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Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Space Development ((BRIEFSSPACE))

Abstract

The differences between the legal regimes applicable to air space and outer space are of a fundamental order: while Air Law is based on considerations of sovereignty, Space Law overtly forbids any form of national appropriation. Widely accepted treaties provided those rules, which can even be recognized as of a fundamental character to Air Law and Space Law. Therefore, the different standards contributed to the creation of two immiscible legal systems, which arguably succeed each other above the surface of the Earth, at a still to be determined altitude.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “A princípio, tinha-se que lutar não apenas contra os elementos mas também contra os preconceitos: a direção dos balões e, mais tarde, o voo mecânico, eram problemas ‘insolúveis’.” Alberto Santos-Dumont. O Que Eu Vi, o Que Nós Veremos. São Paulo, Brazil: Hedra, 2000. p. 17.

  2. 2.

    I. H. Diederiks-Verschoor. “Differences Between Air Law and Space Law”. Recueil des Cours, 172, (1981-III), p. 320.

  3. 3.

    “Following World War II, the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union interacted with the chaotic and fluid state of international relations to produce the Cold War. Understanding the impact of World War II on the international system and its members is crucial to understanding the origins of the Cold War. World War II accelerated fundamental changes in the global distribution of power, in weapons technology, in the balance of political forces among and within nations, in the international economy, and in relations between the industrial nations and the Third World. In addition, the diplomatic and military decisions made during the war had a profound impact on the shape of the postwar world.” David S. Painter. The Cold War: an International History. New York, USA: Routledge, 1999. p. 4.

  4. 4.

    “Um foguete que servisse de propulsor para uma nave espacial também poderia fazer o mesmo com um míssil carregando uma ogiva nuclear.” Geoffrey Blainey. Uma Breve História do Século XX. São Paulo, Brazil: Fundamento Educacional, 2008. p. 211.

  5. 5.

    Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne. Frontiers of Aerospace Law. Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2002. p. 5.

  6. 6.

    “The very concept of international air law may give rise to controversy, since its content entails a vastly more complex system of law than any other system of law. (…) Thus the law needs to build up a great apparatus of manageable concepts in order to provide a workable framework for international air law.” Chia-Jui Cheng. “New Sources of International Air Law”, In: Chia-Jui Cheng (ed.). The Use of Air Space and Outer Space for All Mankind in the 21st Century. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1995. p. 277.

  7. 7.

    “Sendo a aviação muito mais recente do que a navegação marítima, não são, todavia, as questões que ela suscita menores do que as desta. De fato, dificilmente as comunicações aéreas entre países distantes se podem fazer sem o sobrevoo de Estados diferentes; se nem todos os Estados possuem domínio marítimo, não há nenhum sem espaço aéreo; neste, as fronteiras não são demarcadas duma forma visível; a segurança da navegação exige uniformidade de sinalização.” Albino de Azevedo Soares. Lições de Direito Internacional Público. 4. ed. Coimbra, Portugal: Coimbra Editora Limitada, 1988. p. 259.

  8. 8.

    David Johnson. Rights in Air Space. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1965. p. 10.

  9. 9.

    “At the Hague in 1899 it was felt that the use of balloons for the purpose of discharging projectiles was attended by too many uncertainties to be permitted.” David Johnson. Rights in Air Space. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1965. p. 11.

  10. 10.

    Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 6/8.

  11. 11.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 6. ed. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 1.

  12. 12.

    Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 1/2.

  13. 13.

    “Direito Aéreo compreende o conjunto de normas internacionais que regulam o espaço aéreo e sua utilização. Nesta, estão incluídos problemas relativos à navegação, à radiotelegrafia e à radiotelefonia.” Adherbal Meira Mattos. Direito Internacional Público. 2. ed. São Paulo, Brazil: Renovar, 2002. p. 211.

  14. 14.

    Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional dos Espaços. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2009. p. 497/499.

  15. 15.

    Luis Ivani de Amorim Araújo. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. 6. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 1988. p. 184/185.

  16. 16.

    “A expressão ‘direito aéreo’ tem sido criticada por ser ‘vaga e imprecisa’, isto é, ela abrange o meio aéreo e todas as suas utilizações, como a navegação, a radiotelegrafia, etc. Entretanto, no DI [Direito Internacional] traz a grande vantagem de abranger em um único termo as diferentes utilizações do espaço aéreo, cujas regulamentações vão depender da própria regulamentação do espaço aéreo.” Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello. Curso de Direito Internacional Público, Volume II. 15. ed., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Renovar, 2004. p. 1.308.

  17. 17.

    “Direito aéreo e direito aeronáutico. É preciso distinguir-se o sentido em que devem ser empregadas essas duas expressões. Direito aéreo corresponde a um campo de ação mais amplo: abrange não só as normas relativas à locomoção aérea, como ainda as necessárias a regulamentação das diversas atividades utilizadas no espaço aéreo, alcançando as aplicações das invenções recentes: condutos elétricos, telégrafos, radiotelegrafia, radiotelefonia e a televisão. Direito aeronáutico será, então, o complexo de normas jurídicas relativas à navegação feita pelo ar. Seu domínio restringe-se, pois, ao fenômeno da locomoção aérea. Não, apenas, aos transportes aéreos, pois, neste caso, estariam excluídas outras atividades da navegação aérea (esportiva, por exemplo)”. J. C. Sampaio de Lacerda. Curso de Direito Comercial Marítimo e Aeronáutico (Direito Privado da Navegação). Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Freitas Bastos, 1957. p. 387/388.

  18. 18.

    “Temos que entender que uma das principais responsabilidades do Direito Aeronáutico é impedir a invasão de territórios de outros países, já que esse é um motivo precursor da regulamentação jurídica da aeronavegação”. Paulo Henrique de Souza Freitas. Responsabilidade Civil no Direito Aeronáutico. São Paulo, Brazil: Juarez de Oliveira, 2003. p. 37.

  19. 19.

    Federico N. Videla Escalada. Aeronautical Law. Alpheen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979. p. 54.

  20. 20.

    “(…) son immensité, as fluidité, as mobilité le rend [le domanie aérien] comme la mer insusceptible de souveraineté autant que de propriété”. Paul Fauchille. Le Domaine Aéreian et Le Régime Juridique de les Aerostats. Paris, France: Pendone, 1901. p. 19.

  21. 21.

    The proposal was offered at the Neuchatel meeting, in 1900, and later succeeded by a project developed by Fauchille himself in 1902, during the Brussels meeting. Luis Ivani de Amorim Araújo. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. 6. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 1988. p. 192. I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 6. ed. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 1.

  22. 22.

    “L’air est libre. Les fetats n’ont sur lui, en temps de paix et en temps de guerre, que les droits necessaires a leur conservation.”

  23. 23.

    Paul Fauchille. Le Domaine Aéreian et Le Régime Juridique de les Aerostats. Paris, France: Pendone, 1901.

  24. 24.

    “Posteriormente, isto é, em 1910, o mesmo jurista preferiu fixar tal limite em 500 metros do solo, tendo em vista o progresso alcançado pelos aparelhos fotográficos, conforme deixou esclarecido em seu ‘La circulation aérienne et les droits des États en temps de paix’ até que, ao escrever seu ‘Traité de Droit International Public’, em 1925, tomando por base a altura da Torre Eiffel – a mais alta das construções, na época – fixou tal limite em 330 metros”. Luis Ivani de Amorim Araújo. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. 6. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 1988. p. 197/198.

  25. 25.

    Wenceslas J. Wagner. International Air Transportation as Affected by State Sovereignty. Brussels, Belgium: Bruylant, 1970. p. 37.

  26. 26.

    “La práctica internacional en los años precedentes a la primera guerra mundial y, sobre todo, durante el propio período bélico, confirmó que los Estados no se inclinaban de modo alguno a considerar su espacio aéreo como objeto de uso general y desde un principio anunciaron inequívocamente su derecho exclusivo a esa parte de la atmosfera”. A. Vereschaguin. “Derecho Aéreo Internacional”, In: G. Tunkin (coord.). Curso de Derecho Internacional: Manual. Moscow, Russia: Progresso, 1979. p. 71.

  27. 27.

    “O ar é realmente inapropriável, mas o espaço aéreo é apropriável.” Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello. Curso de Direito Internacional Público, Volume II. 15. ed., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Renovar, 2004. p. 1.309.

  28. 28.

    Luis Ivani de Amorim Araújo. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. 6. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 1988. p. 191.

  29. 29.

    Luis Tapia Salinas. Manual de Derecho Aeronáutico. Barcelona, Spain: Bosch Casa Editorial, 1944. p. 41.

  30. 30.

    “Na verdade, em retrospecto, o que surpreende é o vigor dos argumentos apresentados por alguns partidários da liberdade do espaço. Desde o início ficou evidente a importância militar, no mínimo para fins de observação, das atividades aéreas e, em consequência, os Estados preocuparam-se em regular e controlar os processos que tratavam de voos estrangeiros sobre seus territórios. Outro argumento favorável era o perigo dos voos, não só para os que dele participavam como para os que permaneciam em terra, e geralmente se pensava, também por esta razão, que o voo deveria ser regulamentado pelo Estado subjacente.” Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach. Fundamentos Políticos do Direito Internacional. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Zahar, 1964. p. 169.

  31. 31.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 5. ed. Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 2.

  32. 32.

    Reference shall be made to the 1910 Paris International Conference regarding international air navigation, that could not conclude an international treaty mostly due to the conflict of opinions regarding the legal nature of air space. Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 9.

  33. 33.

    Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello. Curso de Direito Internacional Público, Volume II. 15. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Renovar, 2004. p. 1.309.

  34. 34.

    “Evidente a conexão com o antigo preceito, atribuído à escola dos glosadores do século XVIII, com ACCURSIO (falecido em 1263) (…): cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum – e se pode acrescentar et ad inferos, entendendo que pertence ao proprietário do solo, o que está acima dele até o céu e abaixo dele até o ‘inferno’. O preceito pode ter prevalecido, em relação ao espaço de competência do Direito Aeronáutico, mas, anos depois, seria restringido pelo desenvolvimento do Direito Espacial, que, por sua vez, não adota nem seria viável pretender a soberania do espaço territorial.” Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional dos Espaços. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2009. p. 504. Also: Malcolm N. Shaw. International Law. 3. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 464. John Cobb Cooper. “Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum in International Air Law”. McGill L. J., no. 23. Montreal, Canada: 1955.

  35. 35.

    Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 10.

  36. 36.

    “Podemos assinalar que todas ou quase todas as leis internas dos diferentes Estados, relativas à navegação aérea, são baseadas na doutrina da soberania do Estado sobre o espaço aéreo acima do respectivo território.” Hildebrando Accioly. Tratado de Direito Internacional Público. Vol. II. 3. ed. São Paulo, Brazil: Quartier Latin, 2009. p. 330.

  37. 37.

    Peter P. C. Haanappel. The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: a Comparative Approach. The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2003. p. 4.

  38. 38.

    Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 11.

  39. 39.

    Hildebrando Accioly. Tratado de Direito Internacional Público. Vol. II. 3. ed. São Paulo, Brazil: Quartier Latin, 2009. p. 333.

  40. 40.

    “Cada potência tem a soberania completa e exclusiva sobre o espaço atmosférico acima de seu território.”

  41. 41.

    “Cada Estado tem completa e exclusiva soberania sobre o espaço aéreo acima de seu território e águas continentais.”

  42. 42.

    “Mas, o que vem a ser passagem inocente? (…) se há normas determinantes emanadas dos Estados sobre a possibilidade, a liberdade de aeronaves estranhas sobrevoarem territórios e neles pousarem na sua missão de transportar passageiros e mercadorias de um para outro Estado, esse voo é considerado inocente, essa travessia é inofensiva, porque dentro do estabelecido nas convenções entre Estados. Mas, cabe ao Estado sobrevoado ou utilizado como ponto de pouso, isto é, o Estado ao qual pertence o espaço aéreo esclarecer se a passagem tem ou não a característica requerida.” Luis Ivani de Amorim Araújo. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. 6. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 1988. p. 195/196.

  43. 43.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 5. ed. Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 10/11.

  44. 44.

    The ICAO objectives were provided by article 44 of the Chicago Convention: “The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to: (a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes; (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; (f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States; (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation; (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.”

  45. 45.

    “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its functions. Full juridical personality shall be granted wherever compatible with the constitution and laws of the State concerned.”

  46. 46.

    “A OACI tornou-se órgão especializado das Nações Unidas logo após sua criação notabilizando-se pela importância da legislação internacional adotada no âmbito desta organização, que encontra aceitação inconteste e absoluta uniformidade de aplicação, em todos os seus trabalhos”. Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional dos Espaços. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2009. p. 510/511.

  47. 47.

    Michael Milde. International Air Law and ICAO. Utrecht, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2008. p. 124.

  48. 48.

    “The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”

  49. 49.

    “For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.”

  50. 50.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 5. ed. Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 9.

  51. 51.

    “Nenhuma aeronave governamental pertencente a um estado contratante poderá voar sobre o território de outro Estado, ou aterrissar no mesmo sem autorização outorgada por acordo especial ou de outro modo e de conformidade com as condições nele estipuladas.”

  52. 52.

    William R. Slomanson. Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. 4. ed. Belmont, USA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. p. 282.

  53. 53.

    Peter Malanczuk. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7. ed. London, England: Routledge, 1997. p. 198.

  54. 54.

    “Em 4 de julho de 1956, um novo avião-espião americano, o U-2, fez seu voo inaugural diretamente sobre Moscou e Leningrado, tirando excelentes fotografias de uma altura bem acima das possibilidades dos aviões de caça e mísseis antiaéreos soviéticos. (…) Os voos continuaram em intervalos regulares durante os quatro anos seguintes. Os russos, que conseguiam detectá-los no radar mas não tinham como abatê-los, limitavam-se a protestos superficiais, não querendo propagar sua incapacidade de controlar seu espaço aéreo. Os americanos, cientes de que os voos violavam a lei internacional, ficavam calados enquanto exploravam essa mina de informações para a inteligência”. John Lewis Gaddis. História da Guerra Fria. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Nova Fronteira, 2006. p. 70.

  55. 55.

    William R. Slomanson. Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. 4. ed. Belmont, USA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. p. 283.

  56. 56.

    “(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft. (b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft. (c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof. (d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”

  57. 57.

    “(a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization. (b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States. (c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) above to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.”

  58. 58.

    “Se uma aeronave viola algum dos direitos reconhecidos ao Estado sobre o qual voa, é natural que o Estado sobrevoado exerça sobre ela alguma sanção.” Hildebrando Accioly. Tratado de Direito Internacional Público. Vol. II. 3. ed. São Paulo, Brazil: Quartier Latin, 2009. p. 336.

  59. 59.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 5. ed. Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 9.

  60. 60.

    Anthony Aust. Handbook of International Law. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 353.

  61. 61.

    Malcolm N. Shaw. International Law. 5. ed. Cambridge, England: 2003. p. 473/479.

  62. 62.

    Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier e Alain Pellet. Direito Internacional Público. 2. ed. Lisbon, Portugal: Fundação Calouste Gulbekian, 2003. p. 1275.

  63. 63.

    Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional, Terrorismo e Aviação Civil. São Paulo, Brazil: Quartier Latin, 2006.

  64. 64.

    Malcolm N. Shaw. International Law. 5. ed. Cambridge, England: 2003. p. 476.

  65. 65.

    I. H. Diedericks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Air Law. 5. ed. Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. p. 14.

  66. 66.

    “A Corte Internacional de Justiça afirmou, no julgamento do caso das atividades militares e paramilitares na Nicarágua e contra esta (1986), que o sobrevoo não autorizado constitui ofensa ao princípio da soberania territorial dos Estados.” Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional dos Espaços. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2009. p. 509.

  67. 67.

    J. E. S. Fawcett. International Law and the Uses of Outer Space. Manchester, England: University Press, 1969. p. 19.

  68. 68.

    “O Brasil exerce completa e exclusiva soberania sobre o espaço aéreo acima de seu território e mar territorial.”

  69. 69.

    José da Silva Pacheco. Comentários ao Código Brasileiro de Aeronáutico. 4. ed. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense, 2006. p. 39.

  70. 70.

    Created at the Berlin Conference of 1906.

  71. 71.

    ITU Constitution, Atlantic City, 1947.

  72. 72.

    Colin D. Long. Telecommunications Law and Practice. 2. ed.. London, England: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995. p. 206/210.

  73. 73.

    David I. Fischer. Prior Consent to International Direct Satellite Broadcasting. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990. p. 159.

  74. 74.

    David I. Fischer. Prior Consent to International Direct Satellite Broadcasting. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990. p. 160.

  75. 75.

    Manfred Lachs affirmed that the outer space is not a thing, but a place, so that the terms res communis and res extra commercium must be understood under the specific context of Space Law: “Outer space and celestial bodies are to be viewed as spheres of States’ activities; as an environment subjected to a special legal régime and enjoying that particular protection of the law. This determines the relationship between States and the new dimension.” The Law of Outer Space. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010. p. 46.

  76. 76.

    “[com o desenvolvimento do Direito Espacial] tornou-se ilegal qualquer ideia de colonizar o Espaço e os corpos celestes, como se viu no passado em vastas regiões do planeta.” José Monserrat Filho. Direito e Política na Era Espacial. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Vieira & Lent, 2007. p. 32.

  77. 77.

    Gyula Gál. Space Law. Leiden, the Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1969. p. 123/124.

  78. 78.

    “Segundo a visão tradicional, estritamente interestatal, os espaços internacionais, enquanto zonas situadas além do alcance da soberania de cada um dos estados, se equiparavam a res nullius. Como tais, eram considerados passíveis de apropriação e de exploração, indiscriminadas, e isso permanece, sem substanciais alterações, até o contexto pós-moderno. Somente no curso das últimas décadas se põe sentido diverso, tendente ao reconhecimento de interesses coletivos, atinentes a ‘toda a humanidade’, a afirmação de condição compartilhada do conjunto dos espaços, não-sujeitos à jurisdição dos estados, e do interesse comum em relação a estes. (…) Os espaços internacionais, de terra de ninguém (res nullius) passam a ser considerados bem comum (res communis)”. Paulo Borba Casella. Direito Internacional dos Espaços. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2009. p. 566/567.

  79. 79.

    Paul G. Dembling e Daniel M. Arons make reference to a declaration of the American president Dwight D. Eisenhower at UN General Assembly in 1960, where he categorically affirmed that the USA understood that celestial bodies could not be subjected to national claims. “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty”, Journal of Air, Law and Commerce, 419, 1967. Apud Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges. Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy. 2. ed. Boulder, USA: Western Press, 1998. p. 70.

  80. 80.

    “Conforme a tradição, a unanimidade da doutrina internacionalista e inúmeros precedentes de tribunais internacionais, para que um comportamento comissivo ou omissivo seja considerado como um costume jurídico internacional, torna-se necessária a presença de dois elementos constitutivos: (a) um elemento material, a ‘consuetudo’, ou seja, uma prática reiterada de comportamentos, que, no início de sua formação, pode ser um simples uso ou prática; e (b) um elemento psicológico, ou subjetivo, a ‘opinio júris vel necessitatis’, ou seja, a certeza de que tais comportamentos são obrigatórios, em virtude de representarem valores essenciais e exigíveis de todos os agentes da comunidade dos Estados.” Guido Fernando Silva Soares. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. São Paulo, Brazil: Atlas, 2002. p. 82.

  81. 81.

    Henri Wassenbergh. Principles of Outer Space in Hindsight. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. p. 16.

  82. 82.

    Bin Cheng. Studies on International Space Law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Pr, 1998. p. 125/148.

  83. 83.

    http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_13_1348.html, access on 01.10.2011.

  84. 84.

    In 1959, the ad hoc study committee created by Resolution 1348 (XIII) presented report, referred by Ogunsola O. Ogunbanwo: “without necessarily going into details of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, one or two observations will be necessary. First, the Committee considered that ‘as a matter of principle the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice were not limited in their operation to the confines of Earth’.” International Law and Outer Space Activities. The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. p. 12.

  85. 85.

    Valnora Leister. “O Comitê para o Uso Pacífico do Espaço Exterior (COPUOS) da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU)”, In: Araminta Mercadante e José Carlos de Magalhães (orgs.) Reflexões sobre os 60 Anos da ONU. Ijuí, Brazil: Unijuí, 2005. p. 400.

  86. 86.

    http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_14_1472.html, access on 02.10.2011.

  87. 87.

    “The enlargement of COPUOS and the strengthening of the Soviet bloc component in its composition was not the only concession made to the Soviet Union in order to secure its co-operation. From the start, being in the minority, the Soviet Union had wanted the unanimity rule to be applied in COPUOS, instead of the majority rule applicable to all subordinate organs of the United Nations General Assembly”. Bin Cheng. Studies on International Space Law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Pr, 1998. p. 163.

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    MATTE, Nicolas Mateesco. Aerospace Law: from Scientific Exploration to Commercial Utilization. Toronto, Canada: Carswell, 1977. p. 21/30.

  89. 89.

    http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_16_1721.html#secte, access in 02.10.2011.

  90. 90.

    Francys Lyall e Paul B. Laursen. Space Law: a Treatise. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. p. 48.

  91. 91.

    “1. Commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following principles: (a) International law, including the Chapter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies; (b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation; (…).”

  92. 92.

    C. Wilfred Jenks. Space Law. New York, USA: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. p. 201.

  93. 93.

    Bin Cheng. Studies on International Space Law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Pr, 1998. p. 127.

  94. 94.

    “The Legal Sub-Committee failed to break the deadlock which had frustrated its work but reported some progress. On the question of general principles governing the activities of States relating to the exploration and use of outer space, agreement was reached that they should take the form of a declaration, some delegations favoring a treaty-type document and others a General Assembly resolution.” C. Wilfred Jenks. Space Law. New York, USA: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. p. 63.

  95. 95.

    http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_18_1962E.pdf, access on 02.10.2011.

  96. 96.

    “Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”

  97. 97.

    Later it was signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, on September 10th, 1996, in New York, USA. Francys Lyall e Paul B. Laursen. Space Law: a Treatise. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. p. 56.

  98. 98.

    Bin Cheng. Studies on International Space Law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Pr, 1998. p. 153.

  99. 99.

    C. Wilfred Jenks. Space Law. New York, USA: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. p. 184/186.

  100. 100.

    Bin Cheng presents a brief historical record of the Space Treaty creation: “The impetus behind the conclusion of this treaty was the successful ‘soft’ landing by the Soviet Union of its automatic station Luna IX on the moon on 3 February 1966, after three failures the previous years. Speaking from his ranch in Texas on 7 May 1966, President Johnson announced that the United States, which had hitherto opposed the development of international space law through treaties, would seek a treaty through the United Nations to prevent any nation from claiming sovereignty over the moon or any other celestial bodies and that the exploration thereof would be for peaceful purposes only. Consultations with the Soviet Union took place on 11 May when an outline of twelve points which, in the opinion of the United States, should be in a ‘celestial bodies treaty’ was handed to the latter. The response of the Soviet Union was prompt. On 30 May, it requested the ‘Conclusion of an international agreement on legal principles governing then activities of States in the exploration and conquests of the Moon and other celestial bodies’ to be included in the Agenda of the 21st session of the General Assembly. The text of a Soviet draft treaty followed on 16 June 1966. Whilst both drafts and their successive amendments were considered in the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS, in the course of which the United States agreed to enlarge the scope of the treaty to include also outer space, the really crucial discussions took place directly between the two space powers until they were able to present an agreed text in the form of a 43-power sponsored draft resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly on 15 December 1966 for it to be adopted unanimously four days later by the General Assembly itself on 19 December 1966 in resolution 2222 (XXI). The actual treaty was then opened for signature on 27 January 1967 simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington DC, the capitals of the three depository States.” Studies on International Space Law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Pr, 1998. p. 156.

  101. 101.

    Julia Neumann. “An Interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty after 40 years”. Proceedings of the Fiftieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space. IISL, Hyderabad, 2007.

  102. 102.

    Translated in the official Brazilian version as “incumbência da humanidade”, a very questionable option, since it would mean in English something like “a duty of mankind”.

  103. 103.

    Stephen Hobe. “Outer Space as the Province of Mankind – an Assessment of 40 Years of Development”. Proceedings of the Fiftieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space. IISL, Hyderabad, 2007.

  104. 104.

    Paul G. Dembling reported the legislative process regarding article 2 of the Space Treaty: “The text of Article II, which prohibits national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies, provoked only a few minutes of debate. The wording of the second sentence of Article I of the United States draft and the wording of Article II of the Soviet draft are almost identical. Agreement was reached on the final text when the Soviet delegate concurred with a suggestion by the United States delegate that the words ‘and celestial bodies’ in the Soviet draft be replaced by the words ‘including the Moon and other celestial bodies’ and other minor drafting change. Although there was some later criticism of the use of the word ‘appropriation’ for possible vagueness, the Soviet delegate had indicated, at a prior stage of discussions, that the term referred to the ban on assertion of national claims by way of any human activity in outer space or on the Moon or other celestial bodies.” “Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, In: Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S. K. Lee (eds.). Manual on Space Law. Volume I. New York, USA: Oceana, 1979. p. 11.

  105. 105.

    I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Space Law. 2. ed. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. p. 28.

  106. 106.

    Valérie Kayser. Launching Space Objects: Issues of Liability and Future Prospects. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. p. 27/28.

  107. 107.

    Henri A. Wassenberg. Principles of Outer Space in Hindsight. USA: Springer, 1991. p. 20.

  108. 108.

    Steven Freeland and Ram Jakhu. “Article II”, In: Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl (eds.). Cologne Commentary on Space Law. Volume 1 – Outer Space Treaty. Cologne, Germany: Carl Heymanns, 2009. p. 53.

  109. 109.

    Stephen Gorove. “Sources and Principles of Space Law”, In: Nandasiri Jasentuliyana (coord.). Space Law: Development and Scope. Westport, USA: Praeger Publishers, 1992. p. 46.

  110. 110.

    Nandasiri Jasentuliyana. International Space Law and the United Nations. The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1999. p. 32/41.

  111. 111.

    Olavo de O. Bittencourt Neto. Direito Espacial Contemporâneo: Responsabilidade Internacional. Curitiba, Brazil: Juruá, 2011. p. 80/89.

  112. 112.

    Olavo de O. Bittencourt Neto. Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados no Direito Espacial: Brasil como Estado Lançador. São Paulo, Brazil: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil, 2008. p. 72/82.

  113. 113.

    “A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”

  114. 114.

    “In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.”

  115. 115.

    “1. When a space object is launched into Earth orbit or beyond, the launching State shall register the space object by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each launching State shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry. 2. Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, bearing in mind the provisions of article VIII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be concluded among the launching States on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any personnel thereof. 3. The contents of each registry and the conditions under which it is maintained shall be determined by the State of registry concerned.”

  116. 116.

    Olavo de O. Bittencourt Neto. Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados no Direito Espacial: Brasil como Estado Lançador. São Paulo, Brazil: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil, 2008. p. 115.

  117. 117.

    Brazil is not a member-State.

  118. 118.

    “1. The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this article. 2. The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. 3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of the Moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article. 4. States Parties have the right to exploration and use of the Moon without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law and the terms of this Agreement. 5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision shall be implemented in accordance with article 18 of this Agreement. 6. In order to facilitate the establishment of the international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article, States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of any natural resources they may discover on the Moon. 7. The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall include: (a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon; (b) The rational management of those resources; (c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; (d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration. 8. All the activities with respect to the natural resources of the Moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes specified in paragraph 7 of this article and the provisions of article 6, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.”

  119. 119.

    Peter P. C. Haanappel. The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: a Comparative Approach. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. p. 25.

  120. 120.

    I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor. An Introduction to Space Law. 2. ed. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. p. 52.

  121. 121.

    Milton L. Smith. International Regulation of Satellite Communication. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990. p. 201/206.

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de Oliveira Bittencourt Neto, O. (2015). Air Space and Outer Space. In: Defining the Limits of Outer Space for Regulatory Purposes. SpringerBriefs in Space Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16685-8_2

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