The philosophical analysis of values in basic science and applied science should take into account values in three different stages: aims, processes, and results. (i) In the case of aims, values are certainly used to choose the goals of research, either in basic science or in applied science. They could be either descriptive (values related to explanation and prediction, which involve the advancement of knowledge) or prescriptive (values related to solutions of concrete problems, mainly in a practical sphere). (ii) In the realm of processes, values play a key role in order to select the adequate means to get scientific progress as well as to choose the adequate undertakings to develop science as a human activity within a social setting and oriented towards the resolution of specific problems. (iii) In the domain of results, values are frequently used to assess the outcomes of science as intellectual achievement, as well as a product of the society (cf. [31], p. 93).
These three different stages (aims, processes, and results) should be considered in axiology of research developed from a dynamic angle. This position involves an analysis in three consecutive steps (goals, means, and outcomes), which is larger than previous axiological analyses. Frequently, axiology of research is the philosophical study of science that deals with aims or goals (e.g., in the case of Laudan), whereas the other two kinds of values (those related with processes and results) are usually analyzed through methodology of science and the diverse studies on science, technology, and society, when philosophy is one subject among others.
Yet there is an alternative to axiology of research as devoted primarily to aims or goals, an option that has been proposed by Rescher. He suggests a wider conception of values in science, which is more in tune with my analysis of values of scientific research in terms of aims, processes, and results. He proposes a broad axiology of research according to his conviction that sciences are related to values from diverse angles (cognitive, social, etc.). These values in science are related to other human values and rooted in human needs. Furthermore, he sees scientific progress – a central issue of methodology of science – from the viewpoint of “economics of research” (cf. [24], pp. 11–44; especially, pp. 13–27).
This wider conception pays particular attention to the structural role of values in science, both basic and applied. Rescher makes a set of suggestions that can certainly be used as a basis for the new framework of values in science, assuming the idea of value ladenness and the viewpoint of scientific research as a human activity. On the one hand, he offers an overview of scientific values taking into account different aspects of human endeavors (i.e., not only the cognitive one, widely understood); and, on the other hand, he distinguishes diverse kinds of values (mainly, internal and external) of science as a human practice.
There are four main aspects of Rescher’s view of the relation between science and values. (1) Science is a human project devoted to the search for valuable aims, such as information and truth. (2) Science demands an economy of means from the methodological point of view, which involves a set of economic values related to the pattern of cost-benefit.Footnote 31 (3) Science has the characteristics of a social activity of science, because it is based on a process of human cooperation. Thus, science includes attention to human ideals, even though it is a competitive business, because the method and modus operandi of any science asks for honesty, veracity, integrity, collaboration, etc. These values are relevant for scientific communities as human groups. (4) Science has uses and applications that call for a set of values to evaluate the consequences of every scientific activity (above all, in its technological projection). This task of assessment requires an evaluative rationality which should be able to discern the appropriate and legitimate ends of this human activity (cf. [24], p. 16; in this regard, some aspects might be seen in [5] and [82]).
Obviously, Rescher takes into account basic science as well as applied science, with special interest in natural sciences rather than in social sciences or sciences of the artificial. Thus, in his broad axiology of research, he accepts a variety of values around science. They are mainly in four large areas of values: cognitive, economic, social, and operative; implicitly, his approach includes a fifth area: ethical values.Footnote 32 If this plurality of values is seen from the duality internal–external, then it is clear that two of them – cognitive values and economic values – are inserted into a framework basically internal; meanwhile the other two – social values and operative values – are mostly in the external dimension. And, as it has been highlighted here, the ethical values have an endogenous side in addition to an exogenous sphere.
Although basic science and applied science share common values as human activities in a contextual setting (social, historical, cultural, economic, etc.), there might be some differences between the relevance of some values. Basic science seeks the improvement and enlargement of knowledge (mainly in natural, social, and artificial worlds), looking for the possibility of grasping truth (or, at least, truthlikeness). Thus, cognitive values regarding explanation and prediction have an important role. Meanwhile applied science, which seeks the resolution of specific problems in a certain domain, has relevant cognitive values on prediction and prescription. In addition, insofar as it guides social action (e.g., in economics), applied science also gives a more intense role to contextual values than basic science does. This is particularly noticeable in the case of ethical values, when the emphasis on scientific research is not on epistemological contents but rather on practical consequences of research and their repercussion for society as a whole.Footnote 33
Positive Economics and Normative Economics
Economics offers a good “case study” for the general remarks on values in basic science and applied science. To some extent, the traditional distinction between “positive economics” and “normative economics” offers an interesting way of considering values in science oriented towards the advancement of science (mainly through explanation and prediction) and values in science conceived as problem-solving procedure in specific domains (including prediction and prescription). This positive economics–normative economics distinction connects with the duality value-free and value-laden.
Positive economics, insofar as it is seen as a “descriptive” task with “factual” contents instead of being a “prescriptive” undertaking with “evaluative” elements, might be understood as value-free. Thus, it is assumed that positive economics belongs to the sphere of “facts” rather than being connected to “values.” In a relevant sense, this view has links with the tradition in economics in favor of axiological neutrality.Footnote 34 This conception is, in part, related to the discussion on science and ideology, in order to maintain that economics is “science” in a sensu stricto. Besides Weber’s direction of economics as Wertfrei or value-free, there is a line of economic thought with Joseph Schumpeter’s view of economics as a “technique” (cf. [78], p. 211) and Robert Solow’s interest in ways of doing social sciences as close as possible to the ideal of being value-free (cf. [81]).
Normative economics, insofar as it needs prescription, involves the role of values. They are indispensable in the task of evaluating what is good and bad for microeconomics and macroeconomics, mainly in the sphere of aims, but also in the terrain of processes. This line is followed by Amartya Sen in his criticism of the primacy of prediction in economics: “prediction is not the only exercise with which economics is concerned. Prescription has always been one of the major activities in economics, and it is natural that this should have been the case. Even the origin of the subject of political economy, of which economics is the modern version, was clearly related to the need for advice on what is to be done in economic matters. Any prescriptive activity must, of course, go well beyond pure prediction, because no prescription can be made without evaluation and an assessment of the good and the bad” ([79], p. 3).
These tendencies in favor of positive economics as “value-free,” in one way or another, and normative economics as “value-laden” give us some aspects to be considered. An obvious one is the insistence of economics as being a science that is capable of giving facts without the influence of criteria out-of-science (ideological, political, etc.). In this regard, the autonomy of economics as a science rule by its self-corrective criteria should be assumed. In addition, the responsibility of economists is precisely not to be influenced by values different from those that belong to the actual sphere of scientific activity (i.e., regarding aims, processes and results of scientific undertakings).
Autonomy and responsibility of economists fit with the noble attempt of preserving the scientific character of economics in the domain of basic science. However, this position has sometimes been presented as “value-free,” i.e., avoiding any links between positive economics and values. But positive economics is a human activity developed according to rational procedures (in this case, economic rationality), and there is a constant decision-making by scientists while doing science, either individually or collectively. On the one hand, values might be present in the selection of aims (i.e., evaluative rationality), which is followed by a preference for some procedures (i.e., instrumental rationality). And, on the other hand, it seems clear that “the conduct of inquiry cannot possibly be value-free. Inquiry involves action, and action is driven by values” ([34], p. 296; some aspects connected with these issues can be found in [13, 19, 43]).
If we move from positive economics to normative economics, then there is no doubt that normative economics has deep connections with values. Firstly, it might be said that normative economics shares with positive economics the presence of values regarding aims and processes. Thus, there are values while doing “choices of what to study” and also values that “influence choices of what methods to employ and consequently of what hypothesis to discard or to pursue” ([34], p. 296). Secondly, normative economics adds something else here: it requires the constant presence of values when dealing with prescriptions after having predictions (cf. [22]). It seems clear that economic policy as a guide on the future possible (in the short, middle or long run) is linked to a set of values.
Indeed, within normative economics there are internal and external values. They are noticeable in the area of prescriptions. “The internal values of prescriptions depend, to some extent, on the knowledge provided by economic predictions, because, like any other conception which supposes the direction of human activity, it requires a possible aim that should also be achievable. Thus, some of the components of internal evaluations of economic prescriptions can be the simplicity of the goal, the consistency of means, the adequacy with respect to the agents, the ratio between cost and benefit, … Regarding the external values, the list is wider: they go from evaluations of ethical and social character (repercussion to social groups, especially the labour dimension – i.e., in terms of employment: social discrimination versus social cohesion; integration in the working place versus emigration; labour dignity versus ‘junk contract,’ etc.–) or of a social and cultural kind (i.e., social settling versus creation of minorities) to components of a different class (political, ecological, etc.)” ([22], p. 336).
Among values in scientific research, ethical values always have a particularly relevant role. They are present in normative economics, as has been pointed out here, but they are also in positive economics. From a general point of view, it seems to me clear that any basic science can be related with ethics if the focus of attention is not directly on the contents themselves (i.e., the scientific knowledge as such) but rather on the human activity of doing science and its consequences (cf. [23]).
Accordingly, it is understandable that, on the one hand, positive economic can have contents regarding “facts” without dependence on ethical concepts (e.g., demand elasticities); and, on the other hand, as Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson have emphasized, “a good deal of positive economics is unavoidably penetrated with ethical concerns. Ethics has a role within positive economics because ethical commitments affect individual choices and hence economic outcomes, because economic institutions and policies affect ethical commitments, and because the terms in which economists conceptualize and explain individual choices have moral implications” ([33], p. 214; see also [44]).
Conclusion
All things considered, if we look back on the “value-free” ideal and the thesis of “value–ladenness,” the first thing is the recognition of difference between the beginning of the twentieth century and this first decade of twenty-first century, which has been analyzed here both in historical and thematic terms. Even when the preferred option is now the “value-laden” conception, it seems quite reasonable to think of the existence of limits, such as Rescher has done. Thus, one of the key values of science as a human cognitive project is “its selflimitation based in a need to recognize that there are limits to the extent to which this project can be realized.”Footnote 35
Recent decades have shown several fractional orientations on value–ladenness, both on the side of “internal” values (mainly, cognitive ones) and on the side of “external” values (primarily, social ones). But it seems more suitable to think in some form of holistic view on values. Thus, scientific goals (mainly, cognitive ones) are related to the rest of our goals (social, cultural, economic, etc.) in a kind of “system.” So, the dynamic character of scientific research should be also considered, with the presence of values in the realms of aims, processes and results. Science is a human undertaking in a contextual setting rather than a purely cognitive project or an isolated doing.Footnote 36 In other words, science belongs to a human network.
Three are the planes where we can see values in science: (a) in basic science, insofar as it is a human activity, which involves values on ends and means; (b) in applied science, because scientists take into account values to choose aims, need to select processes and seek results on the specific problems that they are researching; and (c) in the applications of science, which are the uses of the results of scientific research in the social and historical context, where we consider values when issues such as risk are at stake. In science, the values are “internal” (cognitive, methodological, etc.) and “external” (social, cultural, etc.). But some values can have a presence in both sides, such as ethical values (endogenous and exogenous) and economic values (cf. [31], pp. 99–106).
Without doubt, economics is a good case study for values in science. The branches of positive economics and normative economics pose the problem of values on the “descriptive” sphere while showing the presence of values on the “prescriptive” area. But economics exemplifies quite well the existence of values in the positive and the normative branches. Thus, although the interest in the “value-free” ideal might be understandable in terms of autonomy of economics and self-correctness instead of extrinsic influence on scientific contents, there are also values in the case of economics when it is focused on doing explanations and predictions.
This presence of values in economics includes ethical ones, insofar as the analysis of economics is made in terms of human activity: (i) the ethical values have a role both in the agents that make the decisions and in the organizations related to economic markets; (ii) economics as a science studies “economic activity” and “economics as activity” (cf. [21]), where there are ethical components concerning ends and means; (iii) the solutions to the specific problems in applied economics involve ethical values on the assessment of prescriptions (i.e., what is going to be implemented); and (iv) the use of the results of applied economics by political institutions commonly involves making choices, and these can also have an ethical component.
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
The designs in the sciences of the artificial take into account values, as can be seen in the case of the evaluative rationality regarding the ends of the designs, cf. [30].
- 4.
- 5.
The characteristics of Historismus can be found in W. Dilthey, cf. [20] pp. 109–137; especially, pp. 110–112 and 115–117.
- 6.
“The idea of truth as the fundamental regulative principle – the principle that guides our search – can be regarded as an ethical principle. The search for truth and the idea of approximation to the truth are also ethical principles; as are the ideas of intellectual integrity and of fallibility, which lead us to a self-critical attitude and to toleration” [67, p. 199]. On the truth as epistemic value and ethical value in Popper, see [59], pp. 282–293.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
This discussion on this issue is in [65].
- 11.
- 12.
However, following a pragmatic approach (sites, products, etc.), he does not see a clear distinction between “science” and “technology” (including “basic research” and technology), cf. [41] pp. 85–91, especially, p. 86.
- 13.
This can be seen in the case of scientific prediction: “Probably the most deeply held values concern predictions: they should be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently satisfied in a given field; and so on” [46], p. 185.
- 14.
On the distinction between “applied science” and “application of science,” see [62], p. 9.
- 15.
According to Imre Lakatos, “Scientists, as citizens, have responsibility, like other citizens, to see that science is applied to the right social and political ends,” in [50], p. 258.
- 16.
Cf. [24], pp. 11–44; especially, pp. 22–26.
- 17.
- 18.
On this notion, see [73].
- 19.
This thematic realm is receiving an increasing attention. Cf. [8].
- 20.
The social consequences in this field are visible. See, for example, [40].
- 21.
- 22.
Cf. Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998. Cf. [24], p. 22.
- 23.
For Laudan, “epistemic values” (truth, falsity, …) can be distinguished from “cognitive values” (scope, generality, coherence, consilience, explanatory, …), cf. [52], p. 20.
- 24.
Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998.
- 25.
Cf. [51], pp. xi–xii, n. 2. The subtitle of his book is very clear: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. In his reticular model of scientific rationality, Laudan emphasizes that those values are good enough for the task: “Doubtless a wide range of cognitive goals or values can satisfy the demands laid down here” [51], p. 63.
- 26.
- 27.
There is usually a tension in the scientist between the defense of his or her autonomy and the need for responsibility, cf. [14].
- 28.
The constitutive elements of science are presented in [28], pp. 3–49; especially, pp. 10–11.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
This means that scientific progress is commonly modulated by an “economics of research.”
- 32.
Cf. [72], Chaps. 7, 8, and 9, pp. 151–203.
- 33.
- 34.
The concept of “neutrality” in science has been analyzed in [1], Chap. III.
- 35.
Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998.
- 36.
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Gonzalez, W.J. (2013). Value Ladenness and the Value-Free Ideal in Scientific Research. In: Luetge, C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_78
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