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Definition

From a formal point of view, a composite indicator is an aggregate of all dimensions, objectives, individual indicators, and variables used for its construction. This implies that what defines a composite indicator is the set of properties underlying its mathematical aggregation convention.

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Composite indicators are more and more popular; many international organizations propose their use in search of evidence-based policy (Nardo et al., 2008). They are very common in fields such as economic and business statistics and are used in a variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, quality of life assessment, globalization, innovation, or academic performance. From a formal point of view, a composite indicator is an aggregate of all dimensions, objectives, individual indicators, and variables used for its construction. This implies that what defines a composite indicator is the set of properties underlying its aggregation...

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Correspondence to Giuseppe Munda .

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Munda, G. (2014). Aggregation Problem. In: Michalos, A.C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_56

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_56

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