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The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions in Africa pp 151–199Cite as

A Rights Framework for the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions in Africa

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Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that fundamental human and peoples’ rights protection will significantly enhance both the negative and positive protection of traditional cultural expressions. The protection of traditional cultural expressions under the banner of human and peoples’ rights significantly enhances the capacity of communities to act as legal subjects in the protection of their rights. The analysis of the negative protection of traditional cultural expressions revealed an attenuated capacity of communities in African states to protect their traditional cultural expressions because the protective framework is, in the main, facilitated by national institutions. Communities are therefore hampered in their ability to protect their traditional cultural expressions. A peoples’ and human rights framework acknowledges the entitlement of communities to protect their traditional cultural expressions and therefore complements the legislative models for the positive and negative protection of folklore. A peoples’ and human rights framework acts as a default standard that, at the very least, will guide and enhance legislative development. The proposition that this chapter explores is that traditional cultural expressions can be protected indirectly through both collective rights and a number of specific human rights. This proposition is based on the principle that only individuals can directly enforce human rights. The fact that communities can enforce rights directly to protect traditional cultural expressions is an emerging idea that is not generally accepted. The focus of this chapter is primarily the Bill of Rights in the national constitutions of the African states, as well as extant jurisprudence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The terms ‘human’ and ‘fundamental human rights’ are used interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    See Buchanan (1993), Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs, p. 89.

  3. 3.

    Buchanan (1993), Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs, p. 94. See also Ramcharan (1993), Int’l J Group Rights, p. 27.

  4. 4.

    See UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc0.html. (Accessed 4 January 2015.) A 6.2 provides: ‘Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion.’

  5. 5.

    2008 1 SA 474 (CC).

  6. 6.

    2008 1 SA 474 (CC), para 144.

  7. 7.

    2008 1 SA 474 (CC), para 150.

  8. 8.

    2008 1 SA 474 (CC), para 154.

  9. 9.

    1999 2 SA 83 (CC).

  10. 10.

    1999 2 SA 83 (CC), para 239.

  11. 11.

    See the following: Lenta (2009), SALJ, p. 827; Woolman (2009), SAJHR, p. 280; Bilchitz (2011), SAJHR, p. 219; Lenta (2012), SAJHR: Religion and Human Rights, p. 231; Woolman (2012), SAJHR: Religion and Human Rights, p. 273; Bilchitz (2012), SAJHR, p. 296; De Freitas (2012), SAJHR, p. 258; Lenta (2013), SAJHR, p. 429.

  12. 12.

    2009 4 SA 510 (T).

  13. 13.

    2005 1 SA 362 (W).

  14. 14.

    2005 1 SA 362 (W), para 58.

  15. 15.

    1996 1 SA 673 (A).

  16. 16.

    [2009] ZAKZPHC 75. Rautenbach (2011), pp. 63–89.

  17. 17.

    Currie and De Waal (2005), p. 631.

  18. 18.

    See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).

  19. 19.

    2006 1 SA 144 (CC).

  20. 20.

    The chapter contains the following rights: s 3—right to life; s 34—right to dignity of human person; s 35—right to personal liberty; s 36—right to fair hearing; s 37—right to private and family life; s 38—right to freedom of thought conscience and religion; s 39—right to freedom of expression and the press; s 40—right to peaceful assembly and association; s 41—right to freedom of movement; s 42—right to freedom from discrimination; s 43—right to acquire and own immovable property in any part of Nigeria; s 44—rights arising from compulsory acquisition of property. S 45 provides for restrictions and derogations from fundamental rights while s 46 provides for the special jurisdiction of the High Courts to enforce fundamental human rights.

  21. 21.

    In 1983, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act A9 of 2004 was promulgated by the National Assembly, making the African Charter enforceable in Nigeria. The extent of the application of the African Charter was one of the issues dealt with by the Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi ILDC 21 (NG 2000); 2000 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228. The Supreme Court was unanimous that the Constitution is superior to the African Charter but that the African Charter is superior to municipal legislation. In many cases Nigerian courts have struck down municipal legislation that breaches rights protected by the African Charter. See, for example, Ubani v Director of State Security Services (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 129; Abiodun v Attorney General of the Federation 2007 15 NWLR (Pt 1057) 359.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, Helfer (2003), Minn Intell Prop Rev, p. 47; Helfer (2006), UC Davis L Rev, p. 971; Chapman (2001) http://portal.unesco.org/cu;ture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=25704&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.htm; Chapman (2002), J Int’l Economic Law, pp. 861–882; Yu (2007), UC Davis L Rev, p. 1039; Yu (2012), Florida L Rev, pp. 1045–1100; Helfer and Austin (2011); Torremans (2004), p. 5.

  23. 23.

    Note, however, that in the certification process leading up to the adoption of the South African Constitution there was a proposal to include the right to intellectual property in the 1996 Final Constitution. When the Constitution came before the Constitutional Court the court was urged to recognise the right to hold intellectual property because it is a universally accepted human right. The court—In re: Certification of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC)—held that the right to hold intellectual property is not a universally accepted fundamental human right and that the Final Constitution is not defective thereby (para 75). See Dean (1997), p. 105.

  24. 24.

    A 15(1) of the ICESCR provides: ‘The State parties recognize the right of everyone (a) To take part in cultural life (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’

  25. 25.

    A 27(1) of the UDHR provides: ‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’

  26. 26.

    See Helfer (2008), Harv Int’l LJ, p. 1.

  27. 27.

    See a 1 of the Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1952, (hereafter European Convention on Human Rights) 213 UNTS 262: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ See Helfer and Austin (2011). In the United States there are a number of dicta which recognise intellectual property as property at least within the due process clause. See, for example, Chavez v Arte Publico Press 204 F.3d 601, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000): ‘Since patent and copyright are of a similar nature, and patent is a form of property [within the meaning of the Due Process Clause] … copyright would seem to be so too.’ See also Lane v First Nat’l Bank 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989).

  28. 28.

    See, for example, Geiger (2008), pp. 101.

  29. 29.

    See Du Bois (2013), pp. 144–170.

  30. 30.

    See Woodman (1996).

  31. 31.

    See, for example, s 257(4) of the Ghanaian Constitution. An example of such tenure is ‘stool/skin lands’.

  32. 32.

    See, for example, Lukan v Ogunnusi 1972 5 SC 40; Ekpendu v Erika 1959 4 FSC 79.

  33. 33.

    Civil Case No 238 of 1999 eKLR 1.

  34. 34.

    S 71 of the repealed Constitution of Kenya.

  35. 35.

    S 82 of the repealed Constitution of Kenya.

  36. 36.

    [1987] LRC (Const) 351.

  37. 37.

    (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708.

  38. 38.

    See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).

  39. 39.

    See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC) 860.

  40. 40.

    See a Canadian court in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1999 1 (SCR) 497, para 53: Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalised, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognise the full place of all individual and groups within…society.’

  41. 41.

    Neethling et al. (1996), p. 243.

  42. 42.

    2001 1 SA 545 (CC). See also Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd. v Sage Holdings Ltd. 1993 2 SA 451 (A); Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. 1989 1 SA 945 (A).

  43. 43.

    See Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 2 SA 451 (A).

  44. 44.

    See s 22(3)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution.

  45. 45.

    See Njuguna v Registrar of Trade Unions [2013] eKLR where the Kenyan Industrial Court recognised a liberal understanding of the public interest as anything affecting the public.

  46. 46.

    These factors include (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.

  47. 47.

    The discussion in this part of the chapter draws largely from an earlier work. See Nwauche (2005), http:/www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/vol2-2/folklore.asp.

  48. 48.

    S 8(2) and (3) of the South African Constitution provides: ‘(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. (3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2) a court – in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with s 36.’ See also Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC). See the following representative literature on this rather unique principle of South African constitutional law: Botha (2004), SAJHR, p. 249; Woolman and Davis (1996), SAJHR, p. 361; Cheadle and Davis (1997), SAJHR, p. 44.

  49. 49.

    See Farr v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd. 2000 3 SA 684 (C); Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust 2000 1 SA 315 (C); Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC).

  50. 50.

    2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) (hereafter Afrox). See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) (hereafter Brisley).

  51. 51.

    2007 5 SA 323 (CC).

  52. 52.

    2010 9 BCLR 892 (SCA).

  53. 53.

    See Kerr (2008), SALJ, p. 241; Glover (2007), SALJ, p. 449.

  54. 54.

    Tladi (2002a), De Jure, p. 306; Tladi (2002b), SAPL, p. 473; Bhana (2007), SALJ, p. 269; Hawthorne (2004), p. 294; Hopkins (2003), De Rebus, p. 23; Brand (2009), SALJ, p. 71; Barnard-Naudé (2008), p. 155; Rautenbach (2011), p. 510.

  55. 55.

    ‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The person who may approach a court are (a) anyone acting in their own interest; (b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; (c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; (d) anyone acting in the public interest; and (e) an association acting in the interest of its members.’

  56. 56.

    1996 1 SA 984 (CC) (hereafter Ferreira).

  57. 57.

    Emphasis supplied.

  58. 58.

    See Currie (2012), p. 251.

  59. 59.

    1998 4 SA 1196 (CC).

  60. 60.

    2007 1 SA 523 (CC) (hereafter SABC).

  61. 61.

    S 16 of the South African Constitution provides that (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. (2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to (a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.

  62. 62.

    See Nwauche (2008), IIC- Int’l Rev. Intell Prop & Comp L, p. 917.

  63. 63.

    See Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 4 SA 295 (CC).

  64. 64.

    SABC 2007 1 SA 523 (CC), para 28.

  65. 65.

    See Mokgoro J in Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) (hereafter Case).

  66. 66.

    The right to education is recognised in s 29 of the Constitution. It is important to understand the critical importance of the right to education as it is a precondition for the exercise of other rights.

  67. 67.

    See the case of De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC).

  68. 68.

    See Tushnet (2004), Yale LJ, p. 535.

  69. 69.

    See generally Alexy and Rivers (2009), Chapter 3.

  70. 70.

    SABC 2007 1 SA 523 (CC), para 55.

  71. 71.

    2007 5 SA 250 (CC). (Charlene Smith).

  72. 72.

    See Charlene Smith 2007 5 SA 250(CC), para 144: ‘In understanding the scope of privacy, it is important to recognize that, at times, the right to privacy might suggest that certain facts should not be published while at the same time the right to freedom of expression might suggest those same facts should be able to be published.’

  73. 73.

    Charlene Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC), para 147.

  74. 74.

    See Currie and De Waal (2005), p. 636; Bennett (2010), U Botswana LJ, p. 3.

  75. 75.

    See also s 15(1)d of the Courts Act 459 of 1993 as amended by the Courts Amendment Act 620 of 2002.

  76. 76.

    [1996–1997] SCGLR 729 (Ciba case).

  77. 77.

    See Center for Public Interest Law v Tema Oil Refinery Suit No E12/9/07. Ruling of 20 September 2007. Available at www.cepil.org.gh/file/CEPILvs.%20TOR.pdf (Last accessed 27 January 2013).

  78. 78.

    See Nwauche (2010), AHR LJ, pp. 502–514.

  79. 79.

    (1981) 1 All NLR 1.

  80. 80.

    S 6(6)b of the Nigerian Constitution provides that the judicial powers vested by the Constitution on different courts ‘(b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person’. There is an identical provision in the Nigerian Constitution.

  81. 81.

    See, for example, Sanderson v Attorney General of the Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 (CC); Government of Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thembesila Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). S 172(1)(b) of the South African Constitution provides that when deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court may make an order that is just and equitable.

  82. 82.

    1997 3 SA 786 (CC).

  83. 83.

    See Milo (2012), p. 11.

  84. 84.

    2011 4 SA 191 (CC).

  85. 85.

    2011 5 SA 329 (SCA).

  86. 86.

    See, for example, s 28D(1) of the SACA; s 43D(3) of the SA TMA; and s 53D(3) of the SADA.

  87. 87.

    See Jones (1999), HRQ, p. 80.

  88. 88.

    See Ouguergouz (2003); Mutua wa (1994), Virginia J Int’l L, p. 339.

  89. 89.

    See Donnelly (1990), p. 39; Nordenfeldt (1987), Nordic J Int’l L, p. 3.

  90. 90.

    See Van Boven (1986), HRLJ, pp. 2–4.

  91. 91.

    See Du Bois (2013), pp. 144–170.

  92. 92.

    The following rights are peoples’ rights in the Charter: the equality of all peoples (a 19); rights to existence (a 20); right to freely to dispose of their wealth and natural resources (a 21); right to their economic social and cultural development (a 22); right to national and international peace and security (a 23); and right to general satisfactory environment (a 24). A 22(1) of the Charter, which provides that ‘All Peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind’.

  93. 93.

    App 276/03 46th Ord Sess.

  94. 94.

    App 276/03 46th Ord Sess, para 238: ‘[T]he African Commission agrees with the complainant that that the property of the Endorois people has been severely encroached upon and continues to be so encroached upon.’

  95. 95.

    See a 21 of American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (9) ILM 99.

  96. 96.

    ‘(1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. (2) No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. (3) Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.’

  97. 97.

    See the following cases: Saramaka People v Suriname, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser. C) No 172, 79 (Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 185 (2008); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty v Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) No 125144 (June 17 2005) and Moiwana Cmty v Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005).

  98. 98.

    See also a 69 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution provides that the state shall protect all types of intellectual property in all fields. See also a 41 of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution which provides that intellectual property is guaranteed.

  99. 99.

    See Katam v Chepkwony [2011] eKLR.

  100. 100.

    [2012] eKLR. The court held that the right to life, dignity and health of petitioners who were living with HIV/AIDS must take precedence over intellectual property rights of patent holders (para 85). The court noted that while such Intellectual property rights should be protected, where there is a likelihood that their protection will put in jeopardy fundamental human rights intellectual property rights must give way to the fundamental rights of citizens in the position of petitioner (para 86).

  101. 101.

    It would appear that the ongoing constitutional review process in Zambia includes a proposed constitution which in a 63(4)c copies the provisions of s 40(5)c. There is a little difference though because the proposed Zambian provision undertakes to ‘support, promote and protect the intellectual property rights of the owner or the people of Zambia’. The inclusion of the word ‘owner’ would suggest a distinction between the individual and collective rights to intellectual property in Zambia.

  102. 102.

    See text accompanying Du Bois (2013), pp. 144–170.

  103. 103.

    See the Nigerian Supreme Court in Owonyin v Omotosho 1960 1 All NLR 304.

  104. 104.

    See, for example, Gyasi (1994), Africa, pp. 391–405.

  105. 105.

    See Ochich (2006), p. 103.

  106. 106.

    See, for example, Kamau v Wanja 1974 EA 348 (Kenya); Otieno v Ougo 1987 4KLR 407 (CA).

  107. 107.

    See, for example, Wanjala (2000), pp. 25–44. See the following cases: Pauline Ndete Kinyota Maingi v Rael Kinyota Maingi (Civil Appeal No 66 of 1984); Kandie and 2 Others v Cherogony [2002] 2KLR; Edwin Otieno Ombajo v Martin Odera Okumu [1996] eKLR.

  108. 108.

    See, for example, Rukunga v Rukunga [2011] eKLR.

  109. 109.

    See Wachira (2010), p. 6.

  110. 110.

    The issues are (1) land held under customary tenure; (2) marriage, divorce, maintenance or dowry; (3) seduction or pregnancy of an unwanted woman or girl; (4) enticement of or an adultery with a married woman; (5) matters affecting status, and in particular the status of women, widows, and children, including guardianship, custody, adoption, and legitimacy; and (6) intestate succession and administration of estates, so far as not governed by any written law.

  111. 111.

    See s 63(1). See also Katana Koi v Protus Evans Masinde [2013] eKLR.

  112. 112.

    The court is established pursuant to a constitutional requirement in s 162(2)d of the 2010 Constitution that a superior court be established to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of and title to land and to make provision for its jurisdiction functions and powers and for connected purposes.

  113. 113.

    See Adam (2012), p. 33.

  114. 114.

    See Amoah and Bennett (2008), AHR LJ, pp. 357–375.

  115. 115.

    See Nwauche (2009), p. 67.

  116. 116.

    Nwauche (2009), p. 67.

  117. 117.

    See Bennett (1995), p. 23.

  118. 118.

    Bennett (2004), p. 1.

  119. 119.

    Bennett (2004), p. 2; Kuruk (2002), eCopyright Bulletin.

  120. 120.

    2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (hereafter Bhe).

  121. 121.

    See Bhe 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 41: ‘… [t]he Constitution itself envisages a place for customary law in our legal system. Certain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt that our basic law specifically requires that customary law should be accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South African Law, provided the particular rules and provisions are not in conflict with the Constitution.’ Ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution entrench respect for cultural diversity. Further, s 39(2) specifically requires a court interpreting customary law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. In similar vein, s 39(3) states that the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by customary law so long as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights. Finally, s 211 protects those institutions that are unique to customary law. It follows from this that customary law must be interpreted by the courts, as first and foremost answering to the contents of the Constitution. It is protected by and subject to the Constitution in its own right.

  122. 122.

    See Bhe 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC), para 42.

  123. 123.

    In Bhe 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) the primogeniture rule as applied to the customary law of succession was held irreconcilable with the rights to human dignity (s 10 of the Constitution) and right to equality (s 9) of the Constitution. See Langa DCJ in Bhe, para 46: ‘It bears repeating, that as with all law, the constitutional validity of rules and principles of customary law depend on their consistency with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.’ See also Moseneke and Others v Master and Another 2001 2 SA 18 (CC).

  124. 124.

    S 36 of the South African Constitution.

  125. 125.

    S 16 of the South African Constitution provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes – (1) (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive and impart ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. (2) The right in subsection 1 dos not extend to (a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement to imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.’

  126. 126.

    See Ngcobo J in Bhe 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC), para 150 (footnotes omitted).

  127. 127.

    This section provides that ‘(1) Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient clarity: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy and natural justice: Provided further that is shall not be lawful for any court to declare that the custom or lobola or bogadi or any other similar custom is repugnant to such principles. (2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing evidence of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that section which is in issue at the proceedings concerned.’

  128. 128.

    See S v Sihlani & Another 1966 3 SA 148 (E).

  129. 129.

    See Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C). See also Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (T).

  130. 130.

    See Mosii v Motseoakhumo 1954 3 SA 919 (A); Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi 1948 1 SA 388 (A).

  131. 131.

    2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC).

  132. 132.

    Bhe 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC), para 151. In para 152 Ngcobo states: ‘It is now generally accepted that there are three forms of indigenous law: (a) that practised in the community: (b) that found in statutes, case law or textbooks on indigenous law (official); and (c) academic law that is used for teaching purposes.’

  133. 133.

    2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC), para 54.

  134. 134.

    See Himonga and Bosch (2000), SALJ, p. 306.

  135. 135.

    2007 5 SA 620 (CC).

  136. 136.

    2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC).

  137. 137.

    2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC), para 64.

  138. 138.

    See Pienaar (2008). www.ejcl.org/121/art121-19.pdf.

  139. 139.

    See Allott (1970), p. 147.

  140. 140.

    See generally Allott (1977), p. 1.

  141. 141.

    Such as reported cases, textbooks and other sources.

  142. 142.

    See Fiaklu v Adjiani [1972] 2 GLR 209.

  143. 143.

    See generally Woodman Customary land law in the Ghanaian courts; Ollennu Principles of Customary Land Law.

  144. 144.

    See Blocher (2006), pp. 180, 166–202.

  145. 145.

    In Mami v Paulina [2005–2006] GLR 1116, the Ghanaian Supreme Court refused to abolish a custom except in circumstances where it encourages people to commit crimes. The court recognised that a custom may be changed by Parliament or by the President.

  146. 146.

    See Cole v Folami (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt 133) 445; Nzekwu v Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 104) 373. See Osibanjo and Osipitan (1991), p. 255.

  147. 147.

    See Ojemen v Momodu (2001) FWLR (Pt 37) 1138.

  148. 148.

    See Adedibu v Adewoyin (1951) 13 WACA 411.

  149. 149.

    See Adeseye v Taiwo (1956) 1 FSC 84 where the court used Ajisafe Laws and customs.

  150. 150.

    See the case of Olagbemiro v Ajagunbade III (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt 136) 37.

  151. 151.

    See Oyewunmi v Ogunesan (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt 137) 182.

  152. 152.

    1989 2 NWLR (Pt 104) 373.

  153. 153.

    1989 2 NWLR (Pt 104) 428.

  154. 154.

    1989 1 NWLR (Pt 99) 566.

  155. 155.

    See s 15 of the High Court Law of Bayelsa State, Chapter H2 Laws of Bayelsa State 2006.

  156. 156.

    See s 15 of the High Court Law of Bayelsa State, Chapter H2 Laws of Bayelsa State 2006.

  157. 157.

    S 14(3) of the Evidence Act.

  158. 158.

    See In re Effiong Okon Ata v Henshaw 1930 10 NLR 65.

  159. 159.

    1932 11 NLR 47.

  160. 160.

    1935 12 NLR 4.

  161. 161.

    1973 11 SC 299.

  162. 162.

    [1994] 9 NWLR (Pt 368) 301.

  163. 163.

    1949 19 NLR 38.

  164. 164.

    1960 5 FSC 84.

  165. 165.

    1962 1 All NLR 602.

  166. 166.

    See Elias (1972), p. 266; Ajayi (1960), p. 103.

  167. 167.

    See the following representative sample: Obilade (1979), p. 110; Agbede (1993), p. 407; Achimu (1976), Nigerian LJ, p. 35; Aboki (1991–1992), p. 1.

  168. 168.

    See, for example, Maishanu v Anchau [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt 1084) 555; Ojoh v Kamalu [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt 958) 525.

  169. 169.

    See, for example, Alli v Ikusebiala [1985] NWLR (Pt 4) 630; Ekpendu v Erika [1959] NSCC 64; Seworuku v Orotiosaku [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt 30) 957.

  170. 170.

    [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt 512) 283 (hereafter Muojekwu).

  171. 171.

    [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt 657) 419. See Uke v Iro [2001] 11 NWLR 196, where a Nnewi custom by which a woman is precluded from giving evidence was held unconstitutional as it offended the right to freedom from discrimination. See also Ukeje v Ukeje [2001] 27 WRN 142, where the Court of Appeal held that an Igbo custom that disentitles daughters from participating in the sharing of the estate of their deceased father is unconstitutional.

  172. 172.

    [2004] All FWLR (Pt 211) 1406.

  173. 173.

    [2004] All FWLR (Pt 433) 1293.

  174. 174.

    [2001] 11 NWLR 196.

  175. 175.

    [2001] 27 WRN 142.

  176. 176.

    See the cases of Agbai v Okagbue 1997 7 NWLR (Pt 204) 391 and Anigbogu v Uchejigbo [2002] 10 NWLR (Pt 776) 472.

  177. 177.

    [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt 504) 459. This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Salubi v Nwariaukwu [3003] ALL FWLR (Pt 154) 401. See Osibanjo 1984–1987 Nigerian J Contemp L 30.

  178. 178.

    See s 260 of the Kenyan Constitution.

  179. 179.

    See Advisory Opinion.

  180. 180.

    See Advisory Opinion, paras 1, 15 and 19. It is important to draw attention to the claim by the Khoisan people to be a fist nation in South Africa. See ‘Khoisan Kingdom Policy on Khoisan Recognition of First Nation Status and Related Matters’. Available at www.khoisan.net/policy.pdf. It is not exactly clear what the consequences of the recognition of Khoisan communities in the Traditional Affairs Bill pending before Parliament.

  181. 181.

    See Symonides (1998), Int’l Soc Science J, p. 559.

  182. 182.

    See Kwall (2012), p. 129.

  183. 183.

    See Srinivas (2007), p. 2866.

  184. 184.

    [2009] ZASCA 85 (SCA). See also Beukes (2009), Int’l J Cultural Prop, pp.67–83.

  185. 185.

    See, for example, Sieghart (1983), p. 368: ‘If any of the individual rights and freedoms protected by modern international human rights law ever came to be regarded as subservient to the rights of a ‘people’ – there would be a real risk that legitimacy might be claimed on such a ground for grave violations of the human rights of individuals.’

  186. 186.

    See Pentney (1987).

  187. 187.

    See Van Boven (1995), Eur J Int’l L, p. 461.

  188. 188.

    See a 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. See also the following cases: Melnychuk v Ukraine 28,742/03 (05/07/2005); Anheuser-Busch Incl.v Portugal No 73049/01 (11 October 2005) of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights; Ashby Donald and Others v France No 36769/08 (10 January 2013). See also Laugh-It-Off Promotions v South African Breweries Ltd. 2006 1 SA 144 (CC).

  189. 189.

    See Lynch (2012), p. 24.

  190. 190.

    The African Commission agrees in its ruling that the failure to provide adequate compensation and benefits, or provide suitable land for grazing indicates that the respondent state did not adequately provide for the Endorois in the development process. It finds against the respondent state that the Endorois community has suffered a violation of a 22 of the Charter.

  191. 191.

    Pentassuglia (2010), p. 159.

  192. 192.

    See Brown (2005), Int’l J Cultural Prop, p. 49.

  193. 193.

    See Kuruk (1998), Am U L Rev, pp. 769–852, 784: ‘The leader controls farmland and other property of the group, arbitrates disputes…’.

  194. 194.

    See WIPO Anon www.wipo.int/export/siteswww/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_brief7.pdf. See also Conway (2009), Texas W L R p. 207.

  195. 195.

    Ndoye (1989), Copyright Monthly Review, pp. 374–378.

  196. 196.

    See Akinyemi (2007), Nordic Journal of African Studies, pp. 90–106.

  197. 197.

    See Boateng (2006), pp. 71–72.

  198. 198.

    See Asein (1994), pp. 64–78.

  199. 199.

    See Picton ‘The Visual Arts in Nigeria’, pp. 235–283, 254.

  200. 200.

    See Asein (1994), p. 67.

  201. 201.

    Shodipo Piracy Counterfeiting.

  202. 202.

    At 37–45. See also Adewoye (1977).

  203. 203.

    Shodipo Piracy Counterfeiting.

    At 37–45. See also Adewoye (1977).

  204. 204.

    See International Institute for Environment and Development www.pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14590IIED.pdf.

  205. 205.

    See Ongugo et al. (2012). www.iied.org/pdfs/G03443.pdf.

  206. 206.

    A good example is how the colonial Nigerian judiciary gradually recognised the individualisation of landholding. See, for example, Lewis v Bankole 1908 1 NLR 82.

  207. 207.

    See, for example, Woodman (1996), pp. 143–163.

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Nwauche, E. (2017). A Rights Framework for the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions in Africa. In: The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions in Africa. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57231-4_6

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