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Kimberley as a Means of Promoting Good Governance: The Role of Business

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Abstract

The Kimberley Process stands for involving business in the promotion of human rights if only in singular circumstances. Financing civil wars with stolen diamonds seems strange. But it did happen in Angola and Sierra Leone a while ago. At that time the world diamond business was still being controlled by just one producer plus trader. In retrospect not so surprisingly, De Beers allowed itself being talked into providing active support to the two governments fighting the respective rebellious groups and to a number of other governments appalled at reports of atrocities occurring on both sides but proving reluctant to commit their own soldiers. As a result business, i.e. De Beers, along with governments, mainly of consumer States, started operating a worldwide certification scheme effectively distinguishing between stolen blood diamonds and their legally marketed clones. The bottom line was that the rebels’ financial resources were gradually being dried out while De Beers managed to secure its near monopoly for another decade or so. On other occasions, it may not be that simple to identify equally effective incentives when business is being asked not only to abide by solemn rules of corporate responsibility but to actively promote human rights and good governance. But given the mixed prospects of judicial enforcement, Kimberley should be kept in mind.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For Angola see e.g. U.N. Security Council, Resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/696%281991%29.

  2. 2.

    See e.g. U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1173 (1998) of 12 June 1998, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1173%281998%29.

  3. 3.

    UNGA Resolution 55/56, The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts, of 1 December 2000, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/56&Lang=E.

  4. 4.

    For an explanation of the term see Kobrin (2009), pp. 349 et seq.

  5. 5.

    For the basic documents and current activities see http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.

  6. 6.

    Wallis (2005), pp. 388 et seq.; Haufler (2009), pp. 403 et seq.

  7. 7.

    For the author’s perception of Justice Holmes’ theory of legal realism see Meessen (2004), pp. 45 and 152.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Meessen (2004), pp. 173 et seq.

  9. 9.

    Meessen (2004), pp. 182–193.

  10. 10.

    For a recent principled discussion see Benvenisti (2013), pp. 295 et seq.

  11. 11.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS, pp. 3 et seq.

  12. 12.

    UNGA Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome of 16 September 2005, no. 138.

  13. 13.

    On more than three decades of abortive efforts to draft a code of conduct, see Sagafi-Nejad (2008).

  14. 14.

    For the most recent edition see OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, Paris 2011.

  15. 15.

    UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises of 6 July 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement.

  16. 16.

    See Chapter I (Concepts and Principles) para. 5 of the Guidelines.

  17. 17.

    Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

  18. 18.

    For the text of the Alien Tort Statute, its history and a discussion of the merits of applying it to claims based on violations of human rights, see Hufbauer and Mikrokostas (2003).

  19. 19.

    For a claim for damages under anti-trust law, see e.g. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., U.S. Supreme Court, Judgement of 14 June 2004, 124 S.Ct. 2389.

  20. 20.

    Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2010).

  21. 21.

    As to that distinction and its impact on international antitrust law, see Meessen (1984), pp. 798 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Meessen (1984), p. 800; for later practice see Meessen (2009); for an account of the first 5 years of implementing the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, see Commissioner Ohlhausen of the US Federal Trade Commission, Speech delivered in Beijing, China, on 31 July 2013, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen.shtm.

  23. 23.

    American Law Institute (1987). For the author’s view and ample references to State practice, see Meessen (1984), pp. 802–808; for an update of the discussion of doctrine and case law, see Meessen (2009), nos. 92–116.

  24. 24.

    Leval (2013), pp. 16 et seq.

  25. 25.

    See supra note 10.

  26. 26.

    See the telling ‘Sovereignty-at-Bay’ title of Vernon (1971).

  27. 27.

    See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

  28. 28.

    Girvan (1976), pp. 90 et seq.

  29. 29.

    For an explanation and references see Meessen (2013), para. 246.

  30. 30.

    See supra note 18.

  31. 31.

    For a more extensive explanation, see Meessen (2013), nos. 132–136.

  32. 32.

    http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/About-US/Our-Approach/.

  33. 33.

    See e.g. Wägenbaur (2009), Art. 81 para. 1 EG nos. 244 et seq.

  34. 34.

    For the various devices of disciplining the members of the diamond and other cartels, see Kronstein (1967), pp. 65 et seq.

  35. 35.

    Wallis (2005), p. 400.

  36. 36.

    Meessen (2013), nos. 132 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Haufler (2009), pp. 408–409.

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Meessen, K.M. (2015). Kimberley as a Means of Promoting Good Governance: The Role of Business. In: Bungenberg, M., Hobe, S. (eds) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15738-2_10

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