Abstract
Human beings are not only self-conscious minds but embodied and social beings, whose subjectivity is conditioned by their social surroundings. From this point of view, it is natural to suppose that the development and existence of a subject that is distinctively human requires contact with other people. The present contribution discusses medieval ideas concerning the intersubjective constitution of human being by looking at the medieval reception of two ideas, which Aristotle presents at the beginning of his Politics: (1) human beings are political animals by nature, which means that those who live outside of political communities due to their nature are either deficient or above humanity – they are beasts or gods; and (2) human beings are parts of political communities, and as such, comparable to hands in a body. When medieval philosophers consider these ideas from metaphysical and normative perspectives, they distinguish different senses in which human beings are naturally political. In effect, they draw a nuanced picture of the relation between an individual human being and the political community, and in so doing they distance themselves from a literal reading of Aristotle. An analysis of the medieval discussions reveals how the social aspect of human subjectivity emerges in medieval political philosophy and how medieval philosophers conceptualise the Aristotelian distinction into three kinds of beings – the beast, the human, and the god.
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Notes
- 1.
Of course it is possible that medieval philosophers meant the solitude of the monastic life when they wrote about solitary life. Yet, many of their arguments seem to be based on the idea that the solitary person is truly alone, possibly a hermit. It is rather clear that their ideas reflect the medieval social reality, even though the philosophical arguments discussed here do not make this connection explicitly.
- 2.
To be sure, Aristotle’s view is open to dispute, especially when it comes to the question whether or not separated human beings are human beings in the full sense. Richard Kraut, for one, emphasises that the purpose of the analogy is not to deny the separated person’s humanity (Kraut [2002], 261–64; see also Saunders [1995], 70). For a different emphasis, see Miller (1995), 47–53.
- 3.
Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1253a19–30.
- 4.
Pol. 1.2, 1253a1–5. Aristotle’s position is far from clear, but the interpretative problems need not bother us here. For discussion and references, one may begin with Kraut (2002), 261–64.
- 5.
“segregatus a communicatione civili, similiter aliis partibus, segregatis scilicet a suis totis […] non dicetur homo, vel domus, nisi aequivoce: quia virtutem et actum hominis non habent, sicut nec pes lapideus, nec manus” (Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis 1.1, p. 14–15).
- 6.
- 7.
Walter Burley, Expositio super librum Politicorum, fol. 3rb–3vb.
- 8.
“Item, ista propositio ‘pars separata a toto non habet propriam operationem’ habet intelligi de parte que corrumpitur per separationem a toto, cuiusmodi sunt partes animalium perfectorum et aliorum consistentium in ordine ad unum finem, sed non est verum de qualibet parte […] Sed loquendo de toto cuius forma nullo modo extenditur in materia, cuiusmodi totum est homo, sic ad corruptionem totius sequitur corruptio cuiuslibet partis integralis formalis. Intendo per partem integralem formalem partem perfectam per formam totius, cuiusmodi sunt manus hominis et pes et sic de aliis partibus, prout perficiuntur per ultimam formam hominis. Partes tamen integrales remote que possunt dici partes integrales materiales non corrumpuntur ad corruptionem totius. Unde cum Philosophus dicit quod corrupto toto non remanet pars, ut civitate corrumpta non remanet civis, loquitur de parte integrali formali. Civis enim est pars integralis formalis civitatis et iste homo, ut Sortes vel Plato, est pars integralis materialis civitatis” (Walter Burley, Expositio, fol. 3vb–4ra).
- 9.
Walter’s position is based on his acceptance of the plurality of substantial forms. See Kuksewic (1981), 370–71.
- 10.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.10, 1035b3–14.
- 11.
Walter Burley, Expositio, fol. 3vb–4ra. Walter may be influenced by Aristotle’s discussion in Politics 3.3, 1276a30–b13.
- 12.
Walter Burley, Expositio, fol. 1vb.
- 13.
Marco Toste has argued that also medieval commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics make this claim (Toste [2008], 173–95).
- 14.
- 15.
Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, 1.1b, 79 (transl. Regan, 1.1, 18). See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST), II-2.64.5.
- 16.
Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum 1.1b, 79. For Aristotle, see Meteorology 4.12, 390a10–13; De anima 2.1, 412b10–24.
- 17.
Cf. Aristoteles Latinus, Pol. 1.2 1253a, p. 9, line 10.
- 18.
ST II-2.188.8 ad 5.
- 19.
ST II-2.188.8.
- 20.
See ST II-2.188.6, where Aquinas compares religious orders with each other.
- 21.
EN 10.7, 1177b26-35; EN 10.8, 1178b32–1179a9.
- 22.
Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum 1.1b, 78.
- 23.
Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum 1.1b, 77.
- 24.
See, e.g., EN 9.9; EE 7.12, 1245b9–19; Lefebvre (2003), 147–74.
- 25.
Similarly, an anonymous commentator argues that virtuous persons who retreat from society in order to enjoy the speculation of truth do not need other people, but they are not self-sufficient in the material sense. See Anon.Quaestiones in libros Politicorum, fol. 3va–b.
- 26.
“Sed que est ista natura? Dicendum quod homo potest considerari dupliciter: uel secundum speciei naturam, uel secundum naturam indiuidui, que est aliqua dispositio materialis” (Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones super libros Politicorum, fol. 277ra; Marco Toste has kindly provided me with excerpts from his forthcoming edition of this work).
- 27.
“Et ideo diuersi homines singulares diuersimode disponuntur ad predictam proprietatem, scilicet esse civile. Si autem contingat quod aliquis homo sic disponatur a natura ut, uel ex multa humiditate uel ex acuta caliditate, habeat sensus ebetes et motus multos turbantes fantasmata, tunc ille homo male disponetur secundum intellectum, non quantum ad substantiam intellectus, sed propter impedimentum organorum ex quibus capit ratio et intellectus, et ideo patietur defectum rationis et per consequens non erit habilis obedire rationi, et tunc sequetur uitam bestialem, sequens omnino appetitum sensitiuum. Et ille erit inciuilis homo […]” (Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones, fol. 277rb).
- 28.
“Et propter hoc aptissimus erit ad speculandum, non indigens societate ad illam suam potissimam operationem, potens etiam illa carere propter moderamen passionum corporalium. Et ille tunc disponitur ad corpus sicut ad inimicum, sicut dicit Eustratius, et habebit uirtutem heroicam, et eliget uitam solitariam ad speculandum altissima; et hoc accidit eis uel ex diuina consuetudine morali uel ex natura propria uel etiam ex supranaturali causa secundum theologos, que omnia accidunt nature speciei. Et ideo illi fiunt inciuiles: ciuitate enim non indigent nec ad defensionem, quia corpus non curant, nec ad necessitatem corporis, quia illius sunt inimici, nec propter consuetudines bonas, quia de se habent excessum uirtutum, ut iam patuit; nec plura sunt opera ciuitatis.” (Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones, fol. 277rb). For the development of the idea that the solitary contemplative person has a heroic virtue, see Costa (2008), 153–72.
- 29.
“Si autem ita contingat quod natura individui medio modo istorum duorum se habeat, tunc concordabit cum natura speciei et tunc ad idem illa inclinabit, et tunc homo erit civilis. Et sic patet quod a natura speciei absolute non est homo ciuilis” (Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones, fol. 277rb).
- 30.
- 31.
Pol. 1253a 30–35.
- 32.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6ra–7rb. The question is based on Aristotle, who argues that although perfect human beings are the best of animals, those who are “separated from law and justice” are the worst (Pol. 1.2, 1253a32–34).
- 33.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6rb.
- 34.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 7ra and 6rb.
- 35.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6vb.
- 36.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6vb.
- 37.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6va.
- 38.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6vb.
- 39.
Nicolas of Vaudémont, Questiones, 1.5, fol. 6vb. When Aquinas compares the excellence of different religious orders, he argues that the best order is not devoted only to contemplation but also to teaching others. See ST II-2.188.6.
- 40.
Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques d’Aristote, 2.6, 83a–b.
- 41.
Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques 1.2, 48b. The quotation from Jerome is from his letter 125 (PL 22, 1077), and in the immediate context Jerome is comparing monastic life to complete solitude. Oresme uses the verb converser, the primary meaning of which in middle French is ‘to be permanently with others’ (Dictionnaire du Moyen Français, s.n. converser).
- 42.
This research has been financed by the European Research Council and Stiftelsen Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. I would like to thank Ville Suomalainen for his invaluable assistance in practical matters.
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Toivanen, J. (2016). Beasts, Human Beings, or Gods? Human Subjectivity in Medieval Political Philosophy. In: Kaukua, J., Ekenberg, T. (eds) Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26914-6_12
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