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The Pursuit of Stability of the Euro Area as a Whole pp 95–160Cite as

Longstanding Sources of Instability: The Current Deficits of the Economic Union

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Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 18))

Abstract

This chapter will identify the main deficits, which are preventing the economic governance from fully achieving the objective of the stability of the euro area as a whole. These are essentially three. First, the limits of the existing legal basis have been the cause of the legal incoherence of the reforms, as well as the wide use of intergovernmental agreements beyond EU law (so called ‘flight into international law’). Second, the reforms introduced to fulfil consolidation and stabilisation policies in the euro area have proven to be substantially ineffective, meaning unable to contribute to the cause of stability. This depends on the scarce credibility of economic sanctions and legal prohibitions, as well as the wide political discretion of the peer-review surveillance on national economic policies. Finally, the democratic deficit has prevented the governance from fully taking into consideration the requests and interests of the people affected by its policies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Decision 2010/281 of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a Securities Markets Programme; Decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 6 September 2012 on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright monetary transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (the OMT decisions); Press Release of the ECB, 22 January 2015 (Quantitative Easing decision).

  2. 2.

    European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation (2017).

  3. 3.

    Schwarz (2014), Ziller (2015), p. 28; Lo Schiavo (2017), p. 143.

  4. 4.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 167. On the use of enhanced cooperation see Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 175.

  5. 5.

    Art. 136 TFEU may represent the ‘locus of true expansion’ for new competences to the EU. See Ioannidis (2016), p. 1270. Accordingly, the norm may behave similarly to art. 114 TFUE for the setup of the single market. See Beukers (2013), pp. 11–12.

  6. 6.

    Leino-Sandberg and Salminen (2017), p. 77. Notably recommendations are non-binding and their legality cannot be reviewed by the ECJ . It is nevertheless unlikely that the mandate under art. 121 TFEU, also in combination with art. 136 TFEU, allows to pass from non-binding instruments to binding instruments. Ibid., p. 78.

  7. 7.

    On the innovative nature of the reverse majority voting see Bauer and Becker (2014), pp. 219–220; Seikel (2016), pp. 1405–1408.

  8. 8.

    Häde (2010), p. 921; Ruffert (2011), pp. 1800–1806; Calliess (2011–2012), p. 116; Fischer-Lescano and Oberndorfer (2013), p. 12; Ohler (2014), p. 128; Palmstorfer (2014), pp. 201–202; Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 170–171; Grimm (2016), pp. 132, 145.

  9. 9.

    Notably art. 16(3) TEU states that the Council shall always act by standard qualified majority, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. Also, the Court of Justice has interpreted the principle of conferral in the sense that EU institutions shall not modify the norms regulating their own functioning, except if the Treaty expressly allows them to do so. See ECJ , Judgment of 6 May 2008, Case C-133/06, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2008: 257, para 54.

  10. 10.

    See Leino-Sandberg and Salminen (2017), p. 78.

  11. 11.

    Palmstorfer (2014), p. 197.

  12. 12.

    In this regard, it should be noted that art. 126(13) TFEU refers specifically to the use of standard qualified majority to be defined in accordance with art. 238(3) TFEU.

  13. 13.

    Palmstorfer (2014), p. 201.

  14. 14.

    The choice of art. 121(6) TFEU depended on the fact that art. 136(1) TFEU expressly excludes the procedures set out in art. 126(14) TFEU from its margin of action. On this topic see Antpöhler (2012), p. 378.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Palmstorfer (2014), pp. 196–197.

  16. 16.

    Some authors tried to argue the legality of the RMV on the fact, they apply only to new sanctions , which are not mentioned in primary law, thus avoiding any direct conflict with the EU Treaty. Others suggested, semi-automatic sanctions might be qualified as implementing acts of the Commission, which might be justified on the basis of art. 291(2) TFEU. Cf. Palmstorfer (2014), pp. 199–201. More in general, even if semi-automatic sanctions aim to change the nature of coordination, thus posing a potentially threat to the conferral principle, their introduction should still be accepted as long as they succeed making budgetary discipline more effective. See Allemand and Martucci (2012), p. 72; Beukers (2013), p. 15.

  17. 17.

    If the norms of the Six Pack are not consistent with primary law, they may be subject to an action for annulment ex art. 263 TFEU. However, such perspective has now become impossible, because art. 263(6) TFEU sets a deadline of 2 months from the publication of the act to start an annulment procedure. A preliminary-reference procedure is unlikely, but not impossible. See Palmstorfer (2014), p. 202.

  18. 18.

    See Calliess (2012), p. 108; Allemand and Martucci (2012), p. 78; De Streel and Etienne (2012), pp. 184–185; Baratta (2013), p. 52.

  19. 19.

    The fact that the ESM is an autonomous legal entity with legal personality, distinct from the participating Member States does not make it fall outside art. 125 TFEU. The ESM is in fact an emanation of the participating Member States, which are its owners. Like the EFSF, the ESM is assimilated to the Member States in the sense of art. 125 TFEU and fall within its scope of application ratione personae. See View of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, para. 110; De Gregorio Merino (2012), p. 1626; Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 123.

  20. 20.

    See Ruffert (2011), p. 1785; Hoffmeister (2011), pp. 120–123; Hentschelmann (2011), p. 286; Ruffert (2013), p. 258; Manzini (2013), pp. 38–40; Häde (2016), Artikel 125 AEUV, paras 11, 12; Grimm (2016), pp. 81–83; Ketterer (2016), p. 248.

  21. 21.

    In this sense, the principle of no-bailout follows the principle of subsidiarity. See Tufano (2002), p. 508.

  22. 22.

    According to art. 25(2) TESM, if a Member State fails to meet the required payment under a capital call, a revised increased capital call shall be made to all the other countries. This may be in contrast with the no bailout principle. See Beck (2014), pp. 548–549.

  23. 23.

    See Ketterer (2016), pp. 217–218.

  24. 24.

    See Ruffert (2013), p. 258; Tomkin (2013), p. 75; Beck (2014), pp. 547–548; Ketterer (2016), pp. 229–231; Grimm (2016), pp. 66–69.

  25. 25.

    On the sovereign debt crisis in Cyprus cf. Vellano (2013).

  26. 26.

    See Ruffert (2011), p. 1786; De Witte and Beukers (2013), pp. 842–843; Ketterer (2016), pp. 232–233.

  27. 27.

    See Hoffmeister (2011), p. 122. Furthermore, art. 125 TFEU consists of a lex generalis, against the lex specialis of art. 122(2) TFEU, which allows the provision of financial support in exceptional circumstances. If financial support could be always given, there was no need for art. 122 (2) TFEU. See Ketterer (2016), pp. 223–224.

  28. 28.

    Most academic doctrine does not share an absolute interpretation of art. 125 TFEU. See Tosato (2010), Herrmann (2010), p. 415; Della Cananea (2011), Thymes and Wendel (2012), pp. 743–748, 754; Smits (2012), p. 828; Bandilla (2017), Artikel 25 AEUV, paras 31–32.

  29. 29.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, para. 130.

  30. 30.

    Ibid. para. 132.

  31. 31.

    Ibid. para. 131.

  32. 32.

    Ibid. paras. 135–136. Beck strongly criticised the Pringle judgment for the exasperation of the teleological approach and extreme literal interpretation, which leads it to absurdity. See Beck (2014), pp. 548–549.

  33. 33.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, para. 136.

  34. 34.

    Cf. supra Sect. 3.6.3.

  35. 35.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 135. On the ultima ratio interpretation see Tuori (2012), pp. 24–25.

  36. 36.

    The Court comes to this opinion also considering the preparatory works relating to the Treaty of Maastricht according to which the aim of art. 125 TFEU is to ensure that Member States follow a sound budgetary policy . See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 135. Borger noticed that the Court could not present the objective of safeguarding the financial stability of the monetary union as a new interpretation of art. 125 TFEU following from Decision 2011/199/EU, as this would have led to an implicit modification of the no bailout clause . See Borger (2013b), p. 135.

  37. 37.

    Tuori and Tuori call it the ‘two-level teleology’. See Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 129.

  38. 38.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 136.

  39. 39.

    View of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, para 139.

  40. 40.

    Ibid. para 140.

  41. 41.

    In favour of the consistency of rescue mechanism with the principle of solidarity see Borger (2013a), pp. 25–26; Bandilla (2017) Artikel 25 AEUV, para 31.

  42. 42.

    View of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, paras 142–143.

  43. 43.

    According to some authors, the Court supported a new interpretation of art. 125 TFEU with the intention to provide a judicial legitimation to a political decision. See Kerber (2013), pp. 10–11; Beck (2014), p. 550.

  44. 44.

    Borger identifies two concepts of solidarity. ‘Factual solidarity’ is a result of the mutual interdependence between Member States of the Union. The introduction of a single currency has indeed strengthened integration within the euro area, making the default of one Member State dangerous for the economic stability of the others. On the other hand, ‘normative solidarity’ derives from the belonging of Member States to the same community and the pursuit of the common good. Evidently both dimensions of the principle apply in relation to the rescue strategy adopted to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. See Borger (2013a), pp. 10–11.

  45. 45.

    The CJEU indeed stressed that assistance granted by the ESM does not consist of subsides, but of loans, which must be paid to the ESM, including an appropriate margin. See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 139. Iaonnidis noticed, however, the credit provided by the ESM contains ‘subsidized interest rates that are significantly lower than market rates’. Ioannidis (2016), p. 1260. The purchase of bonds on the secondary market is legally controversial, as it sorts the effect of discharging the issuing state’s commitment to the former creditor and to upset normal market conditions. See Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 126; Schepel (2017), p. 88.

  46. 46.

    The crisis might have determined an ‘Abirrung der Markte’ (aberration/mistake of the markets), which prevents it from having a regulatory role. See Nettesheim (2012), p. 63. Markets have not always been able to exercise an effective regulatory role. Cf. De Gregorio Merino (2012), p. 1627; Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 127–128.

  47. 47.

    ECJ , Judgment of 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler (and Others) v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 72, 74.

  48. 48.

    ‘Spreads always only result from the market participants’ expectations and are, regardless of their rationality, essential for market-based pricing. To single out and neutralise supposedly identifiable individual causes would be tantamount to an arbitrary interference with market [..]. Ultimately, the distinction between rational and irrational is meaningless in this context and can in any case not be operationalised’. Order of German Federal Constitutional Court , 14 January 2014, [2 BvR 2728/13], para 98.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Ioannidis (2016), p. 1259.

  50. 50.

    See Richter (2013), Article 125 TFEU, para 5.

  51. 51.

    A number of economists and think tanks have already developed some detailed analysis on the project, highlighting the technical options and the legal challenges of the so called ‘Eurobonds ’. The European Commission itself endorsed the idea of Eurozone-joint stability bond in a Green Paper published in 2011. See European Commission Communication (2011).

  52. 52.

    See Adamski (2012), p. 1331; Craig (2013), p. 9.

  53. 53.

    In this regard Adamski believes that Greece received ‘funds on preferential terms’. Adamski (2012), p. 1331. On the sustainability of Greek debt cf. infra Sects. 4.3.3.2 and 5.3.2.1.2.

  54. 54.

    See Eurogroup statement on Greece , 15 June 2018. Greece officially concluded its ESM financial assistance programme in August 2018. It should be noted that in May 2019 the EFSF decided to the return to Greece €103 million euros paid between January 1 to 17 June 2018, in relation to an interest rate hike provided by the MoU , and to suspend a similar increase related to the period June 17, 2018-June 17, 2019, which will save the Greek government € 226 million. See Press Release, ‘ESM formally approves more than 970 million of debt relief for Greece ’, 2 May 2019.

  55. 55.

    De Witte and Beukers (2013), pp. 839–840; Cisotta (2015), pp. 291–292; Palm (2017), Artikel 136 AEUV, para. 57.

  56. 56.

    Thymes and Wendel (2012), p. 748.

  57. 57.

    In Decision 2011/199/EU amending art. 136 TFEU the European Council clearly stated that art. 122(2) TFEU shall not be applied to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. See Whereas (4) European Council Decision 2011/199/EU.

  58. 58.

    The fiscal crisis in countries like Greece does not fit definition as it is the consequence of chronical budgetary mismanagement. See De Gregorio Merino (2012), p. 1634; Vogel (2012), pp. 463–464; Tosato (2012) p. 687; De Witte and Beukers (2013), p. 810.

  59. 59.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras 65, 120.

  60. 60.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 69.

  61. 61.

    Ibid. paras 112–113.

  62. 62.

    See De Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (2013), p. 44; Schwarz (2014), p. 412; Poulou (2017), pp. 996–997.

  63. 63.

    See art. 10, art. 11, art. 12 and art. 13 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013.

  64. 64.

    Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece ), March 2012.

  65. 65.

    Before 2013, the measures directed to countries that received assistance from the EFSF or the ESM, except from formally non-binding Memoranda of Understanding, also took the form of decisions of the Council ex art. 126(6) or (9) TFEU together with art. 136 TFEU. See Ioannidis (2016), p. 1269.

  66. 66.

    The Council decision approving the MAP is binding and its legality can be reviewed by the ECJ . See Leino-Sandberg and Salminen (2017), p. 78. Looking more into details, they have a similar content, but not identical. In particular, the MoUs are longer and more detailed than the decisions of the Council. The loan agreement between the recipient country and the ESM recalls both documents, by acknowledging they have the same legal status. See Poulou (2017), p. 1002.

  67. 67.

    ECJ Judgment of 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd. and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. Cf. Estella (2018), pp. 226–231.

  68. 68.

    Ioannidis (2014), pp. 34–35. Conditionality policy consists of a form of ‘imposition’, rather than coordination. Munari (2018), p. 362.

  69. 69.

    Art. 12 (1) TESM states that conditionality may range ‘from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous respect of pre-established eligibility conditions’ and ‘it should reflect the severity of the weakness to be addresses and the financial assistance chosen. According to art. 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, ‘macroeconomic adjustment programme shall address the specific risks emanating from that Member State for the financial stability in the euro area and shall aim at rapidly re-establishing a sound and sustainable economic and financial situation and restoring the Member State’s capacity to finance itself fully on the financial markets’.

  70. 70.

    Cf. Rossolillo (2018), p. 141.

  71. 71.

    See Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 189; Ioannidis (2016), pp. 1271–1272.

  72. 72.

    The influence that the ESM can exercise on the budgetary policy of Member States depends on their financial strength, and indirectly on their populations (as decisions are taken on the basis of capital contribution). See Dawson and de Witte (2013), p. 838.

  73. 73.

    Munari (2015), pp. 741–743.

  74. 74.

    Order of the General Court, 27 November 2012, Case T-541/10, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626.

  75. 75.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para.180.

  76. 76.

    ECJ Judgement of 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Konstantinos Mallis and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:C:2016:702. For an analysis of the case cf. Cafari Panico (2017), pp. 295–296.

  77. 77.

    In Åklagaren case the CJEU clarified that ‘the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must [..] be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law’. ECJ judgment of 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 21. Accordingly, the EUCFR should be applied when there is direct link between a national (austerity) measure and an act of the Union, meaning any lacuna in the implementation of the austerity measures may cause a violation of both the MoU and the Council Decision ex art. 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, thus leading to a suspension of financial assistance . On the relevance of the Åklagaren case law see Pistoia (2018), pp. 83–84.

  78. 78.

    On the hybrid nature of conditionality policy cf. Sect. 4.2.6.

  79. 79.

    On the connection between conditionality and EU law see Hinarejos (2015), pp. 134–135; Craig (2017), p. 245. Poulou recalls the Wachauf judgment (ECJ Judgment of 13 July 1989, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, C-5/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321), according to which Member States act like agents of the Union, why they apply regulations, directives or decisions of the Council. Poulou (2017), pp. 1021–1022. In the Florescu case, the Court has qualified a MoU stipulated between the European Commission and Romania in the framework of financial assistance ex art. 143 TFEU, as an act of EU law. The latter can be therefore subject to an action of annulment. The Court based its decision on the fact that the MoU has a clear legal basis in the EU Treaties and it was concluded with the European Union. See ECJ Judgment of 13 June 2017, Case C-258/12, Eugenia Florescu and Others v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:448. On the analysis of the case cf. Markakis and Dermine (2018).

  80. 80.

    Bernard (2013), p. 267.

  81. 81.

    ‘[T]he Member States are entitled, in areas which do not fall under the exclusive competence of the Union, to entrust tasks to the institutions, outside the framework of the Union, [..] provided that those tasks do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and FEU Treaties’. ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para 158.

  82. 82.

    ECJ Judgment of 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:C:2016:701.

  83. 83.

    The applicability of the EUCFR to the Council should be less controversial as it participated in the definition of conditionality policy through a decision adopted in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013.

  84. 84.

    For an analysis of the case cf. Poulou (2017), pp. 1008–1009, 1013–1014; Cafari Panico (2017), pp. 293–295.

  85. 85.

    ECJ Judgement of 13 July 2018, Case T-680/13, Dr. K. Chrysostomides & Co. LLC and Others v Council of the European Union and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2018:486, paras 109–110; ECJ Judgment, Case T-786/14, 13 July 2018, Eleni Pavlikka Bourdouvali and Others v Council of the European Union and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2018:487, paras 105–106. It should be noted that the Council has appealed both rulings. See C-597/18 P; C-598/18 P). An action of annulment is excluded because the Eurogroup is not an EU body within the meaning of art. 263 TFEU. Ibid. para. 105.

  86. 86.

    Poulou (2017), pp. 1012–1013.

  87. 87.

    ECJ Judgment of 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, para. 71. The strengthening of economic integration has determined a compression of social rights of EU citizens. It is regrettable the CJEU has normally preferred to privilege the sustainability of public finances over the protection of fundamental individual rights. On the relevant case law cf. Cafari Panico (2017), pp. 306–311. On the possible ways to balance fiscal stability with the protection of the fundamental rights in the EU legal system cf. Condinanzi (2016), pp. 249–252.

  88. 88.

    See Häde (2012), pp. 15–16.

  89. 89.

    See Craig (2012), pp. 238–241; Tomkin (2013), pp. 79–81, Dimopoulos (2014), pp. 62–63.

  90. 90.

    Delors ‘Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community’, 17th April 1989, p. 14.

  91. 91.

    Miglio (2015), pp. 157–158.

  92. 92.

    In perspective, the TSCG does foresee an incorporation clause, according to which within 5 years of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Member States shall take the necessary step to incorporate its substance into the legal framework of the EU.

  93. 93.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras 92, 101. According to Munari, in the Pringle case the CJEU allowed Member States to sign intergovernmental agreements that overlap EU competences but are external to the Union, as long as these international obligations respect EU law. This represents a step backwards with regards to the parallelism of internal and external competences affirmed in in the ERTA case law. Munari (2015), p. 735; Munari (2018), p. 360.

  94. 94.

    Art. 1 TSCG explains the Fiscal Compact aims to ‘strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact , to strengthen the coordination of their economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area’. Art. 3 TESM states that ‘the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support under strict conditionality , appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems’.

  95. 95.

    Art. 3 TESM recalls the objective. The TSCG explains in the Preamble that the strengthening of fiscal consolidation, which is the formal objective of the agreement, aims to pursue the stability of the euro area as a whole .

  96. 96.

    Calliess (2012), p. 105.

  97. 97.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras. 120–121.

  98. 98.

    Notably the ‘comunitarisation’ of the intergovernmental procedures started by the Two Pack aimed to avoid inconsistencies between the MoU and EU law. See supra Sect. 3.6.3.

  99. 99.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras 170–177. On the role of the CJEU in the TESM cf. Miglio (2015), pp. 162–166; Pistoia (2018), pp. 92–96. According Ziller the conferral of this task to the CJEU is the only provision of the TSCG, which could not have been adopted on the basis of secondary law. Ziller (2015), p. 29.

  100. 100.

    See ECJ Judgment of 30 June 1993, Joined Cases C - 181/91 and C-248/91 Parliament v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:271; ECJ Judgment of 2 March 1994, Case C-316/91 Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1994:76.

  101. 101.

    ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para 158.

  102. 102.

    See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland , ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 165.

  103. 103.

    As the ECB is provided with strong independence, the Advocate General has highlighted that the TESM cannot oblige it to perform specific tasks, but these must be accepted voluntarily. See See View of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012 (1) Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, paras 180–181.

  104. 104.

    The involvement of EU institutions in the TSCG is less controversial. The Fiscal Compact does not modify the competences of EU institutions, but only integrates their functions. See Peroni (2012), p. 182. The tasks granted to the Commission are fully in line with its function of supervisor of European fiscal rules under the SGP . The involvement of the CJEU is also acceptable under the arbitration clause ex art. 273 TFEU being the object of the TSCG in wide party falling within the scope of the EU Treaties. More controversial is the setup of the Euro Summit , which may de facto undermine the prerogatives of the Ecofin Council and European Council in the process of economic coordination . On the involvement of EU institutions in the TSCG cf. Pistoia (2018), pp. 134–142.

  105. 105.

    See Hinarejos (2015), p. 75.

  106. 106.

    See Darvas and Leandro (2016), Efstathiou and Wolff (2018), European Parliament Briefing (2018), European Commission Communication (2018b) and European Commission Press Release (2019).

  107. 107.

    See Castaneda and Schwartz (2017); Eurostat, ‘Provision of deficit and debt data for 2017 - first notification’, 69/2018 – 23 April 2018.

  108. 108.

    See Haroutunian et al. (2018).

  109. 109.

    According to Adamski, a non-credible threat is a ‘threat that the player making it would not find optimal to actually undertake if called upon to do so’. Adamski (2016), p. 190.

  110. 110.

    On the scarce effectiveness of sanctions , see Amtenbirik and De Haan (2003), p. 1091; Louis (2004) pp. 577–579.

  111. 111.

    See Adamski (2012), pp. 1341–1342; Adamski (2016), pp. 191–192; Adamski (2018), p. 44.

  112. 112.

    See Chiti and Teixeira (2013), p. 689.

  113. 113.

    See Palmstorfer (2014), pp. 190–191; Allemand et al. (2016), p. 159.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    This is especially true if we take into consideration secondary indicators, which have not been clearly specified. Although the choice of indicators is in some cases innovative, it still lacks a clear methodology. Most probably, the elaboration of the scoreboard has been more the result of a political compromise within the Council, than a coherent analysis of economic imbalances and their causes. See Solomos and Koumparoulis (2012), pp. 300–301; Kegels and Verlinden (2013), pp. 58–59, 62. On the weak application of the MIP see Adamski (2018), pp. 63–65.

  116. 116.

    ECJ Judgment of 13 July 2004 on the affair C-27/04, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2004:436, para 80.

  117. 117.

    Council Decision of 21 January 2003 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany—Application of Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, (2003) OJ L 34/16; Council Decision of 3 June 2003 on the existence of an excessive deficit in France—application of Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, (2003) OJ L 165/29. On the case see Adamski (2018), pp. 38–41.

  118. 118.

    On the analysis of the case see Palmstorfer (2014), pp. 190–191; Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 105–106.

  119. 119.

    A sanction effectively adopted in the framework of the SGP was the fine imposed to Spain for the manipulation of statistics in accordance with art. 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011. Spain challenged the fine in the Case C-521/15. Cf. Chamon (2018).

  120. 120.

    On the soft approach adopted by the European Commission in the enforcement of the new rules of economic coordination see Adamski (2018), pp. 59–63.

  121. 121.

    See Council Recommendation for the necessary policy measures based on art. 121(4); Council Decision based on art. 126 (6) on the existence of an excessive deficit.

  122. 122.

    See Adamski (2012), pp. 1341–1342. On the possible equilibria within the Council for a RMV voting cf. Seikel (2016), pp. 1405–1408.

  123. 123.

    Fabbrini (2016), p. 61.

  124. 124.

    In order to work, the logic of the market needs that creditors are afraid of losing their money. Schepel (2017), pp. 81, 85.

  125. 125.

    See Louis (2010), p. 979; Estella (2016), p. 525. In this regard Menendez recalled Lon Fuller’s law: ‘you shall not pass laws impossible to comply with’. See Menendez (2014), p. 136.

  126. 126.

    See Hinarejos (2015), p. 57.

  127. 127.

    ECJ Judgment of 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler (and Others) v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 72.

  128. 128.

    Schepel strongly criticised the correction of the market logic through the intervention of the ESM and the ECB . Schepel (2017), p. 96. On the transformation of the economic constitution from the market paradigm to conditional financial assistance see Ioannidis (2016), pp. 1263–1274. Tuori and Tuori speak of ‘constitutional mutation’ of the economic union also due to the strengthening of coordination, the widening of surveillance to macroeconomic imbalances and the setup of crisis management tools. See Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 192.

  129. 129.

    Ohler (2011), p. 69.

  130. 130.

    Ibid. p. 69. For example, despite the IMF having declared that Greek debt had become unsustainable in 2016, the creditor countries of the ESM decided to continue financial assistance without demanding debt restructuration . Zettelmeyer (2018), p. 72.

  131. 131.

    Panizza (2014), p. 5; Audit (2014), pp. 218–220; Fuest et al. (2014), p. 311–312. According to Zettelmeyer the fact that the Greek debt restructuration was only partially successful proves the scarce effectiveness of CACs. Zettelmeyer (2018), p. 72.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., p. 71.

  133. 133.

    Ohler (2011), p. 69.

  134. 134.

    Audit (2014), p. 219.

  135. 135.

    European Commission Report (2017).

  136. 136.

    See Fromage and Dermine (2017). For an overlook of the different implementation of the TSCG see the EUI euro-crisis project report. www.eurocrisislaw.eui.eu.

  137. 137.

    ‘[A]s soon as France has ratified the Treaty and it has entered into force, the rules laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 3 will apply to it; […] pursuant to Article 55 of the Constitution, it will be hierarchically superior to legislation; […] it will be for the different organs of State to monitor the application of this Treaty, within the scope of their respective competences; [the] Parliament will be in particular required to comply with its provisions when enacting finance laws and social security financing laws’. Decision No 2012-653 DC of the Conseil Constitutionnel on 9 August 2012, para. 18.

  138. 138.

    European Commission Report (2017), p. 4.

  139. 139.

    See Fromage (2017), p. 124.

  140. 140.

    Ibid. pp. 128–130.

  141. 141.

    See Adamski (2018), pp. 66–69.

  142. 142.

    See Fromage (2017), pp. 133–136; Horvath (2018), pp. 517–518.

  143. 143.

    See Fromage (2017), p. 138.

  144. 144.

    Gros and Alcidi (2014), p. 2. On this topic cf. also Chalmers (2012), pp. 682–683; Menendez (2014), pp. 136–137.

  145. 145.

    See Fabbrini (2016), pp. 45–46.

  146. 146.

    Boggero and Annicchino (2014), p. 260.

  147. 147.

    Ibid. See also Adamski (2018), pp. 66–69.

  148. 148.

    See Gros and Alcidi (2014), p. 3.

  149. 149.

    The costs of the approved bailout consist of Ireland €40.2 billion; Greece €308 billions; Spain €100 billions; Portugal €52 billions; Cyprus €9 billions. See Estella (2016), pp. 507–508.

  150. 150.

    See Peroni (2012), pp. 167. See infra Sect. 5.6.3.1.

  151. 151.

    See supra Sect. 3.6.2.

  152. 152.

    Lo Schiavo (2017), pp. 140–142. More in general on the direct recapitalization instrument see Corti Varela (2015).

  153. 153.

    The empowering of creditor States was also encouraged by the introduction of RMV in the decision-making process regulating the MSP and the EDP . Menendez (2014), p. 135.

  154. 154.

    These are Germany, Estonia, Austria, Slovakia, Finland and the Netherlands.

  155. 155.

    See Hinarejos (2013), pp. 1632–1633.

  156. 156.

    ‘Cyprus successfully exits ESM programme’, ESM Press Release, 31 March 2016; ‘Post-Programme Surveillance report. Ireland , Autumn 2017’, 16 February 2018; ‘Statement by the staff of the European Commission and the European Central Bank following the ninth post-programme surveillance visit to Spain ,’ 16 April 2018; Statement by European Commission and European Central Bank staff following the Eight Post-Programme Surveillance mission to Portugal , 15 June 2018.

  157. 157.

    ‘Eurogroup statement on Greece ’, 15 June 2018. On the current economic situation in Greece see Avgouleas et al. (2018).

  158. 158.

    On the violation of human rights in the Member States following the application of austerity measures see Salomon (2015), Hinarejos (2016), p. 243; O’Gorman (2017).

  159. 159.

    On the negative consequences of austerity measures on the public opinion, social conditions and the economy see Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 235–236; Wilkinson (2015), p. 1072, Estella (2016), pp. 534–535.

  160. 160.

    See Bantekas and Vivien (2016), pp. 562–563.

  161. 161.

    See Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 189–190; Adamski (2016), p. 198; Murswiek (2016), pp. 51–52.

  162. 162.

    Hinarejos (2013), p. 1628.

  163. 163.

    Indeed, governments imposing heavy budget cuts are likely to lose the next general elections. Leino-Sandberg and Salminen (2017), p. 102.

  164. 164.

    See se art. 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/1997 and art. 2(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/1997.

  165. 165.

    See se art. 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.

  166. 166.

    The communication in particular gives orientation to the application of the SGP by taking into account the cyclical fluctuation of the economy and giving margin of manoeuvre for the implementation of structural reforms and investments. European Commission Communication (2015). Cf. Pace (2018), pp. 109–110.

  167. 167.

    Costamagna (2015), pp. 132–138; Hinarejos (2016), p. 245.

  168. 168.

    In a new Communication adopted in 2018, the Commission gave a positive review of the use of flexibility in the last 3 years. See European Commission Communication (2018a).

  169. 169.

    ‘Figures illustrate how in Europe ‘speaking German’ is not necessarily ‘acting German’. Leino-Sandberg and Salminen (2017), pp. 102–103.

  170. 170.

    Regulation (EU) No 2017/2396 amending Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) 2015/1017 as regards the extension of the duration of the European Fund for Strategic Investments.

  171. 171.

    See Clayes and Leandro (2016), Rubio et al. (2016), p. 19.

  172. 172.

    Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1017/2015 explains that projects shall be considered additional (i) if they ‘could not have been carried out in the period during which the EU guarantee can be used, or not to the same extent, by the EIB, the EIF or under existing Union financial instruments without EFSI support’; (ii) they ‘shall typically have a higher risk profile than projects supported by EIB normal operations.

  173. 173.

    This result can be partially explained considering the competition with the European Structural and Investment Funds and the weaker capacity to develop bankable projects and organise private public partnership, as well as the excessively small size of the projects. Cf. Rinaldi and Nuñez Ferrer (2017), p. 11.

  174. 174.

    Rinaldi and Nuñez Ferrer (2017), p. 10.

  175. 175.

    Huguenot-Noël and Zuleeg (2016) and Fernandes (2017).

  176. 176.

    See Inderst (2013), pp. 6–7; Tovo (2016), p. 387.

  177. 177.

    European Commission Communication (2015), pp. 7–8.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., p. 8.

  179. 179.

    European Commission Analytical Grids (2015), pp. 1–2.

  180. 180.

    Tovo (2016), p. 399; Rinaldi and Nuñez Ferrer (2017), p. 21.

  181. 181.

    Cf. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018), p. 6.

  182. 182.

    Ibid. p. 4.

  183. 183.

    ‘In times of stability it is possible that different coverage leads to depositors choosing the highest deposit protection rather than the deposit product best suited to them. It is possible that such different coverage results in competitive distortions in the internal market’. See Whereas (19) Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes Text with EEA relevance, (2014) OJ L 173/149.

  184. 184.

    In the transitional phase, until the Fund reaches the target level of resources, the SRB shall use the SRF in accordance with principles founded on a decision of the SRF into national compartments corresponding to each participating Member State, as well as on a progressive merger of the different funds raised at national level to be allocated to national compartments of the Fund. Cf. art. 77 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.

  185. 185.

    In some exceptional circumstances, the Fund may still be able to absorb losses (up to 5% of the total liabilities). Busch (2017), p. 463.

  186. 186.

    See Moloney (2014), p. 1628.

  187. 187.

    Busch (2017), p. 474. Art. 74 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 only foresees that the SRB shall contract for the SRF financial arrangements, including, where possible, public financial arrangements, regarding the immediate availability of additional financial means.

  188. 188.

    On the impact of the economic governance on the European social dimension see Costamagna (2014).

  189. 189.

    Bovens (2007), p. 450. On the issue of European democracy and accountability see Harlow (2002), Papadopoulos (2007), Bredt (2011) and Von Bogdandy (2012).

  190. 190.

    See Curtin (2016), pp. 183, 186, 190.

  191. 191.

    See Von Bogdandy (2012), p. 321.

  192. 192.

    According to Habermas citizens and peoples are the two constituent subjects of the European Union. Habermas (2012), p. 343. Accordingly, the Union is based on a dual structure of democratic legitimation: the EU citizens and the national peoples. Von Bogdandy (2012), p. 322. The community method complies with this ‘dual legitimacy concept’ as the legal acts shall be adopted by both the European Parliament and the Council. See Calliess (2016), p. 40.

  193. 193.

    See Starita (2017), pp. 19–24.

  194. 194.

    Lenaerts and Desomer (2002), p. 1222.

  195. 195.

    Scharpf (2003).

  196. 196.

    Schwarz (2014), pp. 403–404.

  197. 197.

    Starita (2017), p. 16.

  198. 198.

    For this reason, the German Federal Constitutional Court considered the fiscal autonomy of the Bundestag as a necessary element to protect the constitutional identity of the country. See German Federal Constitutional Court , Judgement, 30 June 2009, [2 BvE 2/08], para. 252; German Constitutional Court, Judgement, 7 September 2011, [2 BvR 987/10], paras. 38, 121–124. On the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht see Rüffert (2011), pp. 847–849.

  199. 199.

    Cf. Ketterer (2016), pp. 263–264.

  200. 200.

    On the marginalisation of national parliaments see Chalmers (2012), pp. 685–687; Crum (2012), p. 622; Fasone (2014), Majone (2014), p. 1221; Martucci (2017), pp. 35–37. According to Jancic not all national parliaments have been ‘passive receivers’ of EU policies. On the contrary, some developed legal and political ways to mitigate the effects of such centralization. Furthermore, domestic parliament maintains some relevant soft powers: voting, scrutiny, information access and public debate. See Jančić (2016), pp. 242–245.

  201. 201.

    See Dawson and de Witte (2013), p. 834; Ioannidis (2014), p. 42.

  202. 202.

    In July 2015, the Greek government called a referendum to decide whether the country should have accepted the bailout conditions proposed by the Troika. Despite the majority rejected it, the governments decided after few days to sign a new MoU setting even harsher conditions for the bailout in order to avoid the exit from the monetary union.

  203. 203.

    On the possible exit from the monetary union cf. supra Sect. 2.4.7.3.

  204. 204.

    See Ioannidis (2016), p. 1277; Curtin (2016), p. 190.

  205. 205.

    Cf. Dawson and de Witte (2013), p. 834.

  206. 206.

    Majone (2014), p. 1221.

  207. 207.

    Daniele (2016), p. 270.

  208. 208.

    See Fasone (2014), p. 172.

  209. 209.

    See Starita (2017), pp. 23–24.

  210. 210.

    Art. 2ab(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/1997.

  211. 211.

    In the event the Commission and the Council refused to participate in the dialogue, the ECJ could be activated through a procedure for failure to act ex art. 265 TFEU. Fasone (2014), p. 176.

  212. 212.

    The President of the European Parliament shall be invited to the summits, while the President of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each meeting.

  213. 213.

    The inter-parliamentary cooperation should work in accordance with the existing legal framework under EU primary law. See Protocol No 1 of the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. The role for the conference of national parliamentary committees (known in practice as ‘COSAC’), however, is not specified. De facto neither the European Parliament, nor national parliaments play a substantial role in the Fiscal Compact .

  214. 214.

    The SRB is in fact an EU agency. In particular the resolution scheme drafted by the Board enters into force only if, within 24 h after its adoption, there are no objections from the Commission or the Council. Cf. Art. 18 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.

  215. 215.

    The procedures involve the Commission, which shall make a proposal, and requires the approval of the European Parliament.

  216. 216.

    Cf. Fasone (2014), p. 184.

  217. 217.

    See Ioannidis (2014), p. 42; Curtin (2016), p. 191.

  218. 218.

    De la Parra identified other limits of the economic dialogue. First, many MEPs do not make optimal use of this new tools: either they don’t ask questions, but just criticism or they leave short margin for reply or just use the time given to enhance their visibility. Second, the debate has been characterised over the last years by the dispersion of questions, a scarce knowledge of the topic, vagueness of the answer. Third, the Eurogroup President attends meetings with the Parliament when it is more convenient for him and shall refuse to answer certain questions regarding the MoUs. See De La Parra (2017), pp. 116–118.

  219. 219.

    The chair and vice chair of the competent committee can be informed only in confidential way. See De La Parra (2017), p. 110.

  220. 220.

    See Ioannidis (2014), p. 39.

  221. 221.

    Art. 34 TESM provides for duties of professional secrecy for the Members or former Members of the Board of Governors and of the Board of Directors and any other persons who work or have worked for or in connection with the ESM. Furthermore, the minutes of the Board of Governors meetings are confidential in accordance with art. 17(6) of the ESM By-Laws. On the limited transparency of the ESM see Tuori and Tuori (2014), pp. 218–219; Hinarejos (2015), pp. 95–96; De Nes (2015), Ban and Seabrooke (2017), Simone (2017), pp. 205–208.

  222. 222.

    See Hinarejos (2015), p. 95; Daniele (2016), pp. 262–266; Pace (2018), p. 145.

  223. 223.

    Cf. Habermas (2015), pp. 550–551.

  224. 224.

    This is also testified by the more and more frequent meetings of the European Council: between February 2010 and January 2016 it met 41 times, while the Euro council 14 times. See Allemand (2017), p. 83. On the role of the European Council cf. Puetter (2016), pp. 258–262.

  225. 225.

    This is the reason why the European Council has become part of the economic dialogue with the European Parliament. See Allemand (2017), p. 84

  226. 226.

    Cf. Puetter (2016), p. 259.

  227. 227.

    See Allemand (2017), pp. 86–87.

  228. 228.

    Cf. Starita (2017), pp. 13–14.

  229. 229.

    Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 217.

  230. 230.

    Cf. Menendez (2014), p. 133.

  231. 231.

    Other authors have a more positive interpretation of the role played by the European Commission in the governance. Cf. Bauer and Becker (2014). According to Daniele the strengthening of the intergovernmental method over the last few years has been balanced by the conferral of important advisory, preparatory and executive tasks to the Commission. See Daniele (2016), p. 271.

  232. 232.

    See Menendez (2014), p. 135.

  233. 233.

    Cf. Council Implementing Decision No 11554/16 on imposing a fine on Portugal for failure to take effective action to address an excessive deficit, OJ L 306/1; Council Implementing Decision No 11555/16 on imposing a fine on Spain for failure to take effective action to address an excessive deficit, OJ L 306/1.

  234. 234.

    Regardless the violation of its previous budgetary commitments, the European Commission decided to launch an EDP against Italy on the 19 December 2018. Dombrovskis (2018).

  235. 235.

    The surveillance model is based on a process of de-politicisation of fiscal and economic policy, which is considered a technical subject. In this perspective, national fiscal choices shall be taken within given objective parameters. Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 211. In reality, the Commission can’t be completely impartial in the management of the governance, as technical decisions are influenced by political considerations. Allemand (2017), pp. 92–93.

  236. 236.

    See Crum (2012), pp. 622–623.

  237. 237.

    See Calliess (2012), pp. 109–110; Tuori and Tuori (2014), p. 179; Menendez (2014), p. 133.

  238. 238.

    On the necessity to strengthen democratic accountability at European level cf. Ruffert (2011), pp. 1801–1802; Baratta (2013), pp. 59–60.

  239. 239.

    Cf. Viterbo and Costamagna (2013) and Cafari Panico (2017), pp. 311–315.

  240. 240.

    Cf. Allemand and Martucci (2012), p. 455.

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    Luca Lionello

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Lionello, L. (2020). Longstanding Sources of Instability: The Current Deficits of the Economic Union. In: The Pursuit of Stability of the Euro Area as a Whole. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28045-1_4

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