Abstract
We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of \(\mathbb{R}^{n}\) that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in Dupuis and Fisher (On the construction of Lyapunov functions for nonlinear Markov processes via relative entropy, 2011), we provide conditions ensuring that these dynamics are gradient like and satisfy a suitable “angle condition”. This is used to prove that omega limit sets and chain transitive sets (under certain smoothness assumptions) consist of equilibria; and that, in the real analytic case, every trajectory converges toward an equilibrium. In the reversible case, the dynamics are shown to be C 1 close to a gradient vector field. Properties of equilibria -with a special emphasis on potential games—and structural stability questions are also considered.
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- 1.
By this we mean that L is the restriction to Δ of a C 1 map defined in a neighborhood of Δ in \(aff(\varDelta ) =\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\,:\sum _{i}x_{1} = 1\}\).
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the SNF grant 2000020149871∕1 I would like to thank J. B Bardet, F. Malrieu, M. W Hirsch, J. Hofbauer, J. Robbin, B. Sandholm, S. Sorin, P. A Zitt for numerous discussions on topics related to this paper.
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Appendix
Appendix
Let L be an irreducible rate matrix and \(\pi \in \dot{\varDelta }\) denote the invariant probability of L. That is the unique solution (in Δ) of π L = 0. For all \(f,g \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) we let
The Dirichlet form of L is the map \(\mathcal{E}: \mathbb{R}^{n}\mapsto \mathbb{R}_{+}\) defined as
By irreducibility, \(\mathcal{E}(\,f)> 0\) unless f is constant, and the spectral gap
is positive. We let L ∗ be the irreducible rate matrix defined by
Note that L ∗ admits π as invariant probability and that L ∗ is the adjoint of L for \(\langle,\rangle _{\pi }.\)
We let \(L^{T}: T\varDelta \mapsto T\varDelta\) be defined by
Finally recall that for all \(f \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) \(\frac{f} {\pi }\) stands for the vector defined by \((\frac{f} {\pi } )_{i} = \frac{f_{i}} {\pi _{i}},i = 1\ldots n.\)
Lemma 8
For all u,v ∈ TΔ
In particular L T is invertible and L T is a definite negative operator for \(\langle,\rangle _{\frac{1} {\pi } }\) whenever L is reversible with respect to π.
Proof
The first assertion follows from elementary algebra. For the second, note that \(\langle L^{T}u,u\rangle _{1/\pi } = -\mathcal{E}(\frac{u} {\pi } ).\) Thus, by irreducibility,
unless u = 0. ■
1.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Given \(f \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) we write f ≥ 0 if f i ≥ 0 for all i. We let \(1 \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) denote the vector which components are all equal to 1. For all t ≥ 0 we let \(P_{t} = e^{tL}.\) Since L is a rate matrix, (P t ) is a Markov semigroup meaning that P t f ≥ 0 for all \(f \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) with f ≥ 0 and P t 1 = 1.
Lemma 9
Let \(I \subset \mathbb{R}\) be an open interval and \(S: I\mapsto \mathbb{R}\) aC 2 function such that \(S^{{\prime\prime}}(t) \geq \alpha> 0.\) Let \(f \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\) be such that f i ∈ I for all i. Then
Proof
For all u, v ∈ I \(S(v) - S(u) - S^{{\prime}}(u)(v - u) \geq \alpha /2(v - u)^{2}.\) Hence for all i, j
Applying P t to this inequality gives
Hence
Therefore, using the fact that \(\langle P_{t}g,1\rangle _{\pi } =\langle g,1\rangle _{\pi }\) leads to
Dividing by t and letting \(t \rightarrow 0\) leads to the desired inequality. ■
Let \(S:]0,\infty [\mapsto \mathbb{R}\) be a C 2 function with positive second derivative. Let \(H_{\pi }^{S}:\varDelta \mapsto \mathbb{R}\) be the map defined by
Corollary 4
For all x ∈Δ
where \(f_{i} = \frac{x_{i}} {\pi _{i}}\)
Proof
For x ∈ Δ let x(t) = xe tL, \(f_{i} = \frac{x_{i}} {\pi _{i}},\,f_{i}(t) = \frac{x_{i}(t)} {\pi _{i}}\) and \(P_{t}^{{\ast}}g = e^{tL^{{\ast}} }g.\) Note that \(P_{t}^{{\ast}}\)) is the adjoint of P t with respect to \(\langle,\rangle _{\pi }.\)
For all \(g \in \mathbb{R}^{n},\langle x(t),g\rangle =\langle x,P_{t}g\rangle =\langle \, f,P_{t}g\rangle _{\pi } =\langle P_{t}^{{\ast}}f,g\rangle _{\pi }\) so that \(f(t) = P_{t}^{{\ast}}f.\) Hence by the preceding lemma applied to L ∗ it follows that
where \(\alpha =\min _{i}S^{{\prime\prime}}(\frac{x_{i}} {\pi _{i}} )> 0.\) ■
We now prove the Lemma. Set \(S(t) =\int _{ 1}^{t}s(u)du.\) Then for all u ∈ T Δ
and the results follows from Corollary 4.
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Benaim, M. (2015). On Gradient Like Properties of Population Games, Learning Models and Self Reinforced Processes. In: Bourguignon, JP., Jeltsch, R., Pinto, A., Viana, M. (eds) Dynamics, Games and Science. CIM Series in Mathematical Sciences, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16118-1_8
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