Abstract
Once a hazard analysis of a system has been undertaken and a list of safety properties that it must satisfy derived, can this be used to obtain properties which a software controller for the system must satisfy? In addition, what evidential value for the safety of a system are proofs of correctness of a formal specification of its software components? We will examine these issues in the context of a specification and development technique for the B formal specification language, which has been used to specify and design discrete event control systems for batch-processing plants. A simple example is used to illustrate the ideas. The results obtained from a larger case study are also presented.
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Lano, K., Kan, P., Sanchez, A. (1998). Linking Hazard Analysis to Formal Specification and Design in B. In: Ehrenberger, W. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability and Security. SAFECOMP 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1516. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49646-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49646-7_5
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