Abstract
This chapter reviews the development of natural gas—in particular, LNG—in the energy consumption of the European Union since the turn of the millennium. Although the EU’s natural gas consumption has decreased by three percent in 2020 due to the economic decline caused by the corona pandemic, the natural gas share in the EU’s energy consumption continues to grow as the EU implements its carbon–neutral energy policy and Germany is set to shut down its last nuclear power plants by the end of 2022. The increased consumption, combined with the decrease in the EU’s gas production, will further increase the EU’s gas import dependence. In 2020, over 85% of gas consumed in the EU was imported from outside the Union. Russia is the EU’s largest gas supplier. In 2020, its share was 48% of the EU’s total gas imports, including LNG. Russia’s share of the EU’s gas imports will grow in the coming years, as the gas production of the Netherlands—currently the largest gas producer in the EU—plummets in 2022 when the Netherlands has to close the Union’s largest gas field in Groningen. Gas production by Norway, the EU’s second most important external gas supplier, will decrease more rapidly over the next decade. Fortunately, the EU’s gas supply now has a third main pillar—LNG, which in 2020 already contributed a quarter of gas imports into the EU. The LNG share could be even larger, as the Union used half of the nameplate capacity of its LNG ports, and only half of EU member states imported LNG. Since LNG already has a strategic role in the EU’s primary energy consumption, the European Commission should in its plans on security of supply pay more attention to bottlenecks in LNG ports and the ownership of LNG tankers, in addition to the geographical diversification of gas supplies. The LNG boom, which has lasted two decades, has slowed down the EU’s dependence on Russian gas supplies, but the boom is now showing signs of deceleration. The spread of LNG is hindered by factors such as the new gas pipelines from Russia to Europe (Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream). While waiting for the completion of Nord Stream 2, Germany—the world’s second largest gas importer—has not constructed a single LNG receiving port on its soil. Although it is possible that Germany could build one or two large-scale LNG terminals, it is evident that the pipelines will continue to dominate the gas supply of the EU’s largest gas consumer. In addition to the pipelines, the Green Deal and the associated hydrogen revolution will also increase uncertainty among member states with an interest in LNG. This is because the LNG boom may gradually be replaced by a hydrogen boom.
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Notes
- 1.
Europe, excluding Russia, accounted for less than two percent of the globe’s total proved natural gas reserves in 2019 (BP, 2020).
- 2.
In 2020, natural gas consumption of the EU27 was 394 bcm (European Commission, 2020c).
- 3.
In 2020, the EU27 produced 54 bcm of natural gas (European Commission, 2020c).
- 4.
The share of natural gas of the EU’s primary energy consumption is around two percentage points lower than the global average. In other words, the EU is less orientated towards natural gas than the world on average (BP, 2020).
- 5.
The FSRU in the Kaliningrad region has an annual capacity of nearly four billion cubic metres (GIE, 2019), while the region’s gas consumption is around two billion cubic metres (Usanov & Kharin, 2014). At the 50% capacity utilisation rate, the FSRU could cover the entire gas consumption of the region, i.e. without gas transit via Belarus and Lithuania. However, the FSRU has not been used to supply energy to the region, except during test runs. In fact, at the start of 2021, the Kaliningrad FSRU unit was leased out for LNG transit between Africa and China (Pipeline & Gas Journal, 2021), which suggests that, despite the cold relations between the EU and Russia, the geopolitical situation in Europe has not reached a point where Russia would deem it necessary to return the FSRU to Kaliningrad.
- 6.
The Bratsvo (Brotherhood) pipeline was completed in the late 1960s, and Soyuz (Union) in the latter half of the 1970s. Both pipelines travel across Ukraine to the European Union (UA Transmission System Operator, 2021). Further pipelines have been built from Russia to the west, including Yamal-Europe across Belarus (1996), Blue Stream beneath the Black Sea to Turkey (2003), the sub-Baltic Sea pipeline Nord Stream to Germany (2011) and a second sub-Black Sea pipeline to Turkey, TurkStream (2020) (EIA, 2021; Gazprom, 2021a).
- 7.
The Russo-Georgian War (2008) and the Ukraine War (since 2014) have not had a notable impact on the EU’s energy purchases from Russia. Although the volume of crude oil imports from Russia fell by approximately 15% between 2010 and 2018, the volumes of gas imports and hard coal imports increased by 25 and 60%, respectively (European Commission, 2020a). It should be noted that in 2019, member states purchased mineral fuels from Russia at a value of nearly EUR 100,000 million, which corresponds to two thirds of the EU’s total imports of goods from Russia (European Commission, 2020d).
- 8.
Three quarters of Croatia’s natural gas came from Hungary in 2019. Because Hungary imports virtually all of its natural gas supply from Russia, it would be appropriate to place an equal sign between deliveries from Hungary and Russia (Eurostat, 2021a). In other words, Croatia should be placed alongside Latvia, Romania and Slovakia in Table 2.1.
- 9.
It is technically possible to increase the capacity of Inčukalns to 3.2 bcm (Conexus Baltic Grid, 2021).
- 10.
The Trans-Mediterranean natural gas (Transmed) pipeline is nearly a 2,500-kilometre pipe from Algeria via Tunisia to Italy. The construction of the pipe was completed in 1983. The annual capacity of the pipe is more than 30 bcm (Hydrocarbons Technology, 2021). In turn, the 500-kilometre Greenstream underwater pipeline connects Libya and Italy. The annual capacity of this pipe is over ten billion cubic metres per year (GEM, 2020). Due to the social turbulence in North African countries after the Arab Spring in 2011, supply cuts and supply irregularities have occurred in the pipe between Libya and Italy. In addition to the North African pipes, Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), connecting Azerbaijan via Turkey, Greece and Albania to Italy was put into operation in December 2020 (IGU, 2021). The current operational capacity of the pipe is ten billion cubic metres but the pipe can be expanded to deliver 20 bcm per annum (TAP, 2021). TAP began its operation in December 2020 (European Commission, 2020c).
- 11.
In January 2020, the EU consumed 50 bcm of natural gas (European Commission, 2020c).
- 12.
China, Russia’s eastern neighbour, is considerably less dependent on Russian fossil fuels compared to the EU. Russia contributes only 15% of China’s crude oil imports and two percent of its oil product imports. In 2019, Russia contributed just three percent of China’s natural gas imports, including LNG. Although Russia’s share in China’s natural gas imports is set to increase in the coming years, China’s dependence on Russian energy will still be nowhere near as high as the European Union’s dependence (BP, 2020; Liuhto, 2019). On the other hand, China is dependent on natural gas imports, although currently not specifically on imports from Russia. In 2019, China’s gas import dependence was already 45%. Ten years earlier, it was only 15% (O’Sullivan, 2021).
- 13.
The EU as a whole is not particularly dependent on electricity imports from third countries (European Commission, 2019b; Eurostat, 2020c). Finland and Lithuania are the only member states currently importing electricity from Russia (INTERRAO, 2021). The share of Russian electricity in Finland’s electricity consumption was only around three percent in 2020 (Finnish Energy, 2020). In Lithuania, the share of electricity imported from Russia is significantly higher. In 2018, it was approximately a third of Lithuania’s electricity consumption (IAEA, 2020; INTERRAO, 2021). On the other hand, although Lithuania imported six terawatt hours of electricity from Russia, it exported four terawatt hours to other countries according to 2019 figures (INTERRAO, 2021; KNOEMA, 2021). Since electricity is perhaps the most sensitive energy to react to geopolitical changes, reducing its import dependence should be among the European Commission’s top priorities.
- 14.
In the 4th quarter of 2020, Norway’s share in the EU’s LNG imports was just 0.1% due to a fire incident in the Hammerfest LNG plant. The plant is estimate to work normally in October 2021 (European Commission, 2020c).
- 15.
‘China is aiming to grow its transmission pipeline network by 60% by 2025. … China is also aiming to raise storage capacity to 10% of its demand’ (IGU, 2020b, 5). “China is aiming to grow its transmission pipeline network by 60% by 2025. … China is also aiming to raise storage capacity to 10% of its demand” (IGU, 2020b, 5). China imported over 130 bcm of natural gas in 2019 (BP, 2020).
- 16.
The value of the US LNG supply to the EU in 2019 was EUR 2.6 billion (European Commission, 2019a), which corresponds to only one percent of the total value of goods exports from the USA to the EU (European Commission, 2020e). Even if the US LNG exports to the EU may grow, the USA would still see the LNG exports more as a way to protect NATO partners from Russia’s leverage, rather than as a money-making opportunity.
- 17.
The capacity utilisation rate of Lithuania’s terminal was just under 50% in 2019 (IGU, 2020a).
- 18.
- 19.
When analysing Germany’s gas imports from the Netherlands, it is important to remember that in 2019, the Netherlands was already importing around a quarter of its natural gas from Russia, and the share of Russian gas is likely to grow significantly in the coming years (Eurostat, 2021a).
- 20.
There is some scepticism about the capacity of the Ukraine network to transmit Russian natural gas (Bochkarev, 2021).
- 21.
- 22.
There are two natural gas pipes between Algeria and Spain, namely Medgaz (a 200-kilometre subsea pipe with a capacity of some 8 bcm) and Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (capacity over 10 bcm). Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline travels from Algeria via Morocco to Spain and further to Portugal (EMPL, 2021; NS Energy, 2021).
- 23.
- 24.
The capacity utilisation rate of the EU’s LNG import terminals is slightly higher than the global average. The average global utilisation rate of LNG terminals was approximately 45% in 2019 (IGU, 2020a).
- 25.
‘The UK has always been playing an important role as berthing site of LNG vessels for continental Europe and shipments are transported to Europe via gas interconnectors with Belgium and the Netherlands. However, during the winter period LNG shipments rather serve for domestic consumption in the UK, especially regarding the limited storage capacities’ (European Commission, 2020c, 14).
- 26.
- 27.
The capacity of Zeebrugge LNG terminal is to be expanded by eight billion cubic metres by 2026 (OGJ, 2021a).
- 28.
El Musel LNG terminal in Gijon with an annual capacity of seven billion cubic metres was completed in 2021 but it was mothballed and it has not been put into operation (GEM, 2021b).
- 29.
The Maltese LNG unit has a strategic importance to Malta’s energy supply, as the country may satisfy all its natural gas needs with this terminal. Natural gas provided nearly a half of Malta’s overall energy supply in 2018 (IEA, 2021a).
- 30.
- 31.
Of the four LNG terminals being planned in Germany, only the Rostock unit is on the Baltic Sea coast, and it is not a large-scale unit. The Nordic countries currently have no plans to construct any large-scale terminals on their soil. The large-scale LNG terminal plans of Estonia and Latvia may not come to fruition, and Lithuania has no need for a larger LNG terminal. Russia already has an FSRU unit that can service the Kaliningrad region. In summary, it is possible that after the large-scale LNG projects of Poland, only small-scale and medium-scale LNG import terminals will be constructed in the Baltic Sea region.
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Liuhto, K. (2022). Natural Gas in the EU in the Twenty-First Century: A Special Emphasis on LNG. In: Liuhto, K. (eds) The Future of Energy Consumption, Security and Natural Gas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80367-4_2
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