Preferences and Procedures

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Introduction

   Pages 1-18

3. Conceptualizing the European Union Legislative Process: Some Insight from the Federalist Papers

   Pages 19-29

4. Assessing the Current State of the Spatial Models Literature

   Pages 31-37

5. Spatial Models of Politcs: An Introduction and a Comparison Using Computer Simulation

   Pages 38-47

6. A Data Set and an Analysis of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in EU Legislative Negotiations

   Pages 48-57

7. Between Power and Luck: The European Parliament in the EU Legislative Process

   Pages 58-71

8. Evaluating the Predictive Power of a Spatial Model for the European Union Legislative Process

   Pages 72-80

9. Summary and Conclusions

   Pages 81-84

10. Back Matter

    Pages 85-99

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Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.

• Decision
• Economy
• European
• European Integration
• European Parliament
• European Union
• European Union (EU)
• Game
• Legislative
• Models
• Selck
• Spatial
• Theory
• Union
• parapluprop

• University of Groningen, The Netherlands

  Torsten J. Selck

Torsten J. Selck is working as Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

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