Abstract
Bioethics has never been far removed from politics or political agendas. For instance, many of the early contributors argued fiercely for the rights of women, or the rights of unborn babies, depending on which side of the political debate their thinking fell. The empowerment of patients against the prevailing medical paternalism was similarly politically motivated. What separated the early bioethical contributions from the purely political ones was that they were using established theories and methodologies of their own disciplines to argue for their case. The scientific validity of these claims was something that could be assessed against the theoretical background of the respective disciplines. Bioethics has always been an inter- and multidisciplinary enterprise and this tendency has become more and more prevalent. The ever-changing realities of medicine and biomedical sciences, available resources and the views, values and beliefs of the various stakeholders are playing an increasingly important role in bioethical deliberations. Widening and deepening the understanding of the complex issues by utilizing a wide variety of approaches is, of course, laudable. However, when the aim is not only to describe, but to prescribe, the multidisciplinarity becomes a methodological problem. Politics can be defined as the practice and theory of influencing people and that is, I would argue, what most bioethicists are trying to do. They have a moral stance and related policy recommendations that they are trying to convince people to accept. This tendency is further strengthened by the expectation from the funding bodies for research to yield practically relevant results. The chapter substantiates the claim that (much of) bioethics is politics by looking at the kind of work that is being carried out in bioethics, the speculative nature of the cost-benefit analyses at the heart of bioethics debates and the problems caused by inter- and multidisciplinary approaches with an emphasis on new technologies.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Green (1990).
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
Häyry and Takala (1998).
- 6.
Gigerenzer and Edwards (2003).
- 7.
Obviously democratic decision-making has all sorts of problems, the least of these not being very able to protect minority views.
- 8.
See e.g. Playing God: The Rock Opera, an attempt to reach people and get them engaged in bioethical deliberations. playinggodrocks.com
- 9.
Häyry and Takala (1999).
- 10.
Häyry (2005). A more detailed formulation would be: “When our actions could be harmful, but this harmfulness cannot be verified or falsified by scientific inquiry, the burden of proof is, according to the principle, on those who propose such actions. Until further research shows that the actions do not have the suspected ill effects, they should be disallowed. Häyry (2010).
- 11.
Holm and Takala (2007).
- 12.
See note 11, p. 3.
- 13.
Häyry (2010), p. 193.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
- 17.
The ideas of playing god and naturalness have also been seen in the literature to form a partnership: “The charges of ‘acting unnaturally’ or ‘playing god’ evoke lofty images of environmental disaster and divine punishment. If we change the course of rivers or move mountains, the long-term cumulative consequences can be catastrophic in ways which we cannot precidely define in the light of our current knowledge. And if we choose to create ‘abominations’ like animal-human hybrids, clones or parentless children, not only are the material outcomes unpredictable, but we can also have to confront the wrath of gods.” Häyry (2010, p. 132).
- 18.
Takala (2004).
- 19.
Some go even further and argue, not only should we allow the technologies to be developed, but that we should actively aid in making this happen by becoming research subjects. Harris (2005).
- 20.
Takala and Häyry (2014).
- 21.
Takala (2015).
- 22.
For a philosopher’s critical take on this, see e.g. Häyry (2015).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Takala (2005).
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Acknowledgement
This chapter was produced as a part of two Academy of Finland projects, Methods in Philosophical Bioethics (SA 131030, 2009–2014) and Synthetic Biology and Ethics (SA 272467, 2013–2017), and of the Finnish Cultural Foundation Argumenta project Justice and Its Alternatives in a Globalizing World. The author acknowledges the Academy’s, and the Cultural Foundation’s, support with gratitude.
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Takala, T. (2017). Bioethics as Politics. In: Kakuk, P. (eds) Bioethics and Biopolitics. Advancing Global Bioethics, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66249-7_8
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